FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

# Daily Report

# East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-030
Tuesday
13 February 1996

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# Daily Report
East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-96-030* *13 February 1996*

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**Albania: Chirac Conveys Wish To Strengthen Ties**

*AU1202093696 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 9 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The President's Press and Information Office reports that President Berisha has received a letter from French President Jacques Chirac, who writes among other things: I would like to confirm my own will to strengthen the relations of friendship and cooperation with your country with the prospect of Albania's coming closer to the European Union.

**Albania: Berisha 'Attacks' Socialists at News Conference**

*AU1302093296 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 9 Feb 96 p 3*

[Report by Arian Cani: "Berisha Attacks the Socialists Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president has delivered a strong attack on the largest opposition party. "The Socialist Party [PS] is nothing but the eager heir to the Albanian Workers Party [PPSh]." Berisha trained his sights on the Socialists again at a news conference yesterday. "The flight of the intelligentsia, the refusal of admission to the Socialist International, the party's lack of concern for migrants to urban areas, and its continuation on the path of the PPSh" were the topics the president chose. However, positive words for those whom he called "The PS's reformers and intellectuals," including Tefik Ajazi, who left his party only a few days ago, provided Berisha with his best opportunity to justify his offensive. The PS's candidates for Tirana were President Berisha's first "quarry." Only a few hours after the announcement of their names, Berisha called them "successors to the candidates of the PPSh." According to the head of state, the only real social democrats are Ajazi and a few others within the PS whose names have still not been made public, and who, according to Berisha, will leave the party soon. Why have intellectuals turned their back on the PS? Berisha used the opportunity to once again summarize what he has said for many years. "Nothing ties the Albanian intelligentsia to those political forces threatening to leave Albania outside Europe, which are led by former secret police chiefs, which are calling for the cracking of skulls, repetitions of St. Bartholomew's Eve, and brawls and civil war." The head of state nevertheless did not mention by name any of the intellectuals that he claimed had left the PS. Berisha said that he respected left-wing intellectuals and explained that they had nothing to do with the extreme left. However, no journalists present were able to learn which left-wing intellectuals the president was talking about.

"The party indeed announced that it had applied to join the Socialist International." This was the other well-worn route Berisha followed in order to attack the PS. Controversy over this issue erupted a short time ago, when a representative of D'Alema's party in Italy arrived in Tirana for a working visit. Several newspapers commented at the time on "the Italian Socialist's reservations toward the Albanian PS's application to join the International." Senior PS leader Luan Hajdaraga had announced that his party had made no application to join this world organization, but the president nevertheless revived the argument yesterday. "The PS says that it has made no application to join the Socialist International. In fact, it later announced that it had applied and would be admitted. However, it seems to have changed its mind after the creation of the Communist International at Sofia. The PS must be trying to choose between the two," Berisha said at the news conference.

As for the new Electoral Law recently approved by a parliamentary majority, the president said that this is a democratic law, citing as examples the laws in force in France, Britain, and the United States.

**Albania: Godo Protests 'Bogus Television Montage'**

*AU1002174396 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 8 Feb 96 p 3*

[Report by El. El.: 'Bogus Montage on Television']

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—"My meeting with Berisha was a bogus television montage." Republican leader Sabri Godo was forthright in his criticism of the state television at lunchtime yesterday, also revealing the truth about the report broadcast a mere two days ago. The leader of the Republicans was driven to attack television because of the television presence of Tritan Shehu beside him at his talks with Berisha on the problem of the Electoral Law. "Such montages on the part of television are improper," Godo said yesterday. Invited to the presidential office, but only for a few minutes, the PR leader had been "subjected" to a tete-a-tete meeting with the Albanian president. It was portrayed on the television screen in an entirely different way: "Scenes from a past meeting of the parties with the president were broadcast. Mr. Shehu, who is in Italy, was not present at my meeting with Berisha, and nor was anybody else," Godo concluded.

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**Albania: Opposition Rejects Berisha's 'Red Front' Charge**

*AU1302085096 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 10 Feb 96 p 4*

[Report by A. Cani: "Opposition Responds Angrily: 'We Are Not Reds'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There has been a bitter row between the president and the opposition parties. Berisha called these parties a "Red front," prompting an immediate reaction from them. The essence of the accusations by the Socialist Party [PS], the Social Democratic Party [PSD], and the Democratic Alliance [AD] is that "the way in which he is directing the country is a serious danger to Albania." Only two days ago, the head of state called these parties a "Red bloc" and said, "This bloc constitutes a serious danger for democracy in Albania." The president's attack, repeated at his most recent news conference, has not been equably received by these parties' leaders, who have been quick to level very serious charges against the president himself. The row has arisen over the opposition parties' attitude to the Electoral Law. Most parties are against the law put forward by the Democratic Party [PD] and recently approved by the president. The echo of the confusion and bitter argument that erupted on the day this law was voted on is still resounding in political life. The opposition considered the voting invalid and condemned the attitude of parliamentary chairman Pjeter Arbnori. There have also been stern responses from the ruling party. The PD leaders called the opposition's objections "rowdy behavior"; and Berisha himself has called these parties activities dangerous, saying that Arbnori will erase everything said by the opposition leaders on that day. Yet it seems that Berisha's choice of the words "Red front" comes after the most recent meeting of the PS, PSD, AD, and the Human Rights Union at Gjinushi's headquarters. AD press spokesman Prec Zogaj called the news conference, summoned only a few hours after the approval of the Electoral Law, "a panel of parties." Zogaj used this expression several times, but was not forgotten by President Berisha, who implied only a few days later that he had translated this "panel" of the opposition into the words "Red front."

This is the response of party representatives who were accused by Berisha of forming a "Red front":

Namik Dokle, PS: "Berisha persists in saying such things and I am sure will continue until the election day. But, the day after the elections, someone will say that others must keep silent when the sovereign speaks, and Berisha will no doubt be quiet after the elections."

Neritan Ceka, AD: "I consider that moment when Berisha spoke about a Red front to be a danger to Albanian democracy. When he strikes attitudes against other parties, talks about things that do not exist, and calls other parties a Red front, I become convinced that only a Red president can do such things."

Gaqo Apostoli, PSD: "The place of the PSD is in the political center. This is a reality. If there is such a thing as communism, it is first of all President Berisha who has a comunist mentality. He is the current danger, which must be avoided or eliminated."

**Albania: Opposition Fears 'Rigging' of Elections**

*AU1302092896 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 9 Feb 96 p 3*

[Report by "El. El.": "Opposition Tells the Europeans: 'Elections in Danger'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—At a 25-minute meeting with Jose Maria Mendiluce Perreiro, deputy chairman of the European Parliament, three leaders of important Albanian political parties concentrated on the Genocide Law, the checking of official figures, and the newly approved Electoral Law. Social Democratic Party [PSD] Chairman Gjinushi attempted to be firm on these points, while Ali Spahija, on behalf of the Democratic Party [PD], demonstrated his party's determination. However, Dokle, Socialist Party [PS] deputy chairman, painted a different picture. Having outlined his concerns over these issues to the guests from Europe, he once again showed no hesitation in repeating his party's ritual incantation about the unjust imprisonment of party leader Fatos Nano. Skender Gjinushi told GAZETA SHQIPTARE yesterday, "As chairman of the PSD, I concentrated on domestic problems that are currently racking Albanian politics, of course not leaving to one side the great problem of Kosova." He later said, "The opposition's main concern is the possible rigging of the elections." The PSD leader was the most outspoken opponent of the Genocide Law, but did not fail to also describe the consequences of the majority principle now established by the PD for the forthcoming elections.

Like the PSD leader, PS Deputy Chairman Namik Dokle described his version of the state of Albanian politics. Dokle's remarks concentrated on the three newly approved laws concerning the elections and their effect on the opposition, and on the PS's concern over Serbian pressure on Kosova. A few hours after meeting the European parliamentarians, Dokle told journalists at party headquarters, "They were interested in the Nano case, which is well known in Europe."

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**Albania: Socialists Protest 'Inhuman Acts' of Police**

*AU1302091696 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 11 Feb 96 p 3*

[Report by Arian Cani: "Socialist Party Predicts Terror at Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialists predict terror at the forthcoming elections. "We appeal to world diplomacy in connection with the Democratic Party's [PD] aim to create disruption and tension on the threshold of the elections," ran the Socialist Party [PS] press statement distributed immediately after the most recent incident between the police and Albanian citizen Behar Toska. Only a few days after the approval of the Electoral Law, police forces escorted Toska to the Commissariat, where he was asked about slogans written on walls in the capital city a few days previously. Toska claims that the police asked him, "How much money did Gramoz Ruci and Ilir Meta give you to do this?" This led to a strong protest from the PS, and the largest opposition party called this a political act on the part of the ruling party. In its statement, the PS Presidium called this "an ugly political scenario initiated by the PD's staff," and rejected any accusations against its own leaders. The the PS's Press Office released a statement that "the policemen who committed these acts of violence and were turned into blind and willing instruments for this ugly scenario, and who have now been identified by the PS, must face their legal responsibilities." The Socialists call for "the identification of those who contrived and ordered this scenario to extract false testimony by force." The PS's charges are also aimed at the Public Order Ministry and the capital city's Police Precinct No. 2, over what the party calls "inhuman acts." "They beat me for a long time, broke my teeth with pliers, and released me after holding me for 48 hours," former policeman Behar Toska said.

The Socialists express their concern in a threefold appeal. "The PS Presidium appeals to its electorate not to be frightened, but to steer clear of the PD in its death throes," Yesterday's press statement runs. The appeal includes policemen: "The PS calls on all honest and professional police personnel not to become involved in such acts of violence and ugly scenarios." The PS's protest continues with some serious charges of corruption. "The police must not pay heed to certain chiefs who are blinded by a thirst for revenge and have accumulated illegal wealth during four years in power," their protest runs. The incident, which it seems will cause fresh political rows, has now reached diplomatic channels. The Socialists are seeking to convey to the embassies in Tirana a message about "the mistreatment of Behar Toska with leading questions" and their "assessment of this incident as creating tension on the threshold of the elections." "Let us sensitize all the governments of democratic counties through the foreign embassies in Tirana over the climate of terror and tension and the intentions of the ruling party as the elections approach," the PS declaration states.

**Albania: Tefik Ajazi Forms 'Reformed Socialist Party'**

*AU1002175396 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 8 Feb 96 p 2*

[Report by Enton Abilekaj: "Reformed Socialist Party Created"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Another Socialist party may be born very soon. The documents and statutes of another left-wing group, the Reformed Socialist Party [Partia Socialiste e Reformuar] have now been lodged at the Justice Ministry. The name has been decided, and the organizers have in fact started work, but approval is still expected from the Justice Ministry, whose officials replied "no comment" to our question about the approval of the new party. As predicted, the leader will be Tefik Ajazi, the self-styled reforming deputy who left the ranks of the Socialist Party [PS]. It was Ajazi himself, when he resigned from the PS parliamentary group a few days ago, who launched the idea of creating a new group. In his resignation speech and subsequent interviews, Ajazi said that he had no leeway to express his opinions in the PS and to do something "to reform the party." In a long interview for state television, the deputy for Berat stressed, alongside the lack of reform, "it was the failure to include the stratum of former political prisoners that had made it necessary for him to change his seat in parliament." The inclusion of the political prisoners, he said a few days ago, "would have considerably reduced tensions and would have made social peace possible."

However, the news of a new left-wing party seems to have aroused very little interest in the PS headquarters, whose leaders declined to comment on the news. Only a short time ago, before Ajazi had made his statement, which passed without any great sensation, the PS's second-in-command Servet Pellumbi had admitted at a news conference the possibility of another left-wing group. "This is possible," Pellumbi had said, without naming the specific names of those who might leave the party. The PS seems to have attached more attention to the motives impelling its former deputy to leave than the criticisms he has articulated. According to the Socialists, Ajazi made his final decision when he realized that he had not been selected as a deputy. PS headquarters

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rejected the former Socialist deputy's prediction that after his departure some others might follow him, and mentioned the care of the party presidium itself to not include those considered to be discontented on the short lists of future deputies.

**Albania: Daily Publishes IRI Poll Data on PR**

*96P20276A Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 16 Jan 96 p 3*

["Text" of statement by the Press Office of the Republican Party of Albania]

[FBIS Translated Text] *We have decided to publish a small part of the data from the poll organized by the American Republican Institute [International Republican Institute--IRI], which refer to some of the main messages of the Republican Party [PR], in order to be transparent in relations with the press.*

*The PR welcomes this valuable initiative of the IRI. However, we have reservations about these results for the simple fact that Albanians are still finding it difficult to express themselves openly.*

*In fact, the polls which we have organized and which we use for study purposes gave us higher marks for the PR's messages and policy than the IRI poll.*

*On the whole, we consider the IRI data to be a significant help to the Albanian political parties and we thank the IRI for this.*

Neritan Alibali

Head of the Press and Information Office

**Data From the IRI Poll**

Some messages of the PR and reasons for voting for the party.

Is the message credible or isn't it?

1. First Message

The PR supports th. return of land to the former owners....

The PR thinks that this policy is the only way to stabilize the economic situation and to encourage foreign investments.

Believe this—32 percent

Do not believe this—53 percent

Uncertain—14 percent

2. Second Message

The PR believes that Albania can be strong only if it is based on strong family values.

The PR is against abortion, homosexuality, incompetence and corruption.

Believe this—33 percent

Do not believe this—51 percent

Uncertain—16 percent

3. Third Mes .ge

The PR wants the security of the family and the laws protecting citizens to be priorities of the government.

If the PR is in power, it will carry on a fierce fight against drugs, theft, prostitution and other crimes.

Believe this—30 percent

Do not believe this—51 percent

Uncertain—19 percent

4. Fourth Message

The PR supports the death penalty for serious crimes such as the kidnapping of children.

If the PR wins, it will restore the death penalty.

Believe this—37 percent

Do not believe this—47 percent

Uncertain—16 percent

The Press Office of the Albanian PR

**Albania: Poll Indicates Public 'Leaning to the Right'**

*AU1302092096 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 10 Feb 96 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Politics: Albanians Look to the Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The Albanians prefer to keep to the right on the political road. This is their choice according to the recent results of the Gallup Eurobarometer poll. The answers provided by Albanians at the end of last year seem to leave no room for doubt and show a significant leaning to the right. Figures show that 58 percent favor political parties that are part of the right and only 22 percent tend [to go] toward the left. The Eurobarometer poll conducted in December grouped four parties under the heading of the right wing: The Democratic Party [PD], the Rightist League, the Human Rights Union, and the Christian Democrats. It included Gjinushi's Social Democrats and the Democratic Alliance under the heading of the left, besides the Socialist Party, the left's main representative. The Eurobarometer data then

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divided the Albanian electorate according to parties, and it seems that Godo's party [Republican Party] has climbed significantly since last year. In contrast to Eurobarometer's results last year, it seems that the left fell behind to some extent in 1995. At the end of 1994, the left emerged stronger, profiting from the blow the PD had just suffered in the referendum defeat of 6 November, when the Albanians voted to reject the draft constitution. The responses relating to recent economic development are also positive this time, although there are also reservations and grievances expressed in the language of statistics.

**Albania: PD, PS Top Voters' Preference List**

*AU1202102196 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 11 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Some newspapers today have published the main results of the European Eurobarometer poll completed at the end of 1995 on the future elections of the People's Assembly in our country. On this occasion, we remind viewers that the Eurobarometer is a well-known observer in Europe. The Eurobarometer conducted another poll in Albania some years ago, about which the Albanian television organized a round-table with various political forces and which was broadcast live on television.

The Eurobarometer devoted the newly published poll to future elections in Albania. The drafters have addressed those interviewed with a direct, clearly formulated question—Which party will you vote for, or which party will you be inclined to give your vote for?

The answers by those who participated in the survey give the following order and percentages:

**Which Party Would You Vote For If Elections Were Held Tomorrow?**

| Party | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Democratic Party [PD] | 45 |
| Socialist Party [PS] | 22 |
| Republican Party [PR] | 6 |
| Democratic Alliance | 4 |
| Social Democratic Party | 3 |
| National Front Party | 3 |
| Legality Party | 2 |
| Human Rights Party | 2 |
| Democratic Party of the Right | 2 |
| Christian Democratic Party | 1 |
| Agrarian Party | 0 |
| Ecological Party | 0 |
| Right Wing Republican Party | 0 |
| National Unity Party | 0 |

Meanwhile, you are watching the results on the screen.

According to the Eurobarometer survey, there are two parties that have the highest percentage—the PD with 45 percent of the votes and the PS with 22 percent. The PR stands third in the list with 6 percent. This is the information contained in the main figures published today in GAZETA SHQIPTARE.

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**Slovakia: DS Vice Chairman on Government's Policies**

*96CH0036A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 18 Jan 96 pp 3-4*

[Interview with Frantisek Sebej, vice chairman of the Democratic Party, DS, by Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "Slovakia's Reputation Can Be Restored Only by a Different Political Elite"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hrabko] How do you perceive or, rather, evaluate Slovak foreign policy during the past year?

[Sebej] As far as the overall foreign policy actions taken during 1995, the Slovak Government has managed to achieve success in that the implied doubts, misstatements, and "whisperings" in the lobbies have been transformed into open condemnation. There is not a single important world medium, there are no important world political circles in which Slovakia was not negatively judged insofar as development of internal democracy is concerned, but also regarding economic development. Slovakia is no longer openly "forgotten," but is transparently not listed in the first rank when it comes to integration of various countries into West European structures. And no one is making a secret of it. This was successfully accomplished in a single year. At the end of 1994, Slovakia was still a country, which should not have been a reason for not being mentioned within the framework of the V-4 countries—today, it simply no longer belongs to that category. This is a consequence of the policies pursued by the governing parties and must be evaluated as such. The year 1995 was a year of massive losses in terms of Slovakia's foreign policy positions, of massive deterioration of the image of Slovakia, and of massive increases of alarm in Western political circles over developments in Slovakia.

[Hrabko] This evaluation of yours is probably based on the fact that you are including internal political developments in foreign policy activities....

[Sebej] Foreign policy is actually everything. It is not possible to draw a dividing line between foreign and domestic policy. For purposes of foreign policy, it is far more important to note what is happening in the Slovak parliament than to note what, say, State Secretary Sestak is doing and how he is traveling about the world. For this reason, for me, foreign policy involves every overt action taken by Slovak political circles. Foreign policy is also every law adopted in the parliament, everything that is said in public, everything that is written in the media. Foreign policy is not conducted only by Minister Schenk and Prime Minister Meciar when they visit Brussels. Foreign policy is conducted, for example, also by Delegate Hofbauer or Delegate Smolec when they write inciteful, hateful, anti-American, and anti-Western articles in the press. This is perceived as a part of the foreign policy activities of the state because these are public figures and are part of the government political environment. The foreign policy of the state even involves the fact that the government makes the decision, from its point of view, to reward those media that cannot be part of the decent spectrum of the print media with important prizes. If it awards honors to journalists and newspapers that espouse the subbasement of the political spectrum, an area that undoubtedly includes profascist views, all of this is foreign policy. Foreign policy also involves the deprecatory and tavern-type blabbering by delegates of the SNS [Slovak National Party] in parliament—although this is part and parcel of the folklore, yet the other side perceives it as an organic component of the way in which this state is being administered, because the political administration of a state is not an abstract feature. It is the conduct of its political elite. And it is the conduct of its political elite that, in the final consequences, shapes that which is commonly called the foreign policy effectiveness of Slovakia. In my opinion, these matters cannot be covered over with any kind of lobbying among politicians and Slovak emigres abroad, or with any amount of positive writing about Slovakia in the media. These are simply realities that cannot be concealed from the world. The world of today is open: A tremendous quantity of information is flowing through it. The majority of important media are accessible the world over; for example, over the Internet. Slovakia is full of people, be they accredited journalists or those working in diplomatic representative offices, who are highly qualified to provide information on Slovakia without needing to consult anybody in the coalition or in the opposition. Without having to draw on the opinions of anyone else, they shape their judgment on their own on the basis of the specific conduct of the government, the legislature, and on the basis of observing the media.

[Hrabko] However, the current government team considers, for example, the signing of the basic agreement with the Hungarian Republic [MR] and the filing of an application for membership in the EU [European Union] to be successes with respect to its foreign policy.

[Sebej] I do not like to contemplate politics in general and foreign policy is no exception. In other words, there are no victories or defeats, but rather successes and failures. The signing of the treaty with the Hungarian Republic is a bit of mandatory conduct on the part of a meaningful foreign policy. I consider it to be good that it was the formulation of the text put together by our negotiators that the prime minister signed. But it

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only becomes success once it is ratified by the Slovak parliament and brought into life. For the time being, the treaty has only been signed and cannot be ranked as a success. As far as submission of the application for membership in the EU is concerned, there is no way one can speak of a success here because this was simply the realization of the intent that had been declared by the government a countless number of times. Our admission to the EU will be a success because it will be based on the fact that, apart from submitting an application, we have been successful in achieving one thing or another in domestic policy, in our legal system, in our economic environment. When they accept us, that will be a success. The submission of an application is an administrative act—not any kind of success.

[Hrabko] Is the failure to ratify the basic agreement with the Hungarian Republic on the "first try" in parliament thus, on the contrary, a failure?

[Sebej] The failure to ratify is not a lack of success, but a failure. And it is not so much a failure of foreign policy as it is a failure of the Slovak Republic. I would call it the failure of the policies of the governing parties in Slovakia, which from the foreign policy standpoint can almost be evaluated as damaging to Slovak foreign policy, because the foreign policy direction is calling into question the steps of the government. It makes Slovakia appear to be a country that is capable of accomplishing theatrical gestures—of signing something before the eyes of Europe—but is not capable of bringing this item to life through ratification.

Among the important nonsuccesses of Slovak foreign policy is the fact that it did not participate in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. I consider this to be a serious error—if Slovakia intends to ultimately become a part of NATO, then it is obliged to participate in its activities, come what may. This is something that we could afford to pay for out of the state budget, almost as important as, let us say, raising the budgetary chapters for some organs of state administration.

[Hrabko] And what of the demarches, which the government collected as a result of its activities last year?

[Sebej] Demarches are dramatic gestures that reveal the deterioration of the international political standing of Slovakia. The contention that they are the results of the activities of the opposition or of the president is absolutely nonsensical. Demarches by the EU and the United States are simply emphatic reminders of the fact that these countries are monitoring the political developments in Slovakia, and that if Slovakia has articulated its ambition to become part of the EU and, on the other hand, also part of NATO, they express disapproval of and disturbance over the developments in the Slovak Republic. I consider it to be an absolute insult and nonsense to claim that these events have come about on the basis of some kind of shortage of information. These are the political circles in the world that have the highest qualifications and the greatest resources for obtaining information, they have the best-paid analytical teams. Information on the basis of which they make decisions is exhaustive information, verified information, adequate information, and reliable information.

I believe that it is possible to categorize these demarches as visible nonsuccesses for Slovakia, but not, however, of its foreign policy. They are nonsuccesses of its domestic policy with foreign consequences. Slovak foreign policy, as perceived by this government, is that which is being done by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, that which is being done by our embassies, and that which is being done by our government representatives when they travel somewhere. I repeat: Demarches are the foreign policy consequences of our domestic political situation.

[Hrabko] Is it possible, as noted by D. Slobodnik, chairman of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, to forget demarches for this year? In the sense that they are part of the past, perhaps it is necessary to draw a fat line under them and to begin with a clean slate.

[Sebej] There is no such thing as a clean slate or a fat line drawn under the past. These are illusions. No fat line that would bury the past and pretend that it does not exist leads to a normal solution. This is a damaging policy and akin to putting one's head in the sand.

Just as there is no Mr. Slobodnik who has no past. Mr. Slobodnik does have a past and his entire past is part of the foreign policy picture of Slovakia. These demarches did occur and the Slovak policy cannot claim that it is starting the year with a clean slate. We are beginning the new year by having been warned. It is as though a soccer player believed that in the second half the yellow card he drew in the first half is invalid. But it is valid and the next one will be a red one.

[Hrabko] What do you say with respect to the widespread opinion that the natural orientation of the present Slovak representatives is in a direction toward the East and not the West, even though outwardly they declare that the opposite is true?

[Sebej] It is with the utmost disturbance that I note the form in which Slovak foreign policy contacts are developing, but mostly the contacts of individual components of state power with respect to Russia. Specifically, a country that is striving for membership

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in such groupings as the EU and NATO must know that it will be judged in a comprehensive manner and that possible membership will be judged also on the basis of the status, image, substance, and activities of such components of the state service as the SIS [State Information Service], the Army, the security components, and all components of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic. These components are not developing by methods that would be acceptable for the EU or for NATO. This disqualifies Slovakia as a potential member of these groupings.

It does not seem to me that, in the area of foreign policy, Slovakia will be able to achieve anything under the present government that could be designated as a success. I also feel that statistical data having to do with the economic situation, which presents the only improving image of Slovakia abroad, need to be judged with caution. It would be a great mistake to believe that statistical data in and of themselves are enough to repair the reputation of Slovakia.

[Hrabko] The frequency of visits by Slovak representatives and the concluding of various agreements is greater in the direction of the east than the west. To what extent is the contention justified that it is precisely the reticence of the West that is forcing Slovakia to turn to the East?

[Sebej] This interpretation is unacceptable because the reticence of the Western powers is caused by the conduct of the Meciar government and this government then claims that if they are reticent, then we have no choice but to turn to the East. All of this is upside down and will not stand because this is simply an upside-down causality. It is the conduct of the Slovak Government that brings about the reticence of the West and not the other way around.

However, it can be stated unequivocally that the Eastern postcommunist and communist environments are a familiar partner for the types of politicians who are in power today in Slovakia—a partner who places no such demands on the political conduct within Slovakia, a partner who imposes no conditions, and a partner who conducts himself in a utilitarian manner. Russia is attempting to renew its position in Central Europe and it would seem that, thanks to V. Meciar, Slovakia is an area where this can be accomplished in an easier manner.

Another thing is what this means for the citizens of Slovakia. Of course, V. Meciar had an easier time concluding economic and other agreements with Russia because Russia is interested in renewing its positions, but, for the citizens of Slovakia, this is bad news. They find themselves in an area that can signify a renewed threat to their freedom and security. For Slovakia, there is no alternative that would mean prosperity coming from the West or from the East, or security from the West or from the East. I am deeply convinced that, given the political development that is ongoing in Russia, Slovakia cannot look for its freedom, security, and hope of prosperity anywhere else other than in West Europe and in Western structures. It is impossible to expect anything like that from the East—developments there will yet go through many a crisis. And if we speak of security, it is always necessary to ask the question—Security from what? From what kind of threat? I cannot imagine what kind of threat we should seek security against coming from the West. At the given moment, I do not perceive any such threat with respect to a democratic West Europe that would compel me to seek military guarantees in Russia. In the opposite direction, I do perceive a potential threat. I perceive the area of the former Soviet Union still as being undefined, but, in essence, showing up as quite aggressive. Moreover, the kind of notions that the Russians have with respect to the use of all possible means is clearly visible in Chechnya. And I would look for security against this threat for Slovakia, and the only place where it is possible to seek such security is NATO.

[Hrabko] And what about neutrality, as mentioned by two parties in the government coalition?

[Sebej] Talk of possible neutrality is unqualified talk and the talk of people who have no inkling as to how international guarantees function, how developments in individual European neutral countries function.

[Hrabko] What do you think of the frequently presented so-called geostrategically important position of Slovakia?

[Sebej] Geostrategic—this is an awful word that anyone can, moreover, imbue with content he happens to find suitable. Slovakia occupies a position like it does. I do not believe that its position is in any respect more important than that of Poland, Hungary, or Ukraine—in other words, of our direct neighbors. Ukraine is an independent state today; it does not have, for the time being, any kind of dominant will to give up its independence—quite to the contrary. I have repeatedly encountered people who have begun speaking of a geopolitical situation as well as the strategic position, and so forth, who, when they were asked to define these concepts, stopped talking about them. Why should it precisely be Slovakia that has a better strategic position than, for example, Poland, through which it is possible to run communications routes and various pipelines in a much simpler manner than is the case for Slovakia? It is true that a look at the map showing the central

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position of Slovakia tends to stimulate this impression, but I would not overestimate it.

[Hrabko] So that this will be possible even without Slovakia?

[Sebej] The position of Slovakia could be a source of uneasiness, for example, for Hungary. Hungary's ambition to become a member of NATO can be realized more easily if Slovakia is an area to facilitate this. Slovakia could become an island. It is not true that all possible types of European integration cannot be accomplished without Slovakia. This is simply a case of false consolation on the part of V. Meciar and the politicians around him regarding the claim that Slovakia has such a geostrategic position that would assure us of achieving some things automatically. Nothing is automatic and, given present-day developments, it is possible that Slovakia will be left out of these integrating efforts. The surrounding states, which are integrating, say, with the EU—if Slovakia will not be integrating—will have to solve such problems as what to do with Slovakia's borders, which will have to be, in such a case, impassable, or they will be borders based on a deceptive agreement. In sum, the geostrategic position of Slovakia is a tempting concept, which is understandable when looking at the map, but it would be a mistake to overestimate it and to rely on it.

[Hrabko] To what do you attribute the advent of leftist parties in the postcommunist countries?

[Sebej] The victory of the left in these countries is a direct consequence of the economic situation in these countries and of the political awareness of their citizens. The citizens of the postcommunist countries are far more susceptible to leftist populism than anyone else because of their situation, because of the generally spreading transformation uncertainty. I perceive the victory in Poland and Hungary as being very alarming, but I would not confuse it, say, with the situation in Russia. The elections to the Duma in Russia were not won by political parties that could be compared to the Horn socialists or to the Kvasniewski communists, who are, after all, only closer to the leftist Western socialists, even if these parties are far more leftist-oriented than many people imagined. They have little in common with the bolsheviks from the Zjuganov party, or with the Zirinovsky nationalists. The Russian environment is different and such analogies are inappropriate. The results of the Russian elections are based on totally different factors than the results of the Hungarian, Polish, or even the Slovak elections.

[Hrabko] This year, an intergovernmental conference of EU countries will be held that will clearly deal also with the possibility of membership by new countries. According to J. Moravcik, chairman of the DU [Democratic Union], this conference is so important for Slovakia that it even requires early elections. What is your opinion?

[Sebej] First of all, I do not think that such conferences are the only environment in which long-term definitive decisions are made. I do not believe that this conference will mean that Slovakia will not get another chance until five years hence. Another chance will come about as a result of the interplay of Slovak domestic developments with developments in the other countries of Europe. There is nothing simpler than to convene a conference and it is not even all that expensive. Political decisions are made much more flexibly and deadlines are much more movable than would appear at first glance. The EU Conference is something that is convened by law every five years and, in between, it cannot make any decision. On the other hand, important decisions are made at the moment the time is ripe for them.

The idea that because of this Slovakia should have early elections lacks any kind of logic, lacks any consideration that would primarily be based on a recognition of the Slovak situation. All public opinion polls speak of the fact that if the elections were held now then there would be no dramatic shift. Perhaps something would be changed with respect to the small quantification of delegate mandates, but there is also the risk that nothing would change at all. To hold early elections under these circumstances makes no sense at all. Moreover, in my deep conviction, Slovakia needs time to acquire experiences with the consequences of its own voter decisions. These elections would truly be premature. They can only be proclaimed on the basis of the constitutional law, which requires 90 votes, and, at the moment, it is not possible to acquire even a fraction of these votes. The debate on premature elections makes no sense at the present moment.

[Hrabko] How can the damaged reputation of Slovakia be rectified? What must happen for it to at least return to the point from which it started out several years ago?

[Sebej] Paradoxically, in view of what I said a while ago on the topic of premature elections, I believe that only another political elite than the one that did the damage can rectify the besmirched reputation of Slovakia. This is a relatively skeptical statement, but, in the end, I do not believe that the political elite that is governing at present is capable of making such a dramatic change in its political style and conduct as would remedy the reputation that Slovakia has made for itself. It can be repaired only by the different political team.

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[Hrabko] Could this not be "done" by exchanging the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] for the SNS in the government coalition?

[Sebej] I am not certain that the SDL would join the coalition. Theoretically, even if it were to join, it would obviously only do so accompanied by a change in the composition of its leadership and a change in its political image. The question is whether that team of people that would show up in this new constellation or in the new alliance would be capable of repairing Slovakia's foreign policy reputation. I believe that this would not occur. They would almost disappear in the grayness of official groupings within the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] and would, in essence, create a situation in which it would be difficult to differentiate between these two parties. I believe that such speculations regarding the possible alternatives, as to what would happen if it happened, and so forth—this is actually a waste of time.

The logic through which the conduct of the present government team is developing can no longer be changed by some kind of new political grouping. Almost anyone who is added to this grouping will be dragged along in this direction and will not be capable of changing this focus. Such a decision could possibly mean some privatization advantages for some officials of the SDL, but in its final consequences it would signify a loss of political standing of this representation. As far as content is concerned, this would represent a definitive alliance between the SDL and that which is currently represented by the HZDS and by the ZRS [Association of Slovak Workers].

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**Hungary: Restructuring of Armed Forces Leadership**

*96CH0023B Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian 8 Dec 95 pp 6-7*

[Article by F.G.: "Nation and Army—Rejuvenation in the Military Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The resolutions of the president and the defense minister as well as the order of the commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces [MH], regarding the personal changes resulting from retirements, recognitions, appointments, and transfers, were announced at a staff meeting. The following officials were present at this event, which was important in the process of restructuring the armed forces: Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, MH commander General Janos Deak, Political State Secretary Istvan Fodor, Administrative State Secretary Jozsef Feher, and Sandor Szili, chairman of parliament's Defense Committee.

The president retired the following persons by maintaining their present appointment: Major Gen. Dr. Jozsef Feher, Lieutenant Gen. Dr. Karoly Janza, engineer, and Maj. Gen. Csaba Liszkay. Reaching the upper age limit for professional service, Maj. Gen. Janos Kovacs was relieved of his leading position in the Ministry of Defense of the Hungarian Republic, of the Permanent Military Representation of the MH, of the leading representative post in the Vienna of the EBESZ's [expansion unknown] Forum of Security and Cooperation, and was retired as of 1 June 1996 in recognition of his accomplishments. Moreover, the president retired Maj. Gen. Dr. Jozsef Farkas, physician, chief surgeon of the MH Central Hospital, the MH Group of Chief Physicians and chief surgeon of the MH, decorating him with the Small Cross Order of the Hungarian Republic in recognition of his accomplishments; Brigadier Gen. Bela Telegdi, chief of staff of the Land Forces Command (first deputy commander), decorating him with the Small Cross Order of the Hungarian Republic; Maj. Gen. Tibor Szegedi, engineer, chief of the Air Force and Air Defense Section (MHPK [expansion unknown] air force and air defense deputy commander), receiving a silver figurine (representing historic attire) as a gift from the defense minister; Maj. Gen. Janos Gillicz, chief of the MH Humane Section (MH deputy commander), decorating him with the Middle Cross Order of the Hungarian Republic; Maj. Gen. Miklos Csurgay, chief of air defense of the MH, receiving a dress sword from the defense minister; Maj. Gen. Ferenc Kantor, chief of HVK [expansion unknown] International Relations (deputy HVKF [expansion unknown]), and Brig. Gen. Imre Kovacs, chief of staff of the Budapest Military District Command (first deputy commander), both receiving a silver figurine (representing historic attire) as a gift from the defense minister.

The defense minister appointed Lt. Gen. Bela Biro deputy commander of the MH; Maj. Gen. Ferenc Vegh first deputy of the MH chief of staff, releasing them from their present positions. In recognition of his accomplishments, Maj. Gen. Lajos Urban was released from his present position in order to assume other important duties, and was transferred to a group of the MH Command, to be prepared for other duties and, at the same time, was permanently appointed to oversee the HVK Temporary Task Force.

Moreover, he appointed, as of 1 December, Maj. Gen. Jozsef Hollo to the MH Humane Section (deputy MHPK); Brig. Gen. Istvan Bako as chief of the MH Air Force and Air Defense Section (MHPK air force and air defense deputy commander); Maj. Gen. Jozsef Bali as first deputy chief of the MH Air Force and Air Defense Section; Colonel Laszlo Braun as chief of the Rockets and Artillery Section of the MH Air Defense; and Col. Ferenc Kalmar as chief of HVK Section of International Relations between 1 December 1995 and 31 August 1996.

The defense minister appointed, as of 15 December 1995, Maj. Gen. Ambrus Preininger as commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps: Col. Tivadar Borszeki as first deputy commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps; Col. Ferenc Gyorossy as chief of staff of the 4th Mechanized Corps (deputy commander and chief of staff—first deputy commander—of the Land Forces Command between 1 December and 15 December 1995); and Maj. Gen. Imre Raba, engineer, as ordinance chief of the 4th Mechanized Corps (the commander's ordinance deputy) as of 15 December 1995.

He appointed Col. Gyorgy Polyak as deputy chief of staff of the 4th Mechanized Corps; Col. Ferenc Szlavik as chief of operations of the 4th Mechanized Corps; and Brig. Gen. Ferenc Kalman as chief of artillery of the 4th Mechanized Corps.

The defense minister appointed Brig. Gen. Ferenc Bator as commander of the 3rd Mechanized Division; Brig. Gen. Andras Havril as first deputy commander of the 3rd Mechanized Division; and Col. Bela Szebenyi as chief of staff of the 3rd Mechanized Division (deputy commander). He appointed Col. Laszlo Paloczi, engineer, as ordinance chief of the 3rd Mechanized Division (the commander's ordinance deputy).

He appointed Col. Tibor Nagy as commander of the 25th Independent Mechanized Brigade; Col. Laszlo Toth as deputy chief of the Mechanized Rifle and Tank Corps of the Section Command of the MH Land Forces; Brig.

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Gen. Attila Kositzky as commander of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps (and commander of the Air Defense Command until 15 December 1995); Maj. Gen. Miklos Kenyeres as first deputy commander of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps; Col. Istvan Nemeth as chief of staff of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps (deputy commander); and Col. Ferenc Sulics as ordinance chief of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps (the commander's ordinance deputy). He appointed Col. Imre Samu as deputy chief of staff of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps; Col. Gyula Harnocz as chief of operations of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps; Brig. Gen. Jozsef Varga as chief of Air Defense Rockets of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps; Col. Istvan Kurucz chief of radio communications of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps; and Col. Laszlo Balogh as chief of the Air Wing of the 2nd Air Force and Air Defense Corps.

Gyorgy Keleti appointed Brig. Gen. Istvan Kelemen as commander of the Central Organizations Command; Col. Dr. Endre Sztanek as first deputy commander of the Central Organizations Command; and Col. Istvan Mate as chief of staff of the Central Organizations Command (deputy commander). He appointed Colonel Bela Nagy, engineer, as ordinance chief of the Central Organizations Command (the commander's ordinance deputy). He appointed Col. Imre Helgert as garrison commander of the Central Organizations Command's Budapest Garrison Command (deputy commander, Central Organizations Command).

Following the briefing on directives and orders, Gyorgy Keleti and Janos Deak addressed the participants of the staff meeting.

Both expressed their thanks and good wishes to the retiring generals and officers, and congratulated the new appointees.

The defense minister said, among other things, that these personal changes signify the effort in rejuvenating the MH and that most of the new appointees are graduates of western military institutions. This trend will advance Hungary's efforts to become a NATO member and is, at the same time, a message to professional soldiers that there are possibilities for career advancement and that the younger generations can look forward to a brighter future. Moreover, he relayed to every commander the president's appeal that they should participate in the important peacekeeping operations in Bosnia to the best of their ability and should encourage their staff to do the same.

**Hungary: Industry Competition, EU Regulations Weighed**

*96CH0022B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 23 Nov 95 pp 22-23*

[Article by Robert Becsky: "In Whose Favor Is the Playing Field Skewed?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Hungarian industry's competitiveness depends essentially on entrepreneurs, rather than on government concepts. However, integration also involves tasks that can be solved only at the cabinet level. When awarding subsidies, care is advisable also to ensure that state intervention conforms to European Union rules.*

Hungary's parliamentary parties do not seem interested in the future. Anyway, that is the conclusion one was able to draw from a recent debate on a report by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, entitled "Future Prospects." Besides the competent state secretary and an expert of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], only the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] was represented in the debate. Yet it is not at all the same how, within how much time, and in the wake of what kind of transformation, will Hungarian industry—it accounts for the competitive sector's decisive part—be able to meet the requirements of the European Union's single internal market. Not to mention the fact that decisions on ailing industries—most recently the decision on the Borsod region, for instance—also raise the question of conformity with the European Union.

Of course, Hungarian industry's competitiveness depends essentially on entrepreneurs, rather than on government concepts. However, integration inevitably involves also tasks that can be solved only at the cabinet level. Obviously, it is no accident that the strategy on industrial policy has been outlined in three sections, the first of which includes specifically the tasks that integration with the European Union requires.

Analyses of the association agreement's effects to date—admittedly, they are few and far between—certainly indicate that, under free trade, several Hungarian industries will be in jeopardy, due to their inadequate competitiveness. As the pressure of competition mounts, demands for protecting the industries concerned will increase. But even according to the Europe Agreement [association agreement], this can happen only under strictly regulated conditions which, unfortunately, can be interpreted in several ways. The best example of this is the case of so-called infant industries. By claiming that such a case exists, even on the basis of the association agreement it would be possible to provide temporary protection for certain industrial activities. The

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only trouble is that there is as yet no precedent for such protection.

In May of this year, the Hungarian Government approved an action plan that specified the tasks in connection with adopting the European Union's rules governing its single internal market, but with the understanding that Hungary's timetable to prepare for admission would be amended before the end of the year, after completion of the White Paper [on Relations With Central and East Europe] containing the community's recommendations. (This material is being circulated at present among the ministries, for their comments.)

From the internal logic of integration it follows that the government will concentrate primarily on adopting the guidelines and other regulations that directly promote the free flow of industrial goods and farm products, as well as of the traditional services associated with the physical movement of merchandise. Incidentally, many of the regulations governing the European Union's internal market also fall within this scope. On the one hand, the pertinent regulations set engineering-technical standards. In the competitive sphere, on the other hand, the main instrument of regulation is the harmonization of competition law with the European Union's rules. The White Paper's third chapter dwells on four areas of competition rules governing the behavior of enterprises (companies) and of the state:

—Whenever state barriers to trade are dismantled, the danger exists that competition might be excluded by fragmenting the market, through restrictive trade agreements. The advantages stemming from such restrictions in this case benefit the private parties to the agreements, rather than the state—in the form of revenue from customs duties, for instance. Hence the importance of regulations to prevent such abuses by companies.

—The internal market presents a challenge for the firms, and occasionally they are better able to meet this challenge by forming strategic alliances or through mergers. Although such a strategy is lawful, the White Paper states, care should be taken lest it lead to monopoly situations.

—The dismantling of barriers to trade might tempt the state to protect domestic producers from competition, by granting increasing subsidies to industry. There are forms of subsidy that serve general objectives—research, environmental-protection and regional-development projects that a company alone could not afford—and the benefits of which are conferred on a wider circle. But all other forms of subsidy are unacceptable.

—Finally, the European Union's document dwells on public utility companies that are state monopolies. They, too, violate free trade. They offer certain players in the market a sort of rent, on the assumption that it will be used to develop services or will be remitted to the state.

The White Paper's Chapter 3 on competition, unlike its 22 other chapters, recommends not a single directive for adoption; even as a secondary source of law, it mentions merely the community's Merger Law enacted in 1989. The reason behind this is that the Europe Agreement prescribes harmonization in this field. In the case of, respectively, restrictive trade practices by companies, state subsidies, and state monopolies of a commercial nature, Hungary has a contractual obligation to guarantee enforcement of the pertinent articles in the Treaty of Rome, and of other, so-called secondary, sources of law based on them.

Comparing the White Paper's recommendations for individual industries with the results to date in the harmonization of Hungary's laws, experts believe that Hungarian antitrust law is already in harmony with the European Union's regulations. This was ensured with the enactment of Law No. LXXXVI of 1990 on Unfair Market Practices. Complete conformity could be achieved by amending the Competition Law, which is scheduled for next year. In the course of this it would be possible to transplant into the Hungarian statutory regulations the European Union's threshold values applicable to vertical combinations and the control of mergers.

The matter of subsidies appears to be a more difficult problem. At first glance, Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome seems unambiguous regarding state subsidies: "...any aid granted by a member state or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between member states, be incompatible with the common market." Although the Treaty of Rome does not define state subsidy, its elements can be determined fairly accurately on the basis of European Union practice. Thus, decisions regarding subsidies are made by a state body (either local or central), or by a private or public institution commissioned by the state; the subsidy is an expenditure for the state budget and enriches a certain enterprise; it creates for a business conditions more favorable than what the market offers, and the enjoyment of these conditions is shared by certain sectors, regions or enterprises.

In the interest of effective community control, member states are obliged to notify the European Union's

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Commission of actions that might induce state subsidies. After notification, the Commission decides whether to grant an exemption from the ban. Such exemptions are possible in the case of subsidies for the solution of regional problems, for projects that serve the community's interests, and for certain economic activities. Research and development, regional, environmental protection, rescue and restructuring, and sectoral (coal and steel, agriculture, fisheries) subsidies and state loan guarantees, as well as acquisitions of equity interest by the state might qualify as grounds for exemptions. The wide range of possible exemptions is evident already from this listing. According to experts familiar with the community's operating mechanism, the member states' constant complaints about subsidies to competitors "skewing the playing field"—i.e., creating unequal conditions for competition—are no accident. Thanks to this, and to the rather loose wording of Article 92, the member states' reported that subsidies to manufacturing alone can be estimated at several hundred million ECU's a year. (There are no estimates of the value of banned subsidies.)

Regarding subsidies, Hungary's association agreement states: "...any state aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is incompatible with the proper operation of this Agreement. Practices to the contrary must be judged on the basis of criteria derived from the Treaty of Rome..."

The White Paper reiterates the aforementioned ban and adds the following requirement: Each associated state must designate an authority, and devise rules of procedure, for monitoring and controlling all state subsidies.

At the beginning of 1995, the European Union proposed for the associated countries procedures to implement the regulations governing state subsidies. Hungary on its part is striving, within these limits, to obtain from the community an approval in principle for restructuring subsidies in conjunction with the transition to a market economy. (FIGYELO has been informed that the first consolidated balance of state subsidies covers 1992 and 1993.)

Hungary's entire system of subsidies and its individual elements are changing constantly and will continue to do so also in future, in accordance with their purpose, objective and function, and depending on which sector they support. In the opinion of Constantin Gracius, an expert of UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization], the Treaty of Rome and the Europe Agreement enable Hungary to treat state subsidies, over a period of five years, in the same way as a developing country or developing region would. After the expiration of the first five years, the Association Council could extend this status for another five years, depending on Hungary's economic situation. From the viewpoint of our accession prospects, however, it is better for us to start out from the general rules governing subsidies. Incidentally, it is easier to gain acceptance of any subsidy when it would serve to dismantle surplus capacity, rather than to preserve it.

In the opinion of domestic professional circles, the association agreement does not make unambiguously clear as to when and to what depth state subsidies must conform to European Union rules. According to some professionals, state subsidies will have to conform immediately. Others believe that the Commission will tolerate subsidies for at least five years. Obviously, Hungary's long-term interest is to demonstrate our maturity for accession also by adopting the community's rules as soon as possible. But the short-term interest is to keep Hungarian producers competitive even against subsidized competitors.

According to the minimum rule that applies within the European Union, subsidies of less than 100,000 ECU's per firm over a period of three years do not fall under community rules. This means that a substantial proportion of the subsidies in Hungary are not of interest from the viewpoint of harmonization. The proportion of Hungarian subsidies in conflict with the principles of European integration is not large also because appropriations for subsidies have been declining steadily in recent years, due to the budget deficits.

**[Box, p 22]**

**Disguised Regional Network Loopholes**

An opportunity to subsidize so-called multiply disadvantaged regions is provided in Article 92, Items a) and c), of the Treaty of Rome. A precondition for regional subsidies is that, in terms of purchasing power parity, the given region's GDP during the past three years had to be at most 75 percent of the community average; furthermore, the region's unemployment rate had to be at least 10 percentage points higher than the national rate. In such regions, subsidies amounting up to 75 percent of total investment are permissible. The cited article also sets the criteria for designating the regions: their borders must be specified accurately; and a region may not cover the entire area of a country (Luxembourg and Ireland are the sole exceptions in this respect). As a 1979 opinion of the Commission put it: a market has to be built and a regional policy allowed, but care must be exercised because a regional subsidy is often a disguised

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operating subsidy for ailing industries. Distinguishing the two is difficult also because traditional industries often are concentrated in certain regions noted for their deposits of raw materials.

[Box, p 23]

**European Union Statistics on Subsidies**

The European Union prepares an annual report of compliance with competition rules, and on state subsidies. The subcommittee responsible for competition policy issued early this summer its latest report, covering the cases that occurred in 1994. According to the report, the Commission decided 527 cases involving subsidies, and in 440 of these cases it raised no objections. The report reveals that there were many subsidy cases especially in Germany and Spain, which the Commission attributes to decentralized decisionmaking. In addition, it is obvious that Germany's peculiar situation must also have played a role, because the eastern states are catching up at the cost of considerable federal effort.

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**B-H: Sacirbegovic Questions Federation 'More Than Ever'**

*BR1202140796 Hilversum Nederland-3 Television Network in Dutch 2134 GMT 8 Feb 96*

[Studio interview with Bosnian UN Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbegovic by Paul Witteman on 8 February; from the "Nova" program; Witteman and Sacirbegovic speak in English with Dutch subtitles; transcribed from the English — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Witteman] Tonight Muhamed Sacirbegovic was in our studio. Until recently he was Bosnia's foreign minister, and now he is chief of reconstruction. Shortly before this broadcast I asked him whether peace, which everyone wanted and which was so close by, was in danger.

[Sacirbegovic, identified by screen caption as UN ambassador] I hope it is not turning permanently, but you are right, it is turning. All the inefficiencies, all the inequalities and imperfections in this peace are coming out. On the one hand, of course, we see the inconsistency between the peace that has been arranged and the fact that war criminals are still allowed to roam free in our country. And on the other hand, you see, of course, still many in places like Mostar who are agitating to continue to divide the country along ethnic lines, something that never existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina before. But I think that if the international community is firm, along, of course, with the Bosnians, and say that we want peace, we want justice, and we want to make sure that Bosnia is reintegrated, I think that peace will hold.

[Witteman] But don't you think the Dayton agreement looks more fragile than ever?

[Sacirbegovic] It's always been very fragile. From the very beginning, when we made the agreement in Dayton, actually from the very beginning of the talks, we were told that we must, on the one hand, pursue diplomacy and on a separate but parallel track pursue justice. But in order for the peace to be permanent to hold, justice and the negotiations must come together, must converge. Now that they are starting to converge, that's of course when there is a real test of the peace, but without those two converging there will not be a lasting peace.

[Witteman] When it's such a fragile agreement, is it wise to arrest Serb officers for war criminals?

[Sacirbegovic] If they are criminals, they deserve to be arrested. Nowhere in any other society would one doubt that it is wise to arrest those who are responsible for crimes. In fact, the best way to maintain justice and to maintain peace is to make sure that war criminals are brought to justice. If you don't take the necessary measures to do that, then those who are the victims will themselves become criminals because they will look for revenge because they have no confidence in law. That's why I think this is actually the right step, even though it may put some stress on this agreement.

[Witteman] In this stage already?

[Sacirbegovic] Yes, I think that once you are faced...

[Witteman, interrupting] Is peace more important?

[Sacirbegovic] There is no peace without justice. That's the whole point.

[Witteman] But you could wait: first peace and then wait a year, or two...

[Sacirbegovic] Or 10, 15, or 50 until it's forgotten.

[Witteman] That's what you are afraid for?

[Sacirbegovic] No, I'm afraid for two things. I'm afraid that the victims will become the criminals, because they will then say that we must take justice in our own hands. I'm afraid that the victims and our own people will lose confidence in our government, in the international community, in justice. And that's very bad for a society to have to start a life anew, believing that justice is not the basis of law.

[Witteman] Nevertheless, the United States have asked your government to release those Serbs who are not under suspicion. Are you complying with that?

[Sacirbegovic] Absolutely. We are now working with the war crimes tribunal to determine who should be held. Remember, these war crimes are to be applied on an international basis. That is, the standards are international. So, we wish the war crimes tribunal to tell us if these suspects should be held either for the war crimes tribunal to bring them to justice or for us to bring them to justice. Under the Security Council resolution that established the war crimes tribunal it is expected that war criminals be brought to justice in two ways: by the Hague tribunal and by our national courts. The Hague tribunal can only bring about 10 to 15 people to justice a year. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of those who are suspected will have to be brought to justice by our courts. But those should be international standards. And that's why we are working so closely with Judge Goldstone and Judge Goldstone has specifically said that we took the right steps so far in arresting these people and asking the Hague tribunal to review their specific situation.

[Witteman] But do you expect that some of those Serb prisoners will be released soon, for instance this weekend, within days?

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[Sacirbegovic] If they are not suspected of war crimes, then they should be released as soon as that is determined. Because there are no more prisoners of war. No one should be held just because they happen to be captured by the other side. Only those who are suspected of war crimes.

[Witteman] You play a strong part in the rebuilding of your country. What do you consider the biggest problem?

[Sacirbegovic] I think so far we still don't have a country that is very integrated. Therefore, its infrastructure is very difficult to rebuild. If we have one country, then the roads will be easily rebuilt, electricity will be provided everywhere, gas, water. So we must move toward the reintegration of the country. Maybe the second biggest problem, of course, is the movement toward full democracy in human rights throughout the entire country. You don't have one country if you have two standards of democracy, two standards or even three standards of human rights. And therefore it doesn't really promote economic reconstruction, new economic life, if you have different standards.

[Witteman] And do you still believe in the federation after what happened this week?

[Sacirbegovic] I must say I was badly disappointed by what has happened...

[Witteman] Will the federation succeed?

[Sacirbegovic] I am questioning it more than ever before.

[Witteman] Take for instance Mostar. It proves how difficult it is for cooperation between Croats and Muslims.

[Sacirbegovic] I don't think it has anything to do with ethnic groups. I think it has to do with the people who are in control. In the western part of Mostar, most of the ordinary people — the Croats, and I know most of the Muslims and the Serbs that live in the area — they want to live together. They don't see any reason to keep separate cities. But it is those who in fact promote the division, because the division promotes their own economic or criminal activities, they are the ones who have led these manipulated actions against the EU. The EU would not be in Mostar and we would certainly not insist upon a united Mostar unless the overwhelming majority of the people wanted it. They do want it. What I am afraid of is that there are still many who continue to undermine it and those who should confront those criminals, those extremists who undermine the peace in Mostar, they are not confronting it, including Zagreb.

[Witteman] And that's the big danger?

[Sacirbegovic] I think that's by far the biggest danger for Mostar and for peace. All we could do now is ask for the EU to hold firm and for the EU mayor of Mostar, Mr. Koshnik, to continue to express courage and to express integrity in the judgments that he makes.

[Witteman] Mr. Sacirbegovic, thank you very much for being here.

[Sacirbegovic] My pleasure, as always. Thank you.

### B-H: Article Sees IFOR as Ineffectual as UNPROFOR

*AU1002201196 Sarajevo NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 3-4 Feb 96 p 5*

[Mehmed Buhic article: "Different Criteria Applied by NATO's Guardians of Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "A sniper from the Sarajevo quarter controlled by the Serbs wounded an IFOR [Implementation Force] member, and physicians are fighting for his life. The barrels of the IFOR soldiers' guns did not respond."

"A group of armed persons from the Sarajevo neighborhood of Grbavica, unknown up to now, fired several shots at IFOR force members, and two peacekeeping soldiers were wounded on that occasion. The fire was not responded to. An investigation is under way."

"A group of Muslims tried to enter Brcko, that is to say their houses, but they were forcefully stopped by the police of the so-called Serb Republic. The IFOR police did not intervene."

"At the control point on the road between Zupanja and Tuzla armed Serb policemen stopped, controlled, and maltreated the members of a humanitarian convoy. IFOR soldiers calmly observed everything without doing anything."

We have been listening to such news almost every day, so that the inhabitants of the free parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as those outside the borders of their home-country are asking themselves whether IFOR is in effect the UN Protection Force — led by the world-famous Akashi and similar persons who did not do us any good — by another name.

Many people say that one must not be immediately angry with 70,000 NATO soldiers who were given the name of IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since their tactic and powers should be different from those that the UN Protection Force had. That they are waiting for the right moment is the essence of the stories with which they are trying to console us. In the middle of the current week, however, we saw our Muslim women, refugees from

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Srebrenica, who, full of pain, took to the streets in an attempt to gain word from the UNHCR about what had happened to their sons, husbands, brothers, fathers.... The lazy officers in the offices of the International Red Cross in Tuzla, who would rather smuggle with stolen humanitarian goods than give them to the poor people, locked themselves in their warm offices and asked the IFOR forces to intervene. IFOR came immediately to the unhappy enraged women, who were throwing stones at the windows of the offices where accomplices in the concealment of crimes committed against their closest relatives and our countrymen, our Muslims, were hiding. Powerful media hastened to convey the picture of the "violence" the poor women from Srebrenica created, in order to show the world how primitive Muslims are, real hillbillies. Statements could be heard, too, that the action was possibly carried out by mujahidins or some such.

**Byzantium Is Not Only in the Serbs**

The peacekeeping force is as miserable as those who sent it to show its power toward thirsty and naked Muslim sisters and mothers.... Even more miserable is the U.S. Army, which has been lamenting for days that there are twenty or thirty mujahidins in Bosnia-Herzegovina who are "a real danger" for the Americans as well as for the British and the French soldiers whose number should rise above 30,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One cannot therefore avoid the question of what kind of armies they are if they are afraid of twenty or thirty soldiers who came from Arab countries to Bosnia-Herzegovina to help us defend ourselves from the hundred times better armed Serbian fascists.

The lamenting of the United States, England, and France about the presence of the alleged foreign Muslim mercenaries is not surprising, since we know that the members of their forces blocked the way for weak and unprotected Muslim women from Srebrenica with armored transporters in Tuzla. Or did they perhaps want to use that case in order to show how quickly they can respond?

The evidence of the misery of the West, that is, NATO, is present everywhere. It is very popular now to thank Chetnik murderers like Krajisnik, Koljevic, Mladic, and Karadzic for being obedient to their leader Milosevic and allowing access to mass graves in and around Srebrenica, Prijedor, Ljubija, and other places, the number of which rises from day to day.

It seems that those who by their orders threw tens of thousands of brutally murdered Muslims into mass graves are real heroes who have to be given international awards, since they — can you imagine — allowed international observes to enter the territory of the "Serb country." The fact that the same Serbs killed all these unprotected people is no longer important.

The old Byzantine behavior the Serbs have shown on many occasions already seems to be familiar not only to the Serbs but also to those who offer them "the salty hand." [quotation marks as published] There is the impression that we should soon have to be grateful to Chetniks to have enabled us to recover from the wounds they inflicted on us.

**Serbs Offend With Lies, Too**

The fascist old sterile woman Biljana Plavsic became arrogant again, repeating the words of Vladislav Jovanovic, the Serbian ambassador to the United Nations, that the Muslims from Srebrenica killed themselves in their mutual clashes, and that the Serbs even helped by burying them in one place.

This is what the Serbian politicians from Pale claim, and our government establishes contacts with them and hosts them in Sarajevo, which could make it possible for the Serbs to hush up their crimes and forget them as the time goes by.

Does the announcement that 10,000 Serbs will return to Tuzla have this meaning, or does it show the possibility that almost 100,000 of yesterday's murderers will remain in the "hotbeds" of Ilidza, Vogosca, Grbavica... occupying the space where, temporarily at least, the earlier inhabitants of Foca, Visegrad, Rogatica, Bijeljina could live... whereas families from Mrkonjic-Grad and Sipovo are being accommodated in several villages around Kljuc that lie on the first front-line facing the Chetniks (?!).

The latest statement issued by Predrag Radic, mayor of occupied Banja Luka, who is a famous destroyer of the oldest mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying that not a single Muslim or Croatian family would return to that town as long as 100,000 Serb refugees from Bosanska Krajina — as he claims — live there.

**Murderers Would Like To Come Back**

Does this not mean that the murderers of the Muslim population from Sanski Most and Kljuc should return to places where mass graves have not been disclosed yet, where thousands of Serbian neighbors of Muslim and Croatian nationality are buried? No one mentions the provincial towns of Bosansko Grahovo and Drvar, from which they fled after they had committed unparalled crimes both in Kninska Krajina on the Croats and in Bosanska Krajina on the Muslims.

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The possibility that the Serbs could return to their "pigsties," which are not worth much, are not at all mentioned. They are not mentioned, since life appropriate for a normal "insane" person is not possible there. They know that Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi... are far more attractive, richer and more civilized.

Therefore we must see the return of the Muslim population in the light of all these events, this even more, since it is known that there is neither a town nor a village without people, and that there is no state without villages and towns in which there are people, peasants, workers, craftsmen, teachers, public servants, physicians, pupils....

When this happens, and when everybody can at least approach his house, both the IFOR and the "extreme" Serbs will play "a different tune" and "international peace forces" will not that easily decide to block the unhappy women from Srebrenica with armored vehicles, who are to blame only because they took to the streets and publicly required the International Red Cross to do its job and try to find out where their families are.

If this happens, everyone will be doing his job, and this is already something...

**B-H: Commentary Criticizes Bildt's 'Inconsistent Policy'**

*AU1302110996 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 96 p 3*

[Commentary by Senad Mesetovic: "Akashi Syndrome"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Carl Bildt, the high UN official in charge of the implementation of the civic part of the Dayton agreement, has been provoking a series of dilemmas and disagreements since he took on this duty. Behaving like Akashi and making compromises with the Serbs, the former Swedish prime minister has, especially recently, been causing justified bitterness among the general public here.

The Dayton agreement has accurately and precisely determined all the time limits and obligations of the signatories. These terms also refer to all the international forces and the UN representatives who are here precisely in order to secure the implementation of the agreement within the determined terms. So, nobody, not even Carl Bildt, is not entitled to arbitrarily change what has been strictly agreed upon.

Thanks to his inconsistent policy, the situation on the ground has become absurd. Two nights ago, at midnight, a 45-day period expired, during which the military and police forces of both sides had to withdraw from the territory that, according to Dayton, should change hands. Having respected that condition, the military and police forces of the Federation have completely left Mrkonjic and Sipovo, so that the Serb civilians could start to return to those towns yesterday.

Simultaneously, there are still Serb police and armed groups of civilians in the parts of the territory around Sarajevo that should belong to the Federation. They are frequently detaining, plundering, and maltreating civilians on their way through Ilidza. Instead of preventing robberies and, according to the Agreement, ensuring that there are no armed Serbs on these territories after 45 days, Bildt, on his own initiative, promised them a prolongation of that period!?

On the other hand, the Swedish diplomat, who obviously (perhaps even deliberately) has not studied the whole Dayton agreement, has recently been "digging" through the Constitution of the Federation, searching for a possible way to organize a joint police forces of the Federation and the Serb entity around Sarajevo!?

Even before Bildt's arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina and his assumption of high office, our authorities had expressed fear and reservedness toward this diplomat's behavior. Time has proved that, unfortunately, they were right.

Because of the serious violations of the Dayton provisions, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, on the occasion of his visit to Sarajevo the day before yesterday, also met the high UN representative behind closed doors. The details from this meeting are not known, but it is very significant that Christopher, upon his very arrival, made a statement that is also the opinion of the U.S. Administration, which clearly says that "Bildt's moves are contrary to the Dayton agreement."

Republican Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic reacted simultaneously. At an urgently summoned news conference, he announced that our government, unless Bildt corrects his attitude, will demand his suspension from the international community. The prime minister has also set a precise seven-day period in which to meet the demands of the Bosnian authorities.

Now, it is the international community's turn. Unless there is a prompt and principled reaction, then the possible negative conclusions will be seen as self-imposed. In that case, the warnings from some Western sources because of the overall situation seem not to be groundless, and they claim that the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement is being brought into question by such behavior of those who are in charge of its civil implementation.

The Bosnian Government, after all, cannot and should not go back. It is time that Mr. Bildt "is driven out

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in the open" so that we can finally see if there is any difference between him and, well-known (for his badly done job) Yasushi Akashi.

**B-H: Sacirbegovic on 'Progress' at Talks With Holbrooke**

*AU1202164396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] President Izetbegovic's special envoy Muhamed Sacirbegovic gave correspondents a statement on the future cooperation with The Hague Tribunal that was harmonized during today's meeting between the Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership and U.S. negotiators led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.

Sacirbegovic stressed that today's talks on the full implementation of the Dayton agreement were constructive and that Ambassador Holbrooke could leave Sarajevo in a much lighter frame of mind.

We also wanted to reassure Ambassador Holbrooke that we would release all prisoners of war, including the four that are currently being detained, if the Hague tribunal does not want these people held and handed over. He added that our officials have received assurances about the release of political prisoners in Serbia and, which is particularly important to our authorities, the release of political prisoners in Sandzak in accordance with Ambassador Holbrooke's talks with President Milosevic.

We made some progress in securing safety for the 700 people who fled Zepa last summer and who are still in Serbia. Their future will be decided through cooperation with the United States to ensure that they will be returned to their homes as soon as possible, Sacirbegovic stressed. He said that our representatives would send their own team to Serbia, together with the representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will contribute greatly to the release of these men.

Ambassador Holbrooke also brought good news regarding the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the intensification of the efforts to fulfill the undertaken obligations, Sacirbegovic stressed. He added that Holbrooke and the entire U.S. team gave their full support to Mostar Administrator Hans Koschnick.

Finally Sacirbegovic expressed his gratitude to Holbrooke on the behalf of the Bosnia-Herzegovina government and people, as it is probably his last visit to Sarajevo in his function of peace mediator.

**B-H: Serbs To Boycott Vienna Talks Until Soldiers Freed**

*LD1002174996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1720 GMT 10 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 10 Feb (SRNA) — Radomir Lukic, deputy foreign minister of the Serb Republic, has informed Vigo Edi, chairman of the conference on the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, that the Serb Republic delegation will not attend the next meeting in Vienna.

In his letter to Edi, Lukic recalls that the Serb Republic government "adopted a decision on temporary withdrawal from the talks because of the capture of 11 Serb army members in the Sarajevo separation zone before the expiry of the D-45 deadline and their illegal detention in a Muslim prison."

With these words the Serb deputy foreign minister explained why the Serb Republic delegation will not take part in the next round of talks on regional stabilization — as agreed in Annex 1b, Article 4 of the Dayton Agreement — scheduled for 13 and 14 February this year in Vienna.

Lukic said that the "Serb Republic delegation will return to the Vienna conference when the Muslim government releases the Serb officers and soldiers."

**B-H: Serb FM Confirms Serbs To Boycott Vienna Talks**

*LD1302144496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1356 GMT 13 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 13 Feb (SRNA) — Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha sent a letter to Vigleik Eide, personal envoy of the OSCE [Orgainization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] president, to say that a Serb delegation will not take part in the confidence building talks on 13 and 14 February in Vienna.

"Unfortunately, I have to confirm that the RS [Serb Republic] delegation will not be in the position to take part in negotiations envisaged by the Dayton Agreement, Annex 1.B, Article 4 and due to take place on 13 and 14 February in Vienna.

"As you have already been informed by my deputy Radomir Lukic, the RS government has decided until further notice to suspend all contacts and negotiations with representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the so-called Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the kidnapping of General Djukic and his aides.

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"You must agree with me that such behavior is quite contrary to the efforts to restore confidence. It is absurd to expect of us, in the light of this witch-hunt, to take part in negotiations on confidence building as an equal partner," Minister Buha says in his letter.

**B-H: Muratovic Confirms Extradition of Serbs to Hague**

*AU1202204796 Paris AFP in English 2002 12 Feb 96*

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 12 (AFP) — Two senior Bosnian Serb officers were released from detention in Sarajevo and transferred to the Hague-based war-crimes tribunal Monday, Bosnia's prime minister told AFP.

"The Hague (war-crimes tribunal) decided to take two senior officers — Djukic and Krsmanovic — for further prosecution at The Hague," Bosnia's premier, Hasan Muratovic, said.

General Djorje Djukic, head of Bosnian Serb logistics during the war, and his deputy Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic were being transferred to the UN court Monday evening [12 February], Muratovic added.

"They've been delivered to The Hague. They left from here with prosecutors who came from The Hague and who held preliminary investigation here," the prime minister said.

(In The Hague, a Dutch official said a judicial transferral operation was expected Monday evening, adding "the destination of the transfer is Scheveningen" near The Hague.

(A prison there has cells reserved for people charged by the International Criminal Tribunal. The source did not confirm that those expected were Djukic and Krsmanovic.)

Four other Serb soldiers held by the Bosnian authorities were released after The Hague said they were not interested in them, he added. "We said before that we were going to comply with all the decisions of the Hague Tribunal," Muratovic said. [passage omitted]

**B-H: NATO's Solana Confirms Serbs Sent to Hague**

*AU1202213596 Paris AFP in English 2120 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels Feb 12 (AFP) — NATO is transferring the two senior Bosnian Serb officers accused of war crimes from Sarajevo to the Hague on the request of the International Criminal Tribunal, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said Monday.

It was the first Western confirmation of the transfer.

The two are Bosnian Serb General Djordje Djukic and his deputy Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, Solana said.

**B-H: Koljevic: Peace at Risk If Serb Officers Not Freed**

*AU1302143396 Paris AFP in English 1404 GMT 13 Feb 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herceina, Feb 13 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb officials warned Tuesday that the entire Dayton peace accord would be under threat if two senior Serb officers held for questioning over war crimes were not released.

"If they are not freed, the whole application of the Dayton accord will be threatened," warned Bosnian Serb vice-president Nikola Koljevic as he pledged an "appropriate response."

"I cannot tell you precisely what that response will consist of, but it will be wholly appropriate," he told reporters.

He said the transfer of General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic to The Hague for questioning "could end well if the officers are freed within a day or two, if that is the only way of saving them from a Moslem prison."

The two were flown to the Netherlands late Monday and will be questioned by prosecutors from the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) on ex-Yugoslavia.

They had been arrested on Moslem-Croat federation territory in Sarajevo on January 30, an incident which Koljevic branded "illegal."

Biljana Plavsic, also a Bosnian Serb vice-president, said the capture of the officers "proves that the Moslem-Croat side, particularly the Moslem side, is not prepared to seek a peaceful resolution to the Bosnian crisis."

Tribunal spokesman Christian Chartier said a request for the transfer of the officers was given to the Bosnian government by a panel of judges after hearing an application from the court's prosecution service.

He would give no details of the allegations against Djukic and Krsmanovic, saying only that they were "interesting suspects."

The officers' arrest by Bosnian police triggered the most serious crisis yet in the Dayton peace accords brokered by US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.

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Meanwhile Toma Fila, the Belgrade defence lawyer assigned to Djukic at the latter's request, said he questioned the tribunal's "objectivity."

"I have agreed to defend him because I am a Serb and consider it my duty," he said.

Djukic and Krsmanovic "did not figure on any ICT list at the time of their arrest," he added, saying the whole process was designed to tighten the noose around Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, himself indicted for war crimes.

Djukic, head of Bosnian Serb logistics during the war, and Krsmanovic joined the sole ICT suspect hitherto held in jail in the Netherlands, the Bosnian Serb Dusan "Dusko" Tadic, arrested in Germany in February 1994.

"The tribunal needed a figurehead to question. Dusko Tadic was only small fry. With the detention of a general and colonel, the tribunal has found its raison d'etre," Fila said.

**B-H: Koljevic: Extradition of Serbs Their 'Rescue'**

*LD1302151696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1425 GMT 13 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 13 Feb (TANJUG) — Serb Vice President Dr. Nikola Koljevic said in Banja Luka today that the extradition to The Hague tribunal of the senior officers of the RS [Serb Republic] army, Lieutenant Colonel General Djordje Djukic and Colonal Aleksa Krsmanovic, could mean their rescue from Muslim captivity.

"This case is an indication of a total lack of cooperation on the part of the Muslim authorities in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The extradition can be a positive development if the Serb officers are released soon," Koljevic said.

"In other words, if this was the only way of rescuing them in view of the illegal conduct by the Muslim authorities, then this major obstacle to implementing the Dayton agreement will be overcome. Otherwise, the agreement will be brought into question," Koljevic said.

Asked what would happen if the officers were not released, Koljevic said that in that case "the RS state leadership will come up with an adequate reply."

**B-H: Izetbegovic Writes to EU's Agnelli on Mostar**

*AU0902131996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 9 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, last night had talks with Susanna Agnelli, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Italy. President Izetbegovic informed Mrs. Agnelli about the very critical situation in Mostar.

In that regard, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today sent a letter to Susanna Agnelli, which says the following:

The issue of Mostar, about which we talked on the phone late last night, is in fact an issue of democracy and human rights. Four elementary human rights have been suspended in the western part of Mostar: the freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom of political activity, and the right to private ownership. Mostar is the only place in Europe, and perhaps in the world, where public expression of religious feelings, except for members of one religion, is forbidden. During the aggression, the last night's demonstrators expelled Bosniak and Serbian families from their land and do not want to return them. They want a divided city in order to maintain this unnatural and unjust situation and this is the essence of their resistance to the proposals made by European Administrator Hans Koschnick.

We were ready to make certain concessions and also made them in order to avoid clashes, but what is involved now is a much more important question: whether violence will be legalized, or the road opened to freedom and respect of human rights. And issues of that kind do not concern the interests of only one city, but of Europe and the civilized world in general. Any further compromise will mean unprincipled negotiating with standards and values that the modern world has decided in favor of. Please, Mrs. Agnelli, inform about this letter the other participants of today's meeting in Rome, it is said in the letter President Izetbegovic sent to Susanna Agnelli.

**B-H: 100 Croatian Police for Mostar Arrive in Medugorge**

*AU1002162596 Paris AFP in English 1556 GMT 10 Feb 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] MOSTAR, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Feb 10 (AFP) — About 100 Croatian police officers, intended to reinforce European police in the divided city of Mostar, have arrived in Medugorge, some 35 kilometres (20 miles) away, a European police spokesman said Saturday.

But Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and European Administrator of Mostar Hans Koschnick "agreed not to bring them to Mostar until further notice," spokesman Howard Fox said.

Dragan Gasic, spokesman for the European administration, added that the Croatian police, who arrived in

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Medugorge on Friday, were "to lend support to the European police and help to unify the police forces" from the Moslem and Croat parts of the town.

The Croat police from the western part of Mostar "have broken off all contact with the European police," Gasic said, adding that the situation "must be clarified" before they could carry out their initial mission.

Meanwhile, two European police officers were held up at the entrance to western Mostar by Croat police, Fox said.

But, according to Gasic, it was a "misunderstanding." [passage omitted]

**B-H: Zubak Invites German Mediator To Visit Mostar**

*LD1102180296 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 11 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Hercegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak invited Christian Shwartzshilling, the mediator for disputes within the Bosnian Federation, to visit Mostar.

The invitation was sent in order to brief mediator Swartzshilling about EU Mostar administrator Hans Koschnick's decision, constitutional provisions of the Bosnian Federation, the Brussels memorandum on Mostar, part of the Dayton agreement referring to Mostar, and particularly about nine-point conclusions issued from a trilateral meeting of foreign ministers. The invitation lays a particular stress on point two of the conclusions which says: the Dayton areement, including the Mostar annex, must be implemented in full.

I am of the opinion that the German public and the German parliament are not informed to a sufficient degree about all the facts in connection with this case, which has resulted in a real anti-Croat campaign, President Zubak's invitation says, among other things adding that Shwartzshilling's role could be of great importance, because he would be able to inform objectively the German public, the German parliament, and the German Government.

**B-H: E. Mostar Mayor Supports Koschnick Arbitration**

*AU1202214296 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 96 p 4*

[Interview with Safet Orucevic, mayor of eastern Mostar, by Nino Djula in Mostar; date not given: "Orucevic: District Agreed With Susak and Granic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The administration of the western part of Mostar has rejected the arbitration of the administrator, Hans Koschnick, by which Mostar is divided into three Croat municipalities, and three Muslim municipalities, and one common district. Mijo Brajkovic, the mayor of western Mostar, explained the breaking of all relations with the European Union in Mostar by saying that Koschnick's solution is contrary to the Dayton agreement. That solution does not respect the demarcation lines, and some 6,000 inhabitants of Mostar will, by this solution, lose their right to elect candidates for or be elected for the future structures of the Council of Municipalities. On the other side, the Bosniak administration of eastern Mostar sees in Koschnick's arbitration a "platform for the beginning of coexistence and the restoration of confidence in the town of Mostar." We talked about this in a short interview with Safet Orucevic, mayor of eastern Mostar.

[Orucevic] Of course, we also have objections to and complains about Koschnick's solution, but his decision was agreed upon between the Croat and Bosniak administrations. The formation of a district has also been agreed with Croatian Ministers Susak and Granic, and Mijo Brajkovic himself agreed to that.

[Djula] The Croat side decided to sever all relations with the European Union after Administrator Koschnick published his arbitration solution. Accordingly, it seems that, agreement was not reached on everything.

[Orucevic] It is an incomprehensible political move that is not a consequence of the revolt caused by the decision made by Administrator Koschnick, but is a sign of deep disappointment with the formation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the extinction of Herzeg-Bosnia. Croat leaders have been signing and talking for a long time, but they have not been carrying things out. It is obvious that they are now facing the moment when they have to tell their people how and to where they have been taking them.

[Djula] What is there in Koschnick's arbitration verdict that the Bosniak side finds unsuitable?

[Orucevic] We have a lot of objections. One is that in case of even 95 percent of the territory of Mostar, Koschnick accepted the military demarcation line. It

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seems that even that does not suit the Croats. However, I would like to say that Koschnick's arbitration is unsuitable for those who would like to see life in Mostar organized in national ghettos and is suitable for those who wish to live in peace in a united Mostar. Therefore, I support Koschnick's verdict, but I do not understand why did it took a year and a half to reach it.

[Djula] What will be the Bosniak Mostar administration's reaction to the Croat rejection of the arbitration? Mr. Brajkovic has announced that he will have Koschnick's verdict considered by the Constitutional Court of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Orucevic] We will wait for the statement of the highest Federation leadership and, in the meanwhile, we will suggest the formation of a united administration in Mostar.

[Djula] Is there a serious threat of the resumption of conflicts in Mostar at the moment?

[Orucevic] We are doing all we can to prevent conflicts. In that sense, I salute the decision of the western mayor to introduce a curfew. We have also intensified the police control, and we are doing our best in order to prevent any kind of armed conflicts. The problem of Mostar must continue to be solved by purely political means.

**B-H: NATO Chief Meets Mostar Croat, Muslim Officials**

*LD1302000996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] In eastern Mostar, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana held talks with Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, president and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation; with EU administrator Hans Koschnick, and with Safet Orucevic, mayor of eastern Mostar.

The talks, also attended by NATO Commander for Europe George Joulwan, were briefly interrupted and then resumed in Hotel Ero where Koschnik's administration is based and where the talks were joined by Mijo Brajkovic, mayor of western Mostar. Afterwards, a news conference was held in the open in the eastern part of the city, near the ruins of the old bridge.

Zubak said that the aim of the talks was to restore cooperation between Hans Koschnick, Mijo Brajkovic, and Safet Orucevic. Changes to Koschnick's plan were not discussed, Zubak added.

Solana said that the way Koschnik has been treated will not be tolerated. He said that Koschnick has accomplished a great deal and his plan has the backing of the EU and the international community.

General Joulwan said: We shall not tolerate any threats against Hans Koschnick.

**B-H: Solana: Plans for Mostar 'Will Not Be Modified'**

*BR1302140696 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1828 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[Unattributed report: "Solana Says Mostar Reconciliation Is Important for Whole of Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar (Bosnia), 12 Feb (EFE) — Today, Monday, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced that the allied troops would protect Mostar's European administrator, and stressed that reconciliation between Muslims and Croats in this town was the "basis" for reconciliation throughout Bosnia.

"NATO will make every effort to bring about reconciliation in Mostar," Solana declared following a three-hour conversation with Hans Koschnik, the EU-appointed town administrator.

Solana and NATO Commander for Europe George Joulwan traveled today to Mostar to offer Koschnik their support after his plans for this southern Bosnian town's future organization gave rise to violent protest from the Bosnian Croat community last Tuesday.

"The plan (submitted by Koschnik) will not be modified," Solana answered in response to questions from journalists, and he stressed that NATO "will not tolerate" any further attacks on the European administrator.

The plan provides for the town — currently divided into two sectors, "Croat" and "Muslim" — to be unified through the creation of six municipalities (three with a Croat majority, and three with a Muslim majority) plus one central district, which would be made up of the town's center and a number of important infrastructure installations.

"NATO is not present in Mostar in the capacity of a police force. We will not tolerate threats against Koschnik and we will cooperate closely with the EU police," General Joulwan explained.

Deployed in the Mostar region are the Spanish and French IFOR troops which have been patrolling the town since the beginning of January, when the first armed incidents between the Muslim and Croatian communities took place.

"Mostar is exceptionally important," said Joulwan, who also said that IFOR's mission did not consist of imposing order but that his troops would try to create "a safe

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environment" and were prepared to protect Koschnik if necessary.

The meeting with NATO's leaders was also attended by the President of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia, the Bosnian Croat Kresimir Zubak, and his deputy, Muslim Ejup Ganic, as well as Mostar Muslim section Mayor Safet Olucevic.

**B-H: Delegates to OSCE View Koschnick Plan for Mostar**

*AU1302140696 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1100 GMT 13 Feb 96*

[Report by Susanne Nevelke]

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Bosnian Croats were in Vienna today to attend the conference on disarmament in Bosnia. Susanne Nevelke spoke to them about Mostar.

[Nevelke] The fronts remain rigid in the conflict over the partition of the southern Bosnian city of Mostar. On the sidelines of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] disarmament talks in Vienna, Vlado Bogadzic, Croatian representative of the Bosnian-Croat Federation, said that the partition plan presented by EU administrator Hans Koschnick last week is unacceptable to the Croatian side. He said the plan is unconstitutional and in breach of the Dayton accord.

[Begin Bogadzic recording] We would accept the original plan that Koschnick presented, but the present plan is clearly in contradiction to the Dayton accord. The points that the Croats most strongly disagree with are the central zone and, if I may say so, the quantity. [end recording]

[Nevelke] Bogadzic says that the central zone would actually mean an extra zone for the Muslims, and yet the Muslims have already been granted three entire zones, more than they need. After all, says Bogadzic, 9,000 Muslims will henceforth live in the west of Mostar, compared to 12,000 before. At the same time, the number of Croats in Mostar has risen considerably. They form the clear majority. Nevertheless, the Croat side continues to be ready for negotiations, and hopes for a rapid solution. However, the Bosnian side cannot imagine new talks on the subject of Koschnick's partition plan. The Bosnian representative in Vienna, [name indistinct], insists on the present partition of Mostar into three Croatian and three Bosnian districts, plus a central zone under joint administration.

[Begin Bosnian representative recording] Of course this plan is not our plan. It is the result of deliberations by experts, and this plan offers a basis for a common life in Mostar and provides a bridge between the nationalities. Why should this bridge be destroyed again? [end recording]

**B-H: Rally for Karadzic, Mladic Attracts Over 10,000**

*LD1202163596 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A large meeting in support of Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and Colonel-General Ratko Mladic, commander of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic Army, was held in Sokolac [northeast of Sarajevo] today. The ad hoc International Tribunal in The Hague has indicted them for war crimes. The meeting of support, which rallied 10,000 people, was organized by the coordination committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] for the Romanija area. [words indistinct]

[Unidentified reporter] More than 10,000 citizens from Romanija's municipalities arrived in Sokolac. The people of Romanija gathered together today at the meeting named "You Are Part of Us," organized by the SDS Coordination Committee for Romanija and the municipal committees of Pale, Rogatica, Olovo, Han Pijesak, and Sokolac.

The people of Romanija raised their voice against the unjustified and unfounded accusations against and discrediting of the founders of the Serb Republic — President Karadzic and General Mladic.

We elected you, we created our state with you, and we will march ahead with you, Momir Tosic, the chairman of the SDS Coordination Committee for Romanija, said as he opened the meeting in Sokolac today. Karadzic and Mladic have already taken honorary positions in the history of the Serb people. [passage omitted]

The participants in today's meeting in Sokolac received telegrams of support from the Novi Sad SDS City Committee, the association of Serbs for assistance to Serbs outside Serbia in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the executive committee of the Serb People's Renewal, the executive committee of the Serb Radical Party from Bijeljina, the Gacko SDS Municipal Committee, and Professor Smilja Avramov.

**B-H: Karadzic Criticizes Parties Supporting Integration**

*AU1002164796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Feb 96*

[Report by Velimir Bozic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Banja Luka municipal committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] had a

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session today, reviewing the party activity during the past period. State authorities, headed by the president of the Serb Republic, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, also attended the session. Velimir Bozic has a report:

[Bozic] In the introductory part of the session, Mr. [name indistinct] introduced Dr. Karadzic to the activity of the Banja Luka municipal committee of the SDS. Talking about the current situation, he established that it was necessary to form a political and economic council of the party. The president of the Serb Republic and of the SDS of the Serb lands informed the members of the Banja Luka municipal committee of the SDS of the current political situation in the country. The international community wants to reunite Bosnia, but we will try to increase the high degree of independence within the union, said Dr. Radovan Karadzic, and added:

[Begin Karadzic recording] We do not have [words indistinct]; we do have a high degree of independence, which we will not allow to decrease; we will try to increase and intensify it by democratic and political means. This is the policy of the SDS, as opposed to the policy of many other parties that support reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are a state [passage indistinct]. Our assembly is the highest of our legislative authorities — it passes laws and need not ask anyone anything, and no one can impose his authority on it. Legislative power is therefore Serb.

Our Supreme Court is [words indistinct]. There can be no more [words indistinct] this court. [end recording]

Dr. Karadzic said the following about the potential dangers to the Serb Republic:

[Begin Karadzic recording] One of the things, one of the ways [passage indistinct] the Serb Republic is to kick out at least part of the authorities — (?Mladic and myself) — from the negotiations and the post-war political life, if at all possible, the intention behind which is to make the Serb Republic weaker and make stronger [passage indistinct]. This is what they did to 'Arafat. For 20 years they claimed he was a terrorist in order to [words indistinct], and when they realized it was not working [passage indistinct].

The international community is eager to get this done, and since they assessed that we would win the election, they postponed the election from June to September [passage indistinct] therefore assessing that we will not become weak enough by September, or December, to [words indistinct]. [end recording]

The present situation is made more difficult [words indistinct], but the state and the nation are priorities, said President Karadzic. Talking about IFOR, Dr. Karadzic said that the good relations were marred by the arrest of the Serb officers, and the Muslim side thus completely degraded the IFOR troops.

The party in power is responsible for everything — both the good and the bad — and it is obliged to finish what it has started, which will require personnel changes, announced [words indistinct] of the party, said Dr. Karadzic.

Accommodating the refugees is a priority, and an action will soon be conducted the aim of which will be to register the lost property and [word indistinct] of the use of abandoned property in the Serb Republic. The Government of the Serb Republic has already prepared appropriate measures.

Dr. Radovan Karadzic also announced that activities would be carried out aimed at professionalizing the army, forming professional units, and establishing regular four-month military service.

The session of the Banja Luka municipal committee of the SDS was continued with an analysis of the reports on the activities of the local party councils and committees. In this part of the session, the problems in the activity of the committee for (?villages), while Svetislav Mudrenovic, president of the committee for economy, pointed out the necessity of establishing money transfers with the FRY, as well as the (?demobilization) of professionals and [word indistinct].

### B-H: Commentary Says IFOR Avoiding War Crime Arrests

*AU0902215196 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 96 p 2*

[Commentary by Fuad Cibukcic: "If IFOR Does Not, We Will"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By arresting two Serb officers accused of war crimes, the Bosnian Government "has rubbed the nose" of the international community well, showing that all the clauses of the Dayton agreement have to be implemented. In this case it is the Implementation Force [IFOR] that should be pilloried, as on the one hand their tanks almost grind the bones of the murdered Bosniaks and Croats at the Ljubija mines while Smith shakes hands with the commander of the Omarska camp, while on the other, people like Serb General Djukic — commander of the unit that kept Sarajevo and its citizens under siege for a full three years — pass under their noses through IFOR checkpoints between Lukavica and the territory under our control.

We would not be surprised to hear that IFOR members saluted them properly, as after all, they are soldiers, and

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Djukic is even a general. IFOR commander Leighton Smith said at the beginning of his soldiering in Bosnia-Herzegovina that his units would not hunt down criminals, but they would arrest them if they were to show up in the vicinity. Well, we have seen how. Of course, pressure was immediately exerted on our officials to release the eight members of the Serb entity's army.

Only a few days ago both the military and civilians chiefs of IFOR flatly refused the justified intervention by our officials, who were protesting against the decision to allow the Serb policemen to carry out "police work" after 3 February on the territory under the control of the federation. Almost every day another mass grave is discovered in Bosnia, a fact that automatically cries out for justice, as the survivors wonder whether there can be peace without justice.

Some circles in the West have labelled this move by the Bosnian Government as a provocation, and an IFOR officer or two have blushed. Unfortunately, only one or two! Those responsible for bestialities must be punished and, after all, the Serb officers have been arrested so that the investigators of the war crimes tribunal can question them. If the people from The Hague say that any of the eight men arrested are not guilty, they will go home, while the others will go to The Hague. They will not be "swallowed by the darkness" in Sarajevo. So, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has made a good move. We have shown to the international public that we are more effective than IFOR in the "all for justice" job, and we have ourselves become convinced now that, if Karadzic and Mladic set off for a drive through Sarajevo, IFOR will salute them and let them through, but we will divert them toward The Hague.

**B-H: War Crimes Categorized; Extradition Viewed**

*AU0902174496 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 96 p 7*

[Zana Andrijevic article: "The Crew for The Hague Is Being Formed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the data submitted by the Commission for the Collection of Data on War Crimes, it is assumed that 20,000 people have committed some kind of a war crime in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the cased of some of them it has already been established that they committed crimes. There are different categories among them, naturally.

The first category includes persons who are as organizers or commanders suspected of having committed the most serious war crimes and the crime of genocide. There are around 1,600 such persons among those registered, and the International Court in The Hague is in charge of at least 3-400 of them. The second category includes persons who have actually committed serious war crimes (3,100 persons), and the third persons regarding whom there are indications that they have committed some form of a war crime (around 3,800 persons). The fourth category includes persons who, as members of the aggressor's army, paramilitary formations, and rebel groups, participated in some of the recorded events in which war crimes were committed but who were not direct performers or commanders; they usually participated in committing the crime to a certain degree or were only present when it was committed. At 10,400 persons, they constitute the biggest group, but this number is not final yet.

**Snipers Are Criminals**

Snipers too are in any event war criminals. The documentation about their number has not been completed yet, but it already says a lot if we know that 775 people were wounded and 255 died at the hands of the snipers in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and March 1995. The most victims were in 1992. There are currently 143 mass graves (disclosed) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 68 mass murders with tens of thousands of dead have been confirmed. Twenty-four thousand people are still considered missing, and 725 persons were wounded and 214 killed in only 15 of the massacres committed in Sarajevo.

These crimes were committed by people whose names are well known and who must held to account. The number of 20,000 people of whom it is assumed that they committed one of the war crimes is big. The number of victims is much bigger, however, and justice is slow but hopefully attainable. Mirsad Tokace, the chairman of the State Commission for the Collection of Data on War Crimes, says that it can be assumed that 500 persons among the above mentioned will appear in the dock in The Hague, whereas 5,000 people will be tried by the national courts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the remaining 15,000 of whom it is assumed that they have committed one of the war crimes, the collection of data has not started yet.

**The Most Serious Crimes**

"We are reaching the stage in which many people will start speaking about crimes. Among them there will also be a certain number of those who were present when a crime was committed. Many committed violations under duress, and they will be punished accordingly. The procedure for the collection of data is far from complete, and we shall try to do it really well," Tokaca says. The persons who committed the most serious crimes, which means those who organized, commanded, thought out crimes, including the political aspect, and those who

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ordered that war crimes be committed will be tried at the International Tribunal for the War Crimes Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. They will be tried only if they are indicted, and, which is very important, if they are brought to the International Tribunal. Various requirements have to be met for the extradition: The country in which a war criminal lives at the moment must be ready to disclose his identity, his address has to be found, as well as information about the crime committed, and he has to be extradited. In most cases war criminals or suspects still live in the territory of the country in which they committed the crime.

**UN Charter**

It is stated in Article Seven of the UN Charter that it is the duty of every country that is a UN member to respect the Statutes of the International Court as the universal international legal act. If this is not the case, the Statutes of the International Court foresee a mechanism by which the International Court president may require that sanctions be introduced against the country concerned.

"Apart from that, a certain number of countries have adopted special laws about the extradition of war criminals. As far as I know, apart from Bosnia-Herzegovina, such laws have been adopted by the Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States. It has already been presented to the Turkish parliament, and it should be adopted as soon as the new government is elected. In order to avoid confusion, however, also countries that have not adopted such laws are obliged to extradite a war criminal," Sead Hodzic, the secretary of the Ministry of Justice, said.

If they are not extradited, certain sanctions have to be applied. Sanctions have already been introduced against the Serbian entity, and it will probably happen that the extradition of war criminals is made the condition for the suspension of these sanctions. The International Court in the Hague can require their extradition only from Bosnia-Herzegovina, since, in Sead Hodzic's words, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as an internationally recognized state, and not its entities, is in charge of all procedures in accordance wit the International Court Statutes.

**Many Questions**

All these facts leave many questions open, however: in which way and whether the police (police forces are divided between entities) will at all arrest a war criminal who at a certain moment is in the territory of the Serb Republic; how pressure can be applied to the Serb authorities for the purpose of extradition; and who is in fact, apart from bodies within states, in charge of his arrest.

"From the point of view of international institutions, IFOR does not have a mandate to require the extradition, but it has the mandate to arrest in the event of contact with a suspect. Every state is, however, obliged to act according to the findings of the International Court. This is also the duty of Interpol, which can be given an order only by the International Court," Hodzic says.

The war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic were indicted on 25 July 1995. The question when these, but also many other war criminals, will finally appear in the dock at the Hague tribunal, how much time will pass by then and whether they will ever be tried remains open, however. We can only hope.

**[Box, p 7]**

**Who Is a War Criminal**

"The International Court in The Hague understands under the term 'war criminal' persons who ordered or committed serious violations of the Geneva Convention, that is, crimes against persons and property protected by the provisions of the Geneva Convention, deliberate murder, torture, inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, deliberate infliction of physical and other damage, destruction and theft of property, forcing prisoners of war to serve in the armed forces of the enemy's army, deliberate destruction of a prisoner of war or a civilian, denying his right to a fair trial, illegal deportation or illegal prevention of a civilian's free movement, and the taking of civilians as hostages. It is only natural that these crimes include genocide, rape, destruction of state-owned property and religious institutions etc.," Zijad Hasic, the deputy of the minister of justice, says.

**[Box, p 7]**

**Unparalled Crimes**

According to the report prepared by the Commission for the Collection of Data About War Criminals, more than 1,600 cases of destruction of cultural and historical monuments under protection and medical institutions necessary for survival have been recorded. At least 1,008 religious objects of the Islamic community, 170 of the Catholic community, 10 objects of the Orthodox, and four of the Jewish community have been either damaged or pulled down. Regarding medical institutions, the University Hospital of Kosevo was hit by shells on 131 occasions, in which attacks one physician, four patients, one medical technician, and three civilians died. The number of shells fired at the "Sarajevo" State Hos-

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pital cannot be established. And the lists of other war crimes are endless.

**[Box, p 7]**

**Extradition Procedure**

The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs adopted a document about the rules for the execution of effective decrees for the extradition of accused persons and for the forwarding of cases on request to the International Court in The Hague. "The arrest procedure, the power to arrest a suspect, the transport through the states to the International Court, the taking over of material, the financing of the whole procedure, etc., have been clearly defined in that document," Zijad Hasic, the deputy minister, says.

**B-H: Article Views Parties' Participation in Elections**

*AU1202210896 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 96 pp 6-7*

[Report by Mirjana Micevska: "The SDS Is Waiting for Amnesty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The announced first post-war elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are justifiably preoccupying the public at large. There is no doubt that their result will influence the future fate of our country, that is, whether Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to reintegrate or whether that process will stagnate. Although the election campaign is gathering steam, there are many moot points at the moment about which parties will run, who they will represent, and where.

The temporary elections commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, together with the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission, is drawing up election rules, which should soon be made public, that is, they should be finally defined sometime in March or April. There is still a lot of uncertainty in all this, and the latest proposal by the organizers is that the elections should first be held at the level of municipalities and cantons and then at the level of the federation and state.

The greatest dilemma is whether the elections will be organized separately in entities or at the same time throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The participation of parties in the elections will largely depend on that.

**Multitude of Parties**

According to the OSCE, 50 parties, associations, and other organizations are registered on the territory of the federation, while there are 26 on the territory of the Serb entity. This however does not mean that all these parties and organizations will participate in the elections, all the more so — as Mato Tadic, federation justice minister and member of the temporary elections commission, says — since there is no need for all these parties to register at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many of them will not participate at the elections at all levels; the municipal, cantonal, federal and the Bosnia-Herzegovina level. At the Bosnia-Herzegovina level, only those parties with deputies in the parliament will be registered.

According to the present state of affairs, as far as the federation is concerned, the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] can run in the elections, as can all the other parliamentary parties: The Social Democratic Party [SDP], the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBSD], the Liberal Party [LS], the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO], and the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO]. In the meantime, the parties that have registered during the war — such as the Republican Party [RS], the Croatian Peasants' Party [HSS], and Silajdzic's new party, which has given rise to high expectations — will probably join in the elections.

The dilemma facing the commission at the moment is whether to go for a new registration of parties for the elections or to accept the existing register. As for the OSCE, it accepts the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina has a Law on Political Parties, and is proposing that the existing legislature be incorporated into the draft of election rules. This gives rise to the question of whether the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] will participate in the elections and how, since this law bans the work of this party in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Opinions regarding this issue vary. For example, SDA Spokesman Ismet Grbo believes that the entities can decide which parties can run in the elections on their territories. As for the SDS, people indicted for war crimes will not be able to participate in the elections, while some kind of an amnesty for the party in general is expected.

**Ban on Functioning**

In the SDP, they are of the opinion that the SDS has been banned by law in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the question is whether this process will be reopened if there is a new registration of parties at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The SDP, as the largest opposition parliamentary party, has certain views on the verification and participation in the elections. First of all, it is not fair to bring into question the parties that have been verified by

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the Constitution and have preserved the legitimacy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to SDP Presidency Member Esad Zgodic, they should be enabled to register and function throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The SDP holds an interesting view when it comes to parties that do not have Bosnia-Herzegovina in their names. For example, the Socialist Party of Serbia is registered in Serbia, but is entitled to run in the elections in the Serb Republic. There are other parties like that in the Serb entity, while the SDA was mentioned as an example in the federation.

Ismet Grbo thinks that such remarks are valid, but believes that a group of people that have organized a party should be allowed the freedom to give it the name they want. Minister Tadic also does not think that the lack of the Bosnia-Herzegovina in a party's name is an obstacle since the party program and tendencies are more important.

As far as the federation is concerned, many dilemmas will be resolved when the federal law on political parties, which is being prepared, is passed.

However, it is certain that the commission is facing a large and arduous job. It will be primarily up to the elections in the entities who will be representing which party in the authorities at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**B-H: Plavsic Views SDS Platform, Election Preparations**

*AU1302070696 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 pp 12-13*

[Interview with "Serb Republic Vice President" Biljana Plavsic by Jovan Janjic in Banja Luka; date not given: "Salvation in a Nation State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By introducing a multi-party system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three leading national parties became, each for its own nation, national movements, because, each of the three peoples voted for its own party. Thus, even people who, because of their attitudes, belong to some other groupings voted or joined these parties (the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]). Biljana Plavsic has been in the SDS since its foundation.

[Janjic] How do you view political life in the Serb Republic?

[Plavsic] Parties are mushrooming in this region, which is nothing unusual. The same situation exists in the FRY. In fact, they are the same people. You know the old saying "Two Serbs — three parties," so a situation like this could have been expected. The opposition parties are making big preparations for the elections that are supposed to take place this fall. That is felt particularly strongly here, in Banja Luka. We had planned it roughly the same way; to hold elections when the war was over. What is symptomatic is that some people are in a great hurry.

[Janjic] Who are you refering to?

[Plavsic] The left-bloc parties have become particularly active. Just today, I read in a newspaper the statement by Dragutin Ilic, chairman of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic. He says in POLITIKA that the nationalist parties that are now in power in Bosnia-Herzegovina have lost their legitimacy, not only by choosing the war option in 1992, but also by their resistance to holding elections according to the Constitution as early as a year ago. He counts the SDS among the nationalist parties that caused the war! He has not even bothered to understand the difficulties that the SDS was going through on the eve of the war, making huge efforts to prevent its outbreak. You know what we were doing to prevent it. We made a number of proposals only to avoid tragedies that could have been foreseen already then, but they accepted none of them.... To accuse the SDS and put it in the same basket with the other two parties that, while we were negotiating with them to avoid the war, were already preparing for it, means that he (Ilic) is denying what is clear to everybody; that the war was forced upon the Serbs.

Or the other accusation — that we resisted the holding of elections for one year! Please, just imagine how holding elections while the war was in full swing would have looked! That would have been chaos and carnage.... To force such an evil upon our own people would have been terrible. Just imagine how the Serb people would have reacted. I am convinced that many people would not have run in the elections at all, and quite rightly, indeed, because Mr. Ilic would have organized elections when a sword was hanging over our heads, when the entire world was attacking us!

[Janjic] How do you understand the statements by the socialists that, with the equalization of the state systems in Serbia and the Serb Republic, the ground would be prepared for the all-Serb unification?

[Plavsic] The Serbs here would be most happy if the mother country accepted us. Beyond these ideologies, there is something much worthier than that — the awareness that we belong to one and same nation. This is the determination and final goal of the SDS. But how can we accomplish that when the mother country — that is, the regime there — does not want us? The Serbs today have a somewhat abnormal attitude toward the

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question of national identity. Cosmopolitan parties stress as their advantage that they are showing understanding and love toward the entire world, while hating their own people. I do not know how any sort of unification can be achieved, given such an attitude toward one's own people.

[Janjic] The blockade on the Drina River seems not to apply to the socialists and the communists in their crusade in the Serb Republic.

[Plavsic] (laughs) It seems that this sort of communication has been open all the time.

[Janjic] Is the SDS preparing for the elections?

[Plavsic] It is. And it ought to be well prepared. I think that is the most important thing to be done now, because only a national party, if it wins the elections, will be able to preserve what has been achieved. The Dayton accord offers great possibilities for us as well. Everything depends on how we shall work, whether we shall take care of Serbdom, whether we shall make sure we get the utmost out of the Dayton accord, whether we shall take care of victims who gave their lives for all this — those who died fighting against the enemy, but also for the Serbian state.... It is clear to every illiterate old woman that the life of the Serbs is protected only in a Serbian nation state. I think all of us are aware of the situation, and if the left-bloc parties win the election, it will be terrible. Everything that has been achieved so far will be obliterated in a moment. We not longer trust them. They had 45 years to show what they could do. First, the SDS must thank some people who did not behave appropriately and in accordance with the law, even if that was due to this war chaos. Every war brings forth some profiteers. Many of them are Serbs. Some of them were aiding the SDS, the army, soldiers on the front.... A monument should be erected in memory of such people, but they should keep away from the public, from people's eyes, from the SDS, state affairs, and institutions.... With its platform, as it was in the beginning, the SDS is able to win the elections. It is a clear platform, with a strong social component. The social component is now being developed, to make it topical, because there are indeed a number of social problems and because, when it is said that a humanitarian disaster is obvious in the entire region, then any standard welfare program is out of question.

**B-H: Serb Socialist Leader Discusses Platform, Chances**

*AU1302095096 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 pp 12-13*

[Interview with Dragutin Ilic, chairman of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, by Velimir Bozic; place and date not given: "Capitalism Will Not Pass"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Banja Luka the fifth session of the Main Board of the SPRS [Socialist Party of the Serb Republic] was held, at which decisions were adopted regarding this party's preparations for the upcoming general elections in the Union of the Serb Republic and Muslim-Croatian Federation. The meeting was attended by Dragutin Brcanin, member of the Executive Board of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and federal minister for information in the government of the FRY. What are the socialists of the Serb Republic planning to do in 1996? According to the decisions adopted, coalitions are anticipated to possibly occur on the eve of the elections, but also thereafter, with all parties fostering similar orientations in the Serb Republic, but also outside the Serbian state, including parties in the Muslim-Croatian Federation. The first contacts of the Liberal Party with the like-minded in the Muslim-Croatian entity, as we unofficially find out, have already been performed. Which is to say, the race has begun, so we have asked Dragutin Ilic to assess the socialists' chances and circumstances.

[Ilic] I hope that all of us together, meaning also other political parties active in the Serb Republic, will accomplish a minimum of this people's interests, because one should not forget that in the political struggle, in the joint parliament with the Muslim-Croatian Federation, we shall have a lot of difficulties.

However, it must not happen again what we have been able to see for ourselves, that we obstruct action, that we are constantly accused of being uncooperative, and of course I hope that in the parliament there will be the greatest number of SPRS deputies, and we shall vigorously defend the interests of our people. We expect forces behaving in a similar way to enter the parliament as well. I am not convinced that nationalists will win people's trust there, except, perhaps, for the Croats, because of the extremely strong influence of the Catholic church and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] in Zagreb.

[Bozic] Can you tell us concretely what the platform of the SPRS is like?

[Ilic] The platform we shall offer to citizens will be based on our support for a democratic, legal state in which all the citizens will be equal and protected by the

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law, and for an independent judiciary. In such a state legislative and executive authorities will be separated. We want to create a prosperous, democratic state where the citizens are happy to live, and to which those who left would come back. Territory without people means nothing, and has no perspective. We shall be supporting the equal treatment of all forms of ownership. We shall not be forcing privatization at any price, but we shall create conditions for all forms of ownership to be equal, adopting the form that will produce the best results. The state will have to regulate certain things, with regard to reconstruction and development, in order for some regions to be able to develop in a balanced way. We shall not allow any usurpation of property belonging to the state, or any sort of revival of the liberal capitalism that Europe abandoned 200 years ago. Which is to say, those who own capital have to bring it in, and buy things, rather than to take away from people what they accomplished over the past period. We shall be supporting the freedom of religion and confession. As for the church as an institution, we shall have a civilized relationship with it, and we particularly pay tribute to our Christian Orthodox church for what it has done to preserve the identity of the Serbian people. We shall be supporting the church in its religious function, but it has to be separated from the state. We cannot support the state and the attitude toward the church that has been fostered by the current authorities, because otherwise we would be like Iran.

[Bozic] After five difficult war years there is a great fear among the Serb people that within the restoration of former Bosnia-Herzegovina or the current Union of the Serb Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the future joint parliament the policy of brotherhood and unity might be reintroduced, which proved to be disadvantageous for the Serbian people. Do the socialists have a solution for that problem?

[Ilic] The SPRS holds the attitude that this war was forced upon the Serbian people, that the Serbian people did not want it, but whether the war really needed to be waged the way it was, or in a way that would cause much fewer victims, I do not want to discuss, because all our citizens were able to see for themselves how the previous regime functioned, and what the consequences of its rule and policy were. We believe the separation of the three peoples had to come about in order for us to understand where mistakes were made and by whom. Only thereafter is it possible to establish any normal cooperation. Which is to say, those who consider as possible the restoration of Bosnia or Yugoslavia as it used to be, are fantasizing. Those who are realistic in their assessments consider that sort of thing as impossible. Since in Serbia the Socialist Party is in power, it is logical to expect that the socialists' victory here would bring about the integration with our mother country, and I must point out that the first goal of our platform is to accomplish national and state unity with Serbia. If, for instance, the radicals were in power in Serbia, my party would support the possible victory of that party in the Serb Republic as well, because in such a way the desires of the citizens in the Serb Republic would be fulfilled much sooner. With the socialists, you can be sure, no integration with Bosnia will ever happen, but rather with Yugoslavia.

[Bozic] Will your party be ready to form coalitions with the existing or new parties?

[Ilic] We shall make assessments about that when the right time comes, for I think it is too early to talk about that now. Our principle is that we cannot form a coalition with parties that stand for hate, chauvinism and intolerance, and whose platforms contain elements of revanchism or destruction. We can form coalitions with parties that are orientated toward democracy, prosperity, humanism and a happier, more humane and juster society than the one we have been living in over the past four years.

### B-H: Liberal Party Leader Views Preelection Campaign

*AU1302121296 Sarajevo NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 96 p 9*

[Interview with Liberal Party leader Rasim Kadic by Azra Terzic; place and date not given: "Agreement With Haris Silajdzic Is Not Ruled Out"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The preelection race in Bosnia-Herzegovina has started, although it is not completely clear how the elections will look. All parliamentary parties, just like those that are not in the parliament, have started elaborate preparations for the elections. As a possible surprise in the upcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, U.S. media and foreign diplomats mention the Liberal Party and its leader Rasim Kadic. This man, who was, in former times, the leading young politician in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has become prominent with his attitudes to the fight for free and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina over the past few years. Before the start of the preelection campaign, Rasim Kadic tells NOVA BOSNA:

[Kadic] At this moment, the most significant activity, apart from the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the elections and, according to some information we have received that has still not been made public, the elections will take place on 22 September of this year. Our standpoint is that the elections should by no means

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be postponed, because that would have huge political consequences, and it would probably also have some heavy consequences for the future of the country. We are a party that, at this moment, is active on the territory of the federation, and our primary intention is to take part in the elections. However, it is interesting that, in Banja Luka, there is the Liberal Party lead by Miodrag Zivanovic, who, before the war, was our representative in that city. Initially, we will establish contact with them, but that by no means means a return to a unified party. We will probably establish a partnership for peace and democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That will be a kind of inter-entity political cooperation.

**Domination of National Parties**

[Terzic] Has your party already started its preelection campaign?

[Kadic] After years of work in a "warm regime" [as published], after years of war, we have started our pre-election campaign. I would say that we have shifted all our activities into the first gear. Recently, we have held consultations regarding the organizational, cadre, financial, and all other aspects of the preelection campaign. A special emphasis will be given to our in-country activities, but also to our activities in the countries in which our refugees live. We will cooperate with all liberal parties in Europe. We have good contacts, particularly with the liberals of Croatia, Slovenia, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Great Britain.... We will try to create good cooperation with the political parties in those countries, so that they help us conduct our pre-election campaign.

**Central Position**

[Terzic] In your opinion, what are the possible political options for the elections in September?

[Kadic] As for the possible political options, it is doubtless that the strong national political parties will be dominant again. The fact that Haris Silajdzic, as a very important person, has been definitely removed from the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] shows that a silent and limited, but in any case new, political restructuring of Bosnia-Herzegovina has started; I hope it will develop in a tolerant atmosphere among the Bosniaks. It is probable that it will give rise to similar processes among the Croat and Serb people in Bosnia as well. We can expect that, in the elections, one factor will consist of a block of national parties that will not enter a coalition. Another factor will consist of a sort of group of social democrats, formed by the SDP [Social Democrat Party] and the USBH [Union of Social-Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina]. A third factor will be our Liberal Party, which has taken a central position, and I hope that, at the elections, our party will be a party of pleasant surprise. [passage omitted]

[Terzic] Lately, there has been a lot of talk that the liberals have offered a place in their party to Haris Silajdzic. How much truth is there in that, and can you tell us something in general about a possible coalition with a party that, according to some information, the former prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina could form?

[Kadic] There has never been any mention of that, but, among the all the political options and the distribution of political forces his options are limited. [passage omitted]

**The First Act Has Already Taken Place**

[Terzic] That means that there are major changes in the political leadership of the country ahead of us?

[Kadic] The first act has already taken place. Haris Silajdzic is no longer in the SDA. The second act could determine the position of all political players on the eve of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but, at this moment, it is very hard to foresee what will happen.

[Terzic] Can you tell us how many members the liberals have, and where they are active?

[Kadic] I cannot give you an exact answer, because no one knows even known how many citizens we have in the country, not to mention the number of party members. What I can say is this: We are active on 28 municipal boards. Our members are not numerous, and that is always the case with liberal parties, but we have restored our links with the Bihac region and with Gorazde, and people have expressed a lot of interest in joining our party. I will reveal to you that, this week, three very influential men from Bosnian politics have become our members. So there is a clear indication that our patience has paid off, in a way. The number of party members does not worry us at this moment, and it will not determine the percentage of votes in the elections.

## B-H: Gen. Divjak Interviewed on Future Federal Army

*AU1302101596 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 96 pp 30-32*

[Interview with Brigadier General Jovan Divjak, assistant to the chief of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Milan Jelovac; place and date not given: "Turkey Will Train the Federal Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Among soldiers, I am respected as an honest officer, and among citizens as a man.

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Do I need a better acknowledgment?" asks Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Brigadier General Jovan Divjak, who, today, is the assistant to the chief of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in charge of cooperation with civilian structures, who, in many people's opinion, is a Sarajevo war legend. "That is something like ikebana [Japanese art of flower arranging]," one of the most qualified and most experienced officers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army says. That fact was the reason for our interview. Of course, the Dayton agreement is its logical beginning.

[Divjak] The Dayton agreement represents a latent danger for the resumption of the combat activities, and not only on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because it is crushing for the Bosniaks, and Croatia and Serbia have secured their border between the Orthodox Church in the east and the Catholic Church in the west. Is this not a step toward an "anschluss" of this territory to Croatia and Serbia? I do not understand why the United States and Europe are "presenting" the Serb Republic with 49 percent of the territory when, according to the 1991 census, there were 31.4 percent of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina or why has the world has allowed Bosnia-Herzegovina to be divided into three almost completely pure ethnic entities.

[Jelovac] What is your appraisal of the future military development in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Have you been satisfied with the efficiency of IFOR [Implementation Force], the separation of the sides in conflict, the security situation, the freedom of movement, and so on, so far?

[Divjak] The present military situation is under IFOR's full control, which strengthens the prospects for a longer period without incidents. However, one has an impression that the armies of the three entities will intensify their military training and maintain the level of their combat readiness "just in case" and for the time after the departure of IFOR. I am convinced that the presence of NATO forces will be significant after a year passes. IFOR has completely implemented the separation of the forces to 4 km from the lines of contact, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, the organizing and the constant work of the mixed military committees from the lowest to the highest levels of command. Unfortunately, IFOR has not taken all the steps necessary to provide freedom of movement and to carry out the exchange of prisoners. The general conclusion is that the agreement on the military aspects of the peace agreement has been carried out more successfully than the civic implementation, which could, at a certain point, exert a negative influence on the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

[Jelovac] Have all the prisoners of war been released? Foreign media have reported that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is still keeping a certain number of prisoners of war in the Zenica prison. Is that true and, if so, who are those people?

[Divjak] The information I have indicates that all three sides are keeping a certain number of prisoners of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Serbia. The relevant European factors indicate that a significant number of imprisoned Bosniaks are being detained and are working in the Aleksinac mines, and we still do not know what happened to 8,000 to 10,000 Srebrenica inhabitants. Some of the prisoners of war have been charged with and convicted of war crimes, so the sides, by keeping them, want to "extort" some kind of better treatment or concessions.

[Jelovac] At the moment, what is the situation on the Sarajevo suburbs that are momentarily under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs? According to what you know, will they withdraw after 19 March?

[Divjak] The situation among the Serbs in Grbavica, Ilidza, Vogosca, Hadzici, and Ilijas is very confused. Namely, there have been diverse statements by the Pale leadership: on the construction of a new Serb Sarajevo, that "the Serbs will not stay in an Islamic country," then "we will stay, nobody can make us leave," and so on, have caused great tension. The prolongation of the adoption of the Amnesty Law will complicate the situation even more. I have information that pressure is being put on the Serbs to leave the town, because "they do not want to live with the Muslims," factories have been moved out (TAS, PRETIS, ORAO, FAMOS), family houses have been pulled down, and so on.

However, other information indicates that the Serbs who were born in Sarajevo want to stay, which is proved by dozens of Serbs who have been coming into the part of Sarajevo under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government to talk and to make agreements on the common life in the united Sarajevo. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina accepts and supports the resolutions of the government that all the Serbs who have not committed war crimes should stay in Sarajevo, and that human rights and basic freedoms should be granted to them. The fact is that the Pale leadership is continuing to insist on the claim that "the Serbs do not want and cannot live with the Muslims," which can cause the collapse of the idea of a multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina. If Sarajevo loses the Serbs as the third constituent nation, there will be no united Bosnia-Herzegovina within the internationally recognized borders.

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[Jelovac] The official goal of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities is a multicultural and multinational society; however, it seems as if there is less and less of it from day to day.

[Divjak] It is a fact that a certain number of the relevant European factors are working on the basis that "if a multinational Yugoslavia could not survive, it is impossible for such a Bosnia-Herzegovina to survive." The aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina was started with the main goal of dividing its territory on the ethnic principle — one nation, one state (all the Serbs in one state). Although the official authorities, in all their activities (international and domestic), define Bosnia-Herzegovina as a democratic, multinational, multicultural, and multireligious state, they tend to deviate from that idea in practice. Is it not a logical question — if the Serbs in the Serb Republic and the Croats in the territories with the Croatian national majority do not develop multinational relations, why should only the Bosniaks do so? Fortunately for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in all three nations there are a significant number of people of civic provenance who have decided to fight for the multinationality and multiculturality of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Jelovac] Foreigners notice a tendency of Islamization that has even been stimulated from the highest state levels. What is your comment on that?

[Divjak] As you claim, foreigners notice "the wave of Islamization." I know that they have also been noticing "the wave of Catholicism" and "the wave of Orthodoxy," which is the lower threshold of propaganda. I do not mind girls with kerchiefs on their heads and with their faces veiled strolling down the streets of the town in the evening, because beside them, in the same street, there are girls in miniskirts and dressed in European fashion. The quality of Sarajevo is in the tolerance of differences; it was, it is, and it will be. Those who wanted to divide Sarajevo dislike that.

[Jelovac] Of course, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army should also be multinational, but some people are warning that it is growing less and less multinational day by day.

[Divjak] As long as there is one single Serb, Croat, Hungarian, or Albanian in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, it will be a multinational army. The share of Serbs and Croats in the brigades of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo and Tuzla is proportionate to the number of those living on these territories. Should we reproach the brigades of the 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for having so few Serbs among them, if we know that, for example, the Bosniaks comprise 97.6 percent of the population in Cazin?

[Jelovac] Did the creation of an ethnically pure Army start with the military review in Zenica (Izetbegovic's review of members of the 3d Corps) and by the personnel purges in the top ranks of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Divjak] I was disappointed by the way in which the celebration of the third anniversary of the formation of the 3d Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was carried out. There have been mistakes on the part of the most responsible persons in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was also proved by the military review in Zenica. I am sure that this was a "false step" that should not be politicized.

It is a fact that the Bosniaks, together with the Croats and the Serbs, were building both their states and their armies during the war, and one should tolerate possible mistakes! I do not think that there is a personnel purge being carried out in order to create an ethnically pure Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Jelovac] How many Islamic volunteers (mujahidin) were there in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to what degree have they influenced the Islamization of the Army, and how many of them are still in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina? There is, for instance, also the 7th Muslim Brigade.

[Divjak] The number of mujahidin has never exceeded 500. Their stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina has brought more evil than good. Namely, their staying was good propaganda for the enemies of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Your readers probably know that, among the mujahidin, there were mostly adventurers and the spies who have been working for the intelligence services of England, France, the United States, Russia, and even the Israeli Mossad. I am sure that everybody is happy that they have left, but we are also worried about the fact that, in the army of the Serb Republic, there are still "volunteers" from Russia, Greece, Ukraine, and other countries, and IFOR [Implementation Force] has not reacted yet...

The 7th Muslim Brigade is a regular unit of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which differs from the other brigades of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina only in that they strictly obey the rules of the Islam, which represents neither Islamization nor a violation of the military regulations of the Army.

[Jelovac] The general public has not quite understood what really happened to the attempt to lift the blockade of Sarajevo last year? Who opposed it?

[Divjak] There was no one reason why the lifting of the Sarajevo blockade in 1995 failed. I will cite, in

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my opinion, only the most important reasons: the bad planning of the operation, inadequate equipment — we did not have superiority in equipment and personnel — the front was too wide, the coordination of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] (from Kiseljak) was also not realized, and it is also not enough to be able to liberate Sarajevo by military means, let alone by political ones?!

[Jelovac] The war, it seems, is over. Looking from a distance, were the Serbs capable of capturing Sarajevo? Apart from their superiority in equipment, they also had the opportunity to set the time and manner of operations. What do you think about Mladic?

[Divjak] Combat documents of the former JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army] that we captured on 3 May 1992 stated that Sarajevo should be captured in five to six days. Everybody understood that he who holds Sarajevo holds all of Bosnia-Herzegovina in his hands. In 1992 and 1993, the aggressor, on many occasions, tried to break through the defenses of Sarajevo along the following routes: Jewish Cemetery-Marijin Dvor-Hum; Mojmilo hill Zuc (and vice versa); and Stup-Nedzarici-Lukavica (and vice versa). In August 1992, in the positions around Sarajevo there were 35 weapons over 12.7-mm (tanks, guns, mortars, and so on) per 1 km, and the Allies had 25 pieces per 1 km of front when they were attacking Berlin in 1944! If they could, they would certainly have "cut up" Sarajevo "into small pieces," they would not have pitilessly destroy it.

The Hague tribunal has said all there is to say with the war crimes indictment of Gen. Mladic! What else is there for me to say? However, as a witness, particularly of the activities around Sarajevo, I claim that he is a bad strategist. He had immense quantities of equipment (for example, the Army of the Serb Republic had 500 tanks, and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had between 60 to 80), the aggressor had 20 to 30 airplanes and up to 50 helicopters, and he used them badly. He decided to shoot and kill civilians, and just imagine what would have happened if he had used 15 to 20 tanks and 20 combat helicopters to cut off and control the Hrasnica-Igman-Pazarici "road of life"? Mladic was a bad strategist, and what he controlled during the war was what he had inherited from the former JNA.

[Jelovac] What is your interpretation of the recent development in Mostar and who is guilty of the incidents in Usora?

[Divjak] Mostar is the question of the moment and of the future, not only of the Federation, but of the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina. But it is also a question of the success and the implementation of the Dayton agreement. Both sides bear some responsibility. The war profiteers have also meddled there, as well as a considerable number of those who belong in The Hague. One of the solutions is to remove those people who are guilty of the mutual killing and genocide and, with new and honest people, to start working on the creation of confidence and the establishment of the united authority on the territory of the whole town. The international factor bears responsibility for the insufficiently energetic and consistent implementation of the Washington agreement.

Basically, there is no big difference in the causes, reasons, and consequences between what has been going on in Mostar and Usora. Incidental situations arise there where there is no democratic authority and where there is despotism and anarchy. Unfortunately, innocent people get hurt. In many regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only law is still — a gun.

[Jelovac] What do you think about the new Defense Law? Is it not absurd that the joint command of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO will only command formations higher than corps level?

[Divjak] In essence, the law represent a good document, the starting platform for some future organization of a united federal army. This is not the best solution, but, with the creation of a professional army and by strengthening the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the present-day distrust will disappear, and, anyway, the officers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO are achieving better results than the politicians.

[Jelovac] What kind of Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina do you expect when the Americans begin the training and armament?

[Divjak] The future Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina — that is, the Federal Army — must be professional and must have high-quality personnel with psychological and physical qualities (capabilities) who are capable of handling sophisticated weapons, multinational. It must be non-partisan and with the right to express religious feelings (but as a private, intimate thing). I know that the Americans will not be too involved in the training of the Federal Army, nor they will participate in its armament. They will probably leave it to Turkey, which was proved by the visit of a high military delegation from Turkey and by the signing of a military agreement. I think that the training of the pilots should nopt take place on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but everything else should be carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO have skillful military and expert personnel who can

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provide quality teaching to its army. One should remain independent of outside factors.

[Jelovac] What is your comment on the recent events on the internal political stage of Bosnia-Herzegovina; for instance, the split between Izetbegovic and Silajdzic?

[Divjak] The departure of Mr. Silajdzic from the office of prime minister has, in my opinion, weakened the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina internationally. At crucial moments for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Silajdzic knew how to influence the relevant world factors to take adequate steps in Bosnia with his public appearances, his sharp sentences, his energetic action, and even by his charm. Mr. Izetbegovic will soon realize that the departure of Mr. Silajdzic represents the greatest loss for Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the battle for Bosnia continues, and I believe that Silajdzic will stay at the front lines to fight for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina on civic principles.

[Jelovac] And, in the end, do you have any political ambitions? Will you get involved in political life?

[Divjak] There are two things I do not want to deal with in my life — politics and business. For both things, a man must have two faces. A politician is trying to convince the people of something he himself does not believe, and a businessman always thinks bout earning a dime more from human weaknesses! I am neither prone to, nor capable of something like that.

### B-H: Zubak: 'No Basis' for Founding Intelligence Service

*AU0902171696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has sent an open letter to the members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the chairman of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the chairman of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding the adoption of a decision to found the Agency for Research and Documentation.

By carefully analyzing the decision to set up the Agency for Research and Documentation and the law on the republican ministries and other organs of the republican administration, President Zubak has established that the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the law on the ministries have been violated seriously and has warned individual members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina about it. The decision to set up the agency was made, President Zubak claims, before the announcement and introduction of the law on the republican ministries and other organs of the republican administration, which should have contained the legal basis for making this decision. He says that the adoption of the decision on the basis of the law that has not taken effect represents the crudest violation of the principles of the law, which the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina must also respect.

The law on the republican ministries and other organs of the republican administration represents a legal basis, but not a basis to found a new service, especially not one with such extensive rights and powers. It represents a legal basis for a decision that should regulate the organization and the functioning of the state security service and the organizational units that cooperate with Interpol until the adoption of an appropriate law, which should happen by 1 June of this year at the latest. So, there is no basis whatsoever for setting up a new service, especially not an agency with powers greater than those envisaged by the law.

The letter states, among other things: The above has led me to conclude that this decision is yet further proof of the practice and attempts to take over the rights and powers of the federal organs via the transitional republican organs or to interfere in their jurisdiction and work.

Considering the above-mentioned facts, President Zubak takes the view that, until the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina makes the decision on the founding of the agency invalid and passes an act that it is indeed empowered to pass, it will not be possible to work on the implementation of the law on internal affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### B-H: Iranian Envoy Views Relations, U.S. Policy

*AU0902231296 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 96 p 5*

[Interview with Iranian Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Mohammed Ebrahim Taherian by Edina Kamenica; place and date not given: "Bosnia Is Nobody's Colony"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perhaps it would have been more logical, and in accordance with good behavior, to use the 17th anniversary of the revolution in this friendly country as a reason for an interview with Iranian Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Mohammed Ebrahim Taherian. However, we believe that his excellency was not surprised that we started the interview with a very concrete question: Was he surprised by what former Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic had to say at one of the latest seminars of the

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VKBI [not further specified] regarding some novelties in relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iran?

[Taherian] What did he say?

[Kamenica] Briefly, that Bosnia was not ordered, but was "advised" to choose one of the two, the United States or Iran, when it came to military cooperation. And the minister stressed (for the first time publicly) that Bosnia had chosen — the United States. Many found this statement unexpected. Did you?

[Taherian] The gentleman's statement, of course, concerns only him. We believe that no country has the right to impose a choice on another country. When we came to the aid of this country, at its request and the request of its people, we did not take upon ourselves the right to say: We will help, but, in return, you have to intensify or reduce relations with some other country. Bosnia is nobody's colony.

**Unnecessary Noise**

[Kamenica] I would like you to be more precise. Was that the first time, as rumor has it, that you heard about the new military course of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, from Mr. Sacirbegovic at that seminar?

[Taherian] We are completely clear about the views of the government, that is, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we have not noticed anything new in those views.

[Kamenica] So what the local observers said is true; that Iran is slighdy resentful about the way in which the Bosnia-Herzegovina diplomatic corps revealed its new foreign political relations?

[Taherian] We have not heard anything new about the Bosnia-Herzegovina views. After all, we are among the states that have been supporting agreements because they have been supported by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and people. It is perfectly natural that we are doing everything Bosnia asks of us at the present time. However, there is a lot of noise, a lot of fuss being made about everything these days. Over the last few days, I have spoken to some U.S. correspondents. They asked me: Where are the Iranian soldiers, what are they doing? I told them that Bosnia has never asked for soldiers. Those of a different opinion obviously either cannot tell what is what or, in the interests of their own propaganda, they launch certain rumors. If we were to bring our soldiers here, we obviously would not keep them in a museum. We have still not forgotten how Srebrenica and Zepa fell and how cool certain great powers were at the time, powers that today claim that they support Bosnia. However, the u cle has turned out to be more compassionate than the mother. The OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference] and Iran have done everything to help Bosnia through legal channels. We even distributed humanitarian aid that way. We are without blemish before God and the Bosnian people. Now, we are ready to help Bosnia in her reconstruction. Some people do not like that. They look at themselves. When they offer help, they do so with a mask on their faces.

[Kamenica] Has the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government given you, as a trusted friend, any information about our new military organization?

[Taherian] Bosnia's defense system and any other system is Bosnia's business. There is no reason why this government should ask permission from anyone for anything. If it wants assistance, we are ready to give it, or rather, the OIC is ready. Very soon, we will have a meeting of the working group in Islamabad, where we will discuss all current issues, including Bosnia. [Kamenica] I was not talking about permissions, but rather the impression that the Bosnia-Herzegovina officials publicly assess the assistance we have been receiving from Iran either timidly or not at all.

[Taherian] I hope that this is not the case.

[Kamenica] Is it because of these "novelties" that you visited Tehran recently?

[Taherian] My family is there. However, I hope that the Bosnia-Herzegovina officials will respond in some way to all this noise being raised around us.

[Kamenica] What is seen by Tehran as the most current issue regarding Bosnia?

[Taherian] The Dayton agreement. Regardless of how problematic it is, its implementation is important. No one should be allowed to comment on it. [sentence as published]

[Kamenica] Why was the meeting between Iran, Greece, and Bosnia not held in January?

[Taherian] The prime minister and foreign minister were replaced here, and the same happened in Greece. They need to get to know one another. We are ready. Perhaps the next meeting will involve four sides.

[Kamenica] What do you mean? Who would be the fourth side?

[Taherian] Let us leave that to the readers' imagination.

[Kamenica] Is it not absurd that the two irreconcilable countries, as it stands now, Iran and the United States, both find themselves here in the same job, both helping? Have there been any contacts between you regarding with Bosnia?

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[Taherian] I hope that it is as you say, that everyone is here to help improve things for Bosnia. As for us, I know that this is the reason for our presence, to help and nothing else. And the relations between us and the United States are not something that should concern Bosnia.

**Limits of Patience**

[Kamenica] Is that so? The fact that not one congressman, who is also deciding on Bosnia, has asked Clinton to change relations with Iran is not an unimportant fact here.

[Taherian] I would prefer to talk about Bosnia a bit more. Still, if you insist.... Let us wait. Many thing will become clear in a while. Iran does not want to have anything to do with a third country in Bosnia. There are too many problems here as it is. We do not want to become one ourselves.

[Kamenica] Many people do not understand the U.S. policy toward Iran.

[Taherian] We do not have enemies among the American people, and I hope one can say that the opposite is also the case. However, the U.S. Government has put aside $20 million for the toppling of the Iranian regime, and it is not even concealing that. Our president sent them a message: It would be better if you spent that money to get to know us. So the solution lies in the United States, that is, an improvement in its government.

[Kamenica] Your assembly has voted for something similar?

[Taherian] That is natural. Every action results in a reaction.

[Kamenica] You did say that, recently, there has been a lot of noise directed at you. You have not commented on that.

[Taherian] This noise is coming from countries that are facing elections and are doing everything they can to be successful. Bosnia has become just a commodity for some circles. We have been taught by Islam to look at life and death differently. If you hear that an innocent man's blood has been spilt and you do not react, then you become an accomplice. This is still not practiced in the world, and this worries us. Our silence? We all face God. However, I do agree with you. Some things ought to be said, but they should not be said by us. We do not accept manipulations with our reputation, or debates on the reasons for our presence here. Everything, including patience, has its limits.

**B-H: Iranian Envoy: 'Some' Treat Bosnia as 'Commodity'**

*AU0802132896 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jan 96 p 9*

[ONASA report: "Bosnia Is Nobody's Colony"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 February — Mohammed Ebrahim Taherian, ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Bosnia-Herzegovina, has said that, just because it is supplying aid to Bosnia, Iran would not allow itself to demand from Bosnia to change relations with some other country, as Bosnia is nobody's colony.

"We have not heard anything new about the attitude of Bosnia-Herzegovina toward Iran. We are among the states that have been supporting agreements because they have been supported by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and people. It is perfectly natural that we are doing everything Bosnia asks of us at the present time," Ambassador Taherian says. According to him, Bosnia has become just a commodity for some circles.

"We have been taught by Islam to look at life and death differently. If you hear that an innocent man's blood has been spilt and you do not react, then you yourself become an accomplice. This is still not practiced in the world, and this worries us. We do not accept manipulations with our reputation, or debates on the reasons for our presence here. Everything, including patience, has its limits," Ambassador Taherian says.

**B-H: Ministry Demands Greater Share of JNA Assets**

*96BA0143A Sarajevo SLOBODNA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 96 p 20*

[Article by Sejo Omeragic: "Inheritance Battle Over Property of Former Yugoslav People's Army: Bosnia-Herzegovina Seeks Airplanes, Tanks..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The French consulting firm Crest has drawn up a list indicating that the property of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] is worth around $70 billion. The Commission at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Defense, which has done a magnificent job, believes that the inheritance is worth two and a half times more. The inheritance battle will continue and must be taken quite seriously.*

At present, the most topical issue in relations among the states that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia is the question of succession. The greatest attention is being paid to the property of the former JNA. For half a century, the former unified state earmarked nearly 10 percent of its national income for the armed

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forces, so it comes as no surprise that figures of several hundreds of billions of dollars are being bandied about in the discussion regarding JNA property.

Serbia and Montenegro believe the succession issue was already settled after the adoption of the 1974 Constitution. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] all want to share in the inheritance. Not all of the states have recognized each other yet, but any normalization of relations would also immediately result in the beginning of distribution of the former state's property.

The largest share of the inheritance will relate to JNA property. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, serious and thorough records have been kept on JNA property. All the data are being kept under wraps by the Ministry of Defense, where it is felt that secrecy accounts for half of the success in this work. Even with the thorough work done by the Commission for the Succession of JNA Property, which functions under the Ministry of Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it appears that allowances will hardly be made for the research done by experts in the new states, nor will the work of the Yugoslav succession commission be viewed any more seriously. At the request of the Peace Conference for the Former Yugoslavia, the well-known French consulting firm Crest has drawn up a "price list" of movable JNA property, according to its market value.

**Howitzers and Excavators**

According to Crest, that property is worth $69.9 billion. The value of materiel is estimated to be as high as $32.7 billion. Compared to many other powerful armies, the former JNA had excessive military reserves, worth $12.4 billion. The value of military training centers is estimated to be around $1.2 billion. The balance of $23.3 billion relates to military bases and the rest of the very sturdy infrastructure of the former JNA. Indeed, Crest looked at the market value of the weaponry, so that, according to its list, the price of a howitzer—believe it or not—is only 100 German marks. Based on that study, a new 122-mm mortar is scarcely more valuable than a T-55 tank. According to Crest, an old T-55 is worth as much as an excavator manufactured on the same date, and the final value of the 18,600 heavy artillery pieces that the former JNA had is estimated at $3.6 billion.

We saw in this war how valuable even this old weaponry is. That is why the Commission for the Succession of JNA Property at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Defense has drawn up a completely different balance sheet and "price list" of the weaponry's useful value. According to this assessment, the JNA property is appraised at $164 billion. Perhaps it should be added to this research in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Slovene succession commission also arrived at a figure of over $100 billion.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Office for State Succession Affairs believes that the inventory list drawn up by Crest is incomplete. During the withdrawal from Slovenia and then from Croatia, the former JNA gathered up everything, including purchased licenses and its own captured technologies. In that grab from Slovenia, the license to produce Gazelle helicopters, which had been purchased from France, was lost. Almost all technical documentation ended up in Serbia. The Bosnia-Herzegovina succession commission demands that the list of former JNA property be expanded to include military libraries, museums, testing facilities, institutes, and recreation centers set up from Budva to Kupar to Crikvenica

Property that was owned by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Territorial Defense should also be included in these figures. This means all infantry weapons, light mortars, and hand-held rocket launchers, which were taken back to the barracks under an illegal decision by the former Presidency, even though their direct owner was Bosnia-Herzegovina and its enterprises. The value of that weaponry is estimated at $600 million.

**Scrap Iron and New Weapons**

According to the Croatian press, the division of former JNA property will be based upon percentages, whereby Serbia and Montenegro get 40 percent of the materiel, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina get 20 percent each, and Slovenia and Macedonia get 10 percent each. Croatia, which is not particularly interested in old weaponry, is seeking 60 of the 232 new M-84 tanks that Serbia currently has, three MiG-29's, and 24 modern Gazelle helicopters. Bosnia-Herzegovina should get the same amounts, but after the horrible experiences of war, its demands are much higher. Indeed, Croatia does not have much reason to be concerned with the succession, because too much of the value of the JNA property was left behind at the numerous naval bases in its territory. It is known that, as usual, there were negotiations and agreements on succession between Serbia and Croatia, and there is no doubt that the "resplendent" Karadjordje tradition will continue. After all, Serbia bought up the Slovenes' debts at 10 percent of their value, and that "amid sanctions."

As regards Bosnia-Herzegovina and its share of the weaponry, two-thirds would belong to the Federation and one-third would go to the Serb entity, which already has three times as much weaponry as its neighbors. In the meantime, Serbia is buying modern M-72 tanks and

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MiG-29's from Russia, so that it will be a long time before there can be any talk of a balance of weaponry in this region.

Another particular issue in the inheritance is the question of military housing. If military housing is divided up, it will be necessary to discuss the one-third of Belgrade built from earmarked accounts of patriots from Triglav to Gevgelija.

The specified-purpose industry will not be included in the succession, because that consisted of commercial enterprises that were developed on the basis of loans and money taken from their workers.

All the states will also have to deal with the immovable property, but that will probably be resolved according to the "locus in quo" principle of international law (something is regarded as the property of the state in which it is located).

Past experience indicates that the succession will be taken seriously by the international community. Naturally, if the major powers agree to do so. It is clear that all the problems of the succession of the former Yugoslavia will be resolved according to that model of the major powers, just as the Americans refused to pay their debt to Nicaragua but imposed war reparations on Iraq after the war in Kuwait.

Thus, when the question of the devolution of the former Yugoslavia's property is placed on the agenda, arbitration by the international community will impose one of the solutions. Reactions are possible by the UN Security Council, which could even impose sanctions on the refractory parties, in this case Serbia and Montenegro. Naturally, unless that is vetoed by Russia. If even that does not work, the instruments for forcing compliance are much more complicated, but they will work nonetheless.

Still, much can be expected from succession, because the international community is very interested in seeing it come about and ensuring that the division is carried out in the best possible way. Just as during the disintegration of the former unified state, we have been the guinea pigs for the disintegration of the Soviet empire. At that time, we warned them there was no need to part company. The division in this region will be a successful experiment for the succession of the dreadful "list" that will be performed in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The international community will do all it can to achieve a division of the inheritance of the former JNA.

After all, no matter how the succession turns out, the Bosnians have already "received" the most—per capita!

**B-H: Serb Commentary Says Funding 'Unequal'**

*AU1202181096 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 96 p 4*

[Unattributed commentary: "Who Practically Does (Not) Respect the Dayton Agreement?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Aleksa Buha, the foreign minister of the Serb Republic, has recently sent a letter to Carl Bildt, the high representative for Serb issues [title as published], in which he informed him that in the opinion of the Serb Republic government some members of the international community responsible for the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement have not been respecting its stipulations.

This memorandum was sent to the Contact Group members through the embassies in Belgrade as well as to the European Commission in Brussels, with the aim of eliminating the negative consequences of violations of the Dayton agreement.

"After the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its 11 annexes was signed, the international community, its members, institutions, and representatives took certain actions and measures for their implementation," the letter reads and adds:

"For the first meeting of the donating countries and organizations for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was held in Brussels on 20-21 December 1995, the European Commission and the World Bank prepared three documents for discussion: 1. The priorities for reconstruction and development; 2. Priorities for reconstruction and development, annexes for sectors; 3. Priority needs for the first quarter of 1996."

These documents are the basis for planning and should attract foreign donating countries and organizations to participate in the reconstruction process. The government of the Serb Republic "notes with regret that they were not included to the necessary extent in the preparation and elaboration of these documents for discussion, or in the preparation of the first meeting of the donating countries and organizations."

**In Which Fields Are the Entities Independent?**

It is pointed out in the text that the government of the Serb Republic considered that "the documents contained several elements that could not be anything other than an unacceptable neglect of the articles concerning the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Annex 4), which took effect on the day the agreement was signed — 14 December 1995 — as well as certain other important facts of a constitutional nature."

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Attention is drawn to the fact that "the Serb Republic, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina by separate declarations dated 14 December 1995, as defined in Annex 4. Since agreement was reached on that point, the Constitution took effect on the same day, as specified in Article XI, paragraph 1 of the Constitution. Since that day, Bosnia-Herzegovina has functioned according to the above mentioned Constitution and its amendments specified in Annexes 1 and 2 of Annex 4. According to the Constitution, the entities should be in charge of issues not explicitly placed under the jurisdiction of the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The legislative and executive powers of the entities, therefore, include domestic transportation, agriculture, industry, education, civil engineering, mining, the electricity industry, water engineering, social security, and the establishment of state institutions in the entities themselves." This means that the entities pass and implement laws in these fields and determine their development policies independently.

The government of the Serb Republic points out that "the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina are not entitled to pass or enforce laws or to determine the policy of development in these fields. In contrast to that, in the preparation of documents for discussion in the first meeting of donating countries and organizations, the European Commission and the World Bank accepted negotiations with those institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina that have neither legislative nor executive power in these fields, which are priorities for the reconstruction and development of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

"Only the entities, and not the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina may establish priorities for reconstruction in the fields that come under their jurisdiction according to their constitutions and laws. If authorities that are not in charge take such actions, as in this case, they will not have the legal power or consequences," the letter warns, adding:

"The documents for discussion do not express the level of damage or the reconstruction requirements objectively. Instead of stating single needs, in other words what has to be reconstructed in both the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the overall needs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the documents mention only the latter, which is proof of a one-sided policy in the approach to the problems of reconstruction."

**Who Has (Does Not Have) the Executive Power?**

The institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been established by the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose powers are explicitly specified by the stipulations of Article 111, Paragraphs 1 and 2. In the opinion of the government of the Serb Republic "the European Commission and the European Bank have openly ignored in several places in discussion papers 1 and 2, especially in the part that refers to implementation mechanisms, effective constitutional solutions for the distribution of power between the entities and institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since they foresaw that many powers would be central. They have been transferred to ministries of Bosnia-Herzegovina in areas in which the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina do not have the jurisdiction."

It is pointed out in the letter "that it is quite clear that the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be accompanied by the process of reconstruction but only by the procedure foreseen by the Constitution. [sentence as published] Therefore only the entities can establish mechanisms of implementation, in compliance with their constitutions and effective laws, as has been agreed with the European Commission and the World Bank. The entities can also harmonize and standardize the mechanisms for implementation through the Joint Temporary Commission, but only on the basis of agreements."

It is pointed out in the text that the three documents for discussion also contain several conditions that simply cannot be used in the present constitutional context.

The explanation is that these documents refer "to the state made up of the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the "Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," although Article [number indistinct], Point 1 of the Constitution clearly states that its real name is simply Bosnia-Herzegovina."

What is more, in contrast to the explicit stipulations of Paragraph 3 of the same article, the Serb entity is not called "the Serb Republic;" other completely inappropriate names such as "areas under Serb control," "areas with a Serb majority," and "the Serb entity" are used in the documents, which violate the dignity of the Serb Republic.

**Ready To Cooperate**

The fact is neglected that the vast majority of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of three different nations: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, which is clearly and unambiguously stated in the last paragraph of the Preamble to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina." It is warned that the Constitution of the European Commission and the World Bank [as published] is "completely unacceptable for the government of the Serb Republic, since it is a violation of the Constitution of

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Bosnia-Herzegovina and endangers a just implementation of the reconstruction program, thus seriously jeopardizing the stabilization of the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The Serbs believe that they have been completely deprived of their rights and that the international community has again given the Croatian-Muslim coalition the right to decide about their destiny and life, which makes the government of the Serb Republic express "its serious reservations about the political approach of the European Commission and the World Bank over reconstruction problems."

Still, the Serb Republic's government expresses at the same time its readiness to cooperate with the European Commission, the World Bank, the IMF as the World Bank agent, and with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Joint Temporary Commission under the condition that the above-mentioned actions and solutions are revised, since they do not arise from the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the end of the letter, it is pointed out that "the government of the Serb Republic considers that this can and must be done before the second meeting of the donating countries and organizations for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina takes place, probably in March; if this is not done, however, it means that the international community, including the European Commission and the World Bank, is not ready to treat the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina equally or to respect the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which it strongly supported.

**[Box, p 4]**

**The Status Quo Until September**

Aleksa Buha, the minister of foreign affairs of the Serb Republic, stated that it had been assessed in a meeting of the headquarters for the Dayton agreement implementation in Serb[-occupied parts of] Sarajevo, held recently in Pale, that the agreement allows the maintenance of the present situation until elections are held, planned for September.

"The maintenance of the present situation means that the present borders of the Sarajevo boroughs and their present administration, including the police, remain valid," Buha told SRNA, and added:

"Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community, was required to confirm this interpretation of the Dayton agreement. If he cannot do this for any reason, we shall require from him that an international arbitration be formed urgently to decide on the status of Serb Sarajevo." According to Buha, Bildt is required to act like Hans Koschnick, the EU administrator in Mostar, since international arbitration should start there if the situation is not sorted out within 14 days.

"The situations in Mostar and Sarajevo are equal and we do not see any reason why the same standards should not be applied," the foreign minister said and explained: "This must be carried out urgently, so that the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement is not late or even jeopardized because of the unclear situation in Sarajevo."

Commenting on the statement issued by Michael Steiner, Bildt's deputy, that the Sarajevo Serbs should remain in their homes until the elections are held in September, Minister Buha assessed that this possibility had to be officially confirmed by the high representative of the international community for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Another interpretation of the Dayton agreement in connection with the destiny of Serbs in Serb Sarajevo leads to uncertainty and chaos and it would be the 'green light' for their exodus.

This would at the same time be the confirmation of the intention of the international community to make Sarajevo an ethnically clean Muslim town," the chief of the Serbian diplomacy concluded.

**B-H: Status of Demobilization, Employment Discussed**

*96BA0137A Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 96 p 7*

[Article and interview with Asim Suvalija, deputy director of the Office for Unemployment of the Ministry of Refugees and Social Policy, by E. Plecic; place and date not given: "Demobilization and Employment: Covering Unemployment With Systematization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In Sarajevo Okrug alone, around 17,000 men seeking work are expected as a result of the demobilization order for fighters over the age of 45; another wave of demobilization is on the way, for those over 35.*

The process of demobilizing fighters is under way, or whatever the official name is for reorienting away from war status, and toward hiring by one's own firm, open positions in other enterprises, private trades, retirement, or some other way of resolving one's basic living status. In Sarajevo Okrug alone, it is estimated that there are around 17,000 such people, as a result of the demobilization order for members of the Army over the age of 45. There is a significant influx of fresh manpower in other places as well.

A second wave of demobilization is on the way, for those over 35, who are thus at their highest work

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potential. That is why in both military and economic structures the situation is truly mobile, precisely because of the attitude of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that making room for the ex-fighters must be a top priority.

Operative realization of this task has been entrusted to the Office for Unemployment of the Ministry for Refugees and Social Policy, the former Bosnia-Herzegovina Cooperative for Unemployment.

"We are keeping records on demobilized persons and interceding with regard to employment, especially for those demobilized people who are refugees, whose enterprises have been destroyed, or even whose enterprises present problems in that regard. We have a good level of cooperation with military and civilian bodies in the opstinas. We have offices in all the opstinas in territory where official government authorities are in control. There is also the task of providing retraining and vocational training for those disabled by the war," says Asim Suvalija, the deputy director of the Office for Unemployment.

[Plecic] What is the situation at enterprises?

[Suvalija] It varies! Some of them are getting by on war systematization, in order to close their doors in this manner to the demobilized. Systematization must be urgently expanded, or rather translated into a peacetime way of doing business. Systematization cannot be used to formally cover unemployment. The question of responsibility for the devastation and destruction must be raised, as well as the attempts at illegal privatization of some firms in order to maintain a monopoly on labor and employment.

[Plecic] How significant are the securities to which the fighters are entitled with regard to work?

[Suvalija] Only to the extent that they serve to open up jobs. That is why it is necessary to support efforts to put what the fighters are entitled to as "wages" for their investment of patriotism into savings accounts and to ensure the nominal preservation of value in German marks. If we also offer attractive programs for hiring and personal determination according to employment—by buying machines and tools for work through customs exemptions—that will be a real success. Simply put, we cannot leave the demobilized fighters to their own devices. The doors to employment offices are always open to our liberators.

**[Box, p 7]**

**Bugojno: Everyone Will Get a Job**

We asked director Ahmet Haracic how things will go with hiring demobilized fighters who used to work at the shoe factory in Bugojno. He said:

"According to our records, we have 90 guys in the Army who are our workers from the territory of Bugojno Opstina, six from the territory of Donji Vakuf Opstina, and one from the territory of Gornji Vakuf Opstina. They will all have jobs at the factory after demobilization. But that is not the end of it in terms of hiring male manpower at the collective. It is our moral obligation to also hire those who were not working anywhere. Objectively speaking, the work that we must begin to do in the coming period makes it possible for us to employ even more workers. This will be taken into account here. These boys fought so that they would have something to do and live on with their families tomorrow," says Haracic.

**B-H: Commentary on Employing Demobilized Troops**

*AU1302072696 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 p 7*

[Commentary by Eldin Karic: "Private Business for the Select"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Investing all funds and resources in creating jobs for members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and assistance for those who cannot work of 100 German marks [DM] each in cash or kind are the primary tasks for all the social and primarily economic subjects of our society. This is one of the conclusions reached at a joint meeting of army, public, and economic structures from the region of the Sarajevo county. However, everything has been reduced to mere stories and promises that, according to experience so far, have little chance of coming true, while, on the other hand, the demobilized soldiers have every chance of becoming welfare cases.

Since the beginning of what many believe is the first year of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the part under Bosnia- Herzegovia Army control around 20,000 troops have been demobilized as well as many officers. In terms of the army's size, this is an insignificant number. For the economy, though, it can produce enough problems to cause chronic headaches, though this an indication of the ability and even willingness to take in the demobilized members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. [passage omitted]

During the general destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina it was unquestionably very important to preserve at least

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some industrial capacity, but objectives should have been set for the time that we now face. Those who have not met the requirements of those goals should bear the necessary consequences. The demobilized soldiers, however, do not have time to wait for the results of such reconsiderations and they are demanding concrete proposals and, above all, concrete jobs. In this regard, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has issued Conclusions on Ways of Employment and Material Support for Members of the Bosnia-Herzegovia Army. The basis of these conclusions is a 16-point set of proposals, which has been forwarded to municipal, cantonal, and economic authorities in order to secure a living for the demobilized Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldiers. The content of this ruling is made up of, for the most part, dry instructions and suggestions to these authorities that so far have not made any concrete progress in employing the demobilized soldiers. The conclusions contain even such proposals as providing monthly assistance of DM50, either in cash or in form of family packages, for demobilized Bosnia-Herzegovina Army members for whom it is not possible to find employment or whose firms are not in a position to provide financial aid for them. The problem with this proposal is that the funds are to be provided by the municipalities and the city of Sarajevo, or the canton/county, whereas it is well known that so far army members have been receiving their salaries five months late. Perhaps the municipalities, according to the current number of demobilized soldiers, might be able to cover these expenses, but what are they supposed to do when, by June this year, there is the expected demobilization of an additional 160,000 army members? The skepticism in the army has deep and well founded roots.

**Fund as Aid**

At the meeting of businessmen, state and city bodies, and Bosnia-Herzegovina Army representatives, Sefkija Okeric, the chairman of the Executive Board of the City of Sarajevo, proposed establishing a fund for supporting demobilization and forming individual files on those demobilized. Of course, the primary goal was to secure funds for financial aid to unemployed demobilized soldiers. The funds would be provided through this fund, to be taken out of net incomes, expected to be set at 1.5 percent of net salaries, and has been used so far to subsidize army members in various respects and, according to Okeric, will probably ultimately amount to DM100 in cash or as a family package of the equivalent value. Among the government's conclusions, this was the main subject and reason for this meeting and a measure was also discussed that "to resolve the problem of employing demobilized soldiers in the municipality in the best possible way, cantons/counties and other institutions should take encouraging measures by which the process of employment of the demobilized and obtaining of work permits will be simplified and to treat demobilized soldiers as a priority in leasing units of land or business premises." However, this provision does not define how the demobilized soldiers are supposed to get the money needed to open the private firms that are being so generously offered to them. The proposer probably had in mind soldiers referred to by Brigadier Nedzad Ajnadzic as "daddies' sons and sons of officials, who will be returning from abroad with their pockets full of money." To this General Dudakovic added "the sons of some officers," as well. After these talks and reading the government's conclusions, what remains is a bitter taste in the mouth and the question asked by Brigadier Ismet Hadzic: "The Dayton accord may fail tomorrow, God forbid, and who, and with what right, will order those demobilized people back to the front line?"

Finally, considering that one newly created job costs between DM10,000 and DM100,000, that the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy and former industrial giants have turned virtually into small businesses, and that a giant wave of 200,000 demobilized soldiers is coming increasingly close, it seems that many social disorders are an unavoidable prospect. Alas.

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**Croatia: NATO's Solana Briefs Tudjman on Mostar**

*LD1202203596 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a report saying that immediately after visiting Mostar, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana spoke to President Tudjman on the phone and informed him about his stay and talks, asking for his support and aid in resolving the Mostar problem.

**Croatia: Granic Discusses Milutinovic Visit**

*LD1202145496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received the following brief announcement from the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Dr. Mate Granic, vice president and minister of foreign affairs, today received Veljko Knezevic, the head of the FRY office in Zagreb. In the talks that took place on this occasion, special attention was devoted to preparations for a planned return visit by FRY Foreign Affairs Minister Milan Milutinovic to Croatia, due to take place soon, and to bilateral state relations. Knezevic told Granic that Belgrade is working on its response to the draft of bilateral agreements on some aspects of normalization in relations between the two countries. This is expected to be on the agenda of the talks due to take place during Minister Milutinovic's visit to Zagreb.

Dr. Granic said that Croatia believes progress in the efforts to resolve some of the open issues would be a direct and positive contribution to the peaceful reintegration of Croatia's Danubian region and to the overall stabilization of the situation in the region. For this reason, Dr. Granic said, in addition to the efforts by the Croatian Government, UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia], and General Klein, it is necessary for the local Serb population in that part of Croatia to become involved in a more active and positive way.

**Croatia: Tudjman Meets Russian Oil Company Delegates**

*LD1202162196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has received in the presidential palace a delegation of the Russian Federation's association of oil companies. The delegation was headed by Sergey V. Muravlenko, the president of Yukos, one of Russia's largest companies. The meeting was attended by Hrvoje Sarinic, the chairman of the managing committee of INA [Croatia's oil company] and the president's [Tudjman's] chief adviser. They discussed business cooperation between INA and Yukos. Mira Baric has a report: [passage omitted]

[Baric] Now is the right time to start business between INA and Yukos, it was said at the meeting today. Hrvoje Sarinic, the chairman of INA's managing committee stressed the following:

[Begin Sarinic recording] We will now sign an agreement on cooperation. You know that in Rijeka and Sisak we have unused facilities for the processing of crude oil. They will deliver crude oil to us, and we will process it. After that we will jointly place oil products on the market—here in Croatia and abroad. In addition to this, there is mutual desire for cooperation in tourism. Just like INA, they are engaged in tourism activities. All this cooperation will be to INA's benefit. [end recording]

[Baric] Yukos is also interested in building petrol stations jointly with INA and in the delivery of crude oil to the Rijeka refinery.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman expressed his interest in versatile and comprehensive cooperation with the Russian Federation—not only economic, but also political. If INA and Yukos finds it in their mutual interest, then you have my full support, President Tudjman said.

**Croatia: Tudjman, Slovak Prime Minister Hold Talks**

*LD1202213696 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Official talks between Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, and their aides opened in the presidential palace half an hour ago. It is a known fact that there are no controversial or unresolved issues between Croatia and Slovakia. Friendly relations between the two countries have been confirmed by the Slovak delegation's visit, which will pave the way for new forms of cooperation, especially in the economic sphere.

In addition to bilateral relations, President Tudjman and Prime Minister Meciar are also discussing the situation in the region and, in particular, issues relating to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and to attitudes to Europe and to joining its integrational processes in which both countries are greatly interested. It is also known that Slovakia has sent troops to eastern Slavonia as part of the United Nations. They will operate there in accordance with the Dayton Agreement and the UN Security Council resolutions.

These are the main points of the meeting in the presidential palace this evening.

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**Croatia: Government To Help Demobilized Soldiers**

*LD0902230196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Croatian government had several interesting points on the agenda today. A draft constitutional law on cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the International Court of Justice has been sent to the assembly, the government gave priority in employment to demobilized members of the Croatian armed forces, and it passed a series of laws giving its wholehearted support for the return of refugees to liberated areas. Zeljko Korba reports.

[Korba] [Passage omitted] At the Croatian president's instigation the government adopted a special conclusion firmly obliging all bodies of state administration, public companies and state-owned firms to give priority to demobilized members of the Croatian armed forces in the employment of new workers. The government also ruled that Croatian defenders should be given priority in renting business premises and land.

[Begin recording] [Defense Minister Gojko Susak] We heard from the finance minister that the ranks of the financial police have not been filled. We also heard that there are vacancies in the customs administration. I would like to see it written down in these conclusions that courses should immediately be organized for those people [demobilized troops] to train them to do these things.

[Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa] This also refers to HEP [Croatian Electricity Distribution Company], HPT [Croatian Post and Telecommunications] and all public companies. Let there be no misunderstanding. They must do it, this is not subject to their goodwill. And they have to start doing it from today. [passage omitted] [end recording]

**Croatia: Refugees From Bosnia Hold Press Conference**

*LD0902235296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Croats expelled, made refugees, and displaced from Bosnia-Herzegovina held a news conference in Split today. Dijana Pazanin reports:

[Pazanin] Croats expelled from Bosnia-Herzegovina have not gained any rights by the signing of the Washington and Dayton Agreements, although their return to places from which they were expelled and the right to the payment of war damages were guaranteed, it was said at today's news conference of the Association of Croats expelled, made refugees, and displaced from Bosnia-Herzegovina. At a meeting of their delegation with Jadranka Kosor, deputy speaker of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Ivica Kostovic, deputy prime minister, and Dr. Ivan Valenta, secretary general of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], they were promised better care and the same rights as Croat refugees from regions in Croatia.

Although 62 percent of the expelled Croats would like to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina, their partner in the Federation, the Muslims, obviously do not accept this, Association Chairman Stefo Masatovic said. He said that 150 Muslim families returned to Jajce and conditions for the return of 100 more were met in Stolac. Not one Croat returned to Bugojno or Travnik. Croats expelled from Serb-controlled territories do not wish to return there.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia there are some 450,000 Croats expelled from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The safe places in the Federation to which they could return, if the Croatian Government helps out with the reconstruction, are Mostar, Stolac, Capljina, Neum, Drvar, Kupres, Jajce, and Grahovo.

**Croatia: 26,000 Serbs Want To Return to Krajina**

*LD0902174796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1518 GMT 9 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—The Human Rights Commission of the Serb community in Croatia has announced in Zagreb that, in cooperation with the Serbian Helsinki Human Rights Committee, it has established that more than 26,000 Serbs who fled Krajina filed requests to return to Croatia.

Commission members warn that Croatian Government representatives "are doing their best to explain that there is no interest for return among Serbs," but that statements to this effect, made by some officials in Zagreb, are untrue. [passage omitted]

**Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Lease Unused Farmland**

*AU0802144896 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 2 Feb 96*

[Report by Ljiljana (?Dajic) on Executive Council of Srijem-Baranja Province adopting decision on conditions for temporary use of abandoned agricultural land]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The decision of the Executive Council of Srijem-Baranja Province concerning the conditions for temporary use of the abandoned farmland determines the obligation to register the abandoned farmland, the modes of doing so, and the process of [word indistinct], as well as the conditions for its temporary use.

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According to this decision, abandoned farmland is land whose owner left Srijem-Baranja Province, land belonging to a legal person whose present residence is outside the territory of Srijem-Baranja Province, and land that has not been used, that is, worked, during the past two economic years.

Abandoned farmland will be used temporarily, for three years, and will involve either payment, lease, or no payment, which will be decided by the executive council of a certain municipality.

[Begin recording of Simo Sijan, secretary of the Secretariat for Agriculture, Forestry, Water Resources Management, and Food Processing Industry of Srijem-Baranja Province] Our aim was to create conditions for those who are interested in working the land—and we have about 152,000 hectares of arable land and (?gardens) in Srijem-Baranja Province—to have the possibility and right to temporarily use the land.

We expect that the implementation of this decision will be widely approved by all those who are interested in agricultural production.

The following persons have the right to use the land without payment: members of a family of a soldier killed in the war, disabled war veterans, persons who do not have regular income, and refugees.

By presenting the documents that prove they meet the above conditions and that prove their status to the municipal authorities that will be authorized by each municipality's executive council, they can apply for use of farmland without payment [end recording].

[(?Dajic)] Fifty percent of the leases will be paid to the agricultural budget of Srijem-Baranja Province, while the remaining 50 percent of the funds will be allocated by the executive council of a certain municipality, with the consent of the Secretariat for Agriculture.

There is much land in Srijem-Baranja Province that, considering its natural and economic conditions, can be used for agricultural production in a more rational way by taking appropriate agricultural and technical measures. This is a chance for everyone who wants to live and work here.

**Croatia: Purges in Armed Forces Detailed**

*96BA0133A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jan 96 pp 5-6*

[Article by Davor Butkovic: "President Tudjman Begins Major Purge of Top Officers in Croatian Armed Forces: Generals Antun Tus, Franjo Feldi, Petar Stipetic, Vinko Vrbanec, and Many Others Are Leaving!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *GLOBUS is the first to report, from reliable sources within the Croatian military, on the new organization of the Croatian Armed Forces [HV], which in its peacetime composition will have approximately 50,000 people, including 30,000 conscripts, 14,000 to 15,000 members of guard brigades, and 5,000 members of special services and military schools, plus facts about the major clash between the Ministry of Defense and part of the General Staff on the eve of massive changes in the military with incalculable consequences.*

General Antun Tus, the chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces [GSHV] and hero from the homeland war, who has spent the last three years as military advisor to the president of the republic, is now awaiting a decision on retirement.

Tus's departure from the Croatian Armed Forces is not simply the result of his many years of squabbling with Minister of Defense Gojko Susak, which first erupted in December 1992 when General Janko Bobetko replaced Tus in the post of chief of the GSHV; rather, it also signifies the culmination of the conflict between part of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, a conflict in which the commander in chief was definitively on the ministry's side, the result of which will be the biggest purge in the command structures to date.

In this purging of top-ranking Croatian officers, set against a political background, the ones who will suffer most are those who came to the HV from the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and were members of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia], despite the fact that it was precisely these military professionals—from the commanders at Vukovar, Colonel Dedakovic and Brigadier Borkovic, to the commander of the Croatian Air Force, General Imre Agotic, and the chief of the intelligence service, Admiral Davor Domazet—who made the greatest contribution to the successful conduct of the homeland war, under extremely adverse conditions at the time, in the fall and winter of 1991.

"Several months ago, a final political decision was made to remove from the command structures of the HV the majority of officers who came from the JNA, aside from those who, because of specific expertise, are still needed by the Croatian Armed Forces. The occasion for implementation of this decision, whereby a large number of high-ranking officers will be retired, is the transition from a wartime to a peacetime military organization," says one of GLOBUS's sources, a high-ranking official in the General Staff.

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Indeed, a series of expert-political clashes between the GSHV and the Ministry of Defense have characterized the preparations for a new, peacetime organization of the Armed Forces, which will take effect once the question of eastern Slavonia is finally resolved.

According to current plans, the Croatian Armed Forces should have approximately 50,000 soldiers in its peacetime structure, including 30,000 conscripts, 14,000 to 15,000 members of guard brigades, and 5,000 members of special services and military schools.

**The Case of General Tus**

At the same time a new structure for controlling the Armed Forces is also being prepared. This is, in fact, one of the main reasons for Gen. Tus's conflict with President Tudjman and especially with Minister Susak.

Specifically, Gen. Tus favors an HV structure in which the General Staff would answer directly to the commander in chief—the president of the republic—while the Ministry of Defense would only be part of the government and would concern itself with a number of specific questions, from the legal status of members of the HV to mobilization lists. However, the Ministry of Defense would have no influence on military command.

At present, the Ministry of Defense has under its control not only the military counterintelligence service (SIS), over whose work the General Staff has absolutely no influence, but also all other institutions essential to the operation of the Armed Forces, even special military formations such as the president's First Guard Corps, which is not formally under the command of the GSHV.

The concrete reason for Tus's clash with the president of the republic and the Ministry of Defense was the formation of the Office for International Military Cooperation, which in Tus's opinion is very important to national security.

Gen. Tus, who was supposed to be in charge of this office, was unwilling to agree to it being placed under the control of the Ministry of Defense; instead, he insisted that it answer directly to the president of the republic, as commander in chief.

Even before the clash over who will supervise the new Office for International Military Cooperation, officers of the General Staff, who are rallying around their top commander, managed to derail a number of other initiatives by the Ministry of Defense which they regard as a threat to national security.

For example, several months ago the ministry proposed abolishing the separate commands of the Croatian Air Force and the Croatian Navy. The justification provided for this proposal was that the ground forces do not have a separate command either.

Tus's sympathizers in the General Staff barely managed to ward off the ministry's plan to establish a unified command for all branches of the HV, putting forward arguments about the specific technical aspects of commanding an air force and navy.

Almost simultaneously, the Ministry of Defense proposed establishing a separate command for all guard brigades. Under that proposal, the nine guard, professional, and elite brigades of the Croatian Armed Forces would be combined into one large formation.

The officers of the General Staff tore that ministry plan apart as well, explaining that it is preposterous for the Croatian Armed Forces to have only one top-notch combat unit, which would also have to cover a huge and varied territory, from eastern Slavonia to the Knin borderland: "If we were to turn the guard brigades into a corps or division, they would become awkward in terms of maneuvering and hopelessly slow. How can we move 15,000 people from Knin to Vukovar within 24 hours? It is impossible! Creating a separate command for the guard brigades would jeopardize Croatian strategic interests," says the GLOBUS source at the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces.

It has already been reported that the HV should soon be organized in only three corps regions (there are currently six). These will be the Zagreb, Split, and Osijek corps regions.

These three corps regions cannot be covered by all the essential HV brigades and regiments that will not be eliminated after the transition to a peacetime organization.

Hence the idea to form HV divisions—i.e., unwieldy structures with more than 10,000 soldiers.

The majority of officers at the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces do not approve of the plan to create divisions.

The most interesting thing here is that this is not an internal clash between proponents of various ideas for organizing the HV. After all, President Tudjman himself is insisting on the division organization of the Croatian Armed Forces!

The majority of generals at the General Staff think this is an outdated idea, that Croatia no longer needs such large and poorly mobile formations. They think that the organization of the HV should be based on easily mobile brigades, as is the case in NATO.

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"The U.S. Armed Forces have maintained the division structure only for traditional reasons. Indeed, there the division comprises a number of smaller formations that can act independently," a GLOBUS source says.

The commander in chief of the HV, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, in fact, justified his plan for a division structure of the HV with traditional reasons, which perplexed the officers: "Isn't that a little ridiculous? Neither the Partisans nor the Home Guards had divisions, but rather regiments and brigades, for the most part. What kind of tradition is that? Why must we now set up a Varazdin Division when we do not need it organizationally and we have no particular historic reason to do so?" says a deputy to the chief of the General Staff.

**Purge in the General Staff**

It is clear, however, that the president's authority in this case has gotten the better of the expert arguments, and that larger formations, outside the Zagreb, Osijek, and Split Armed Forces, will be declared divisions.

A major purge is coming to the General Staff very soon. For now, it is certain that besides Gen. Tus, the Croatian Armed Forces will also lose General Franjo Feldi, his closest associate from the homeland war days and, according to Gen. Bobetko, the planner of Operation "Flash," through which western Slavonia was liberated. Gen. Feldi has long been the chief of the General Staff's deputy in charge of schooling.

According to GLOBUS sources, the majority of the officers at Croatian military schools will be retired over the next few months, because it is precisely in the military school structures that a large number of former JNA officers can be found. If that is true, then this could have catastrophic consequences for the future of military schooling and, generally speaking, for the professionalism of the HV.

But since the "war is over for the most part, the president and the minister are no longer that interested in military professionals," says GLOBUS's source.

Many of the highest ranking officers of the HV, from the commander of the National Guard Corps, Martin Spegelj, and the former commander of the "Tigers," General Marekovic, to Gen. Tus, regard Stipetic as the most competent commander of the Croatian Armed Forces in operational terms.

Among other things, General Stipetic led the HV operations in Bosnian Posavina in the summer of 1992. During that period, the Croats held all the most important cities in Posavina, including Derventa, Modrica, and Bosanski Brod. Stipetic then received orders from Zagreb to withdraw, so that the Serbs retook Posavina, which was ultimately legitimized by the Dayton and Paris accords!

In March of last year, Minister Susak and the chief of the General Staff at that time, Gen. Janko Bobetko, allegedly signed a decision to retire Gen. Stipetic. When he learned of that decision, Gen. Tus went to see President Tudjman. Tus allegedly told the president that he was acting unfairly toward Stipetic, because he had entered the HV as a brigadier general and had not been promoted in four years, and that the decision to retire him was in fact catastrophic: Stipetic is the only Croatian general who can lead major war operations in the field.

President Tudjman responded to Gen. Tus by mentioning Stipetic's withdrawal from Posavina in 1992, upon which Tus retorted: "Mr. President, you know better than anyone why Gen. Stipetic had to withdraw from Posavina and who in fact ordered that withdrawal!"

Dr. Tudjman declined to argue, acknowledged that Stipetic had earned a higher rank, and refused to sign Susak's and Bobetko's retirement proposal.

In early May 1995, Gen. Stipetic was in command during the liberation of western Slavonia.

At the end of May, Stipetic was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, and in early August he commanded the operations to liberate Banija and Kordun.

In "Flash" and "Storm," Stipetic definitively demonstrated that he is one of Croatia's best military professionals. His minister and former commander wanted to retire him only a few months before the beginning of the war of liberation, a fact that says the most about the situation in the Croatian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense.

GLOBUS's sources in the SIS (the military counterintelligence service) told us back in early January that Gen. Stipetic is now once again in the running to succeed Gen. Cervenko, which is generally regarded as an interim position on the way to the post of chief of the General Staff.

However, in view of the fact that in his report on the state of the nation the president did not praise Gen. Stipetic, one of the commanders of "Flash" and "Storm," while he did praise several HVO [Croatian Defense Council] officers against whom the tribunal in The Hague could soon be announcing formal charges, it is not very likely that he will, in fact, succeed Cervenko.

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**The Case of General Vrbanec**

The case of Gen. Vinko Vrbanec is also indicative of the situation in the Croatian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense.

Gen. Vrbanec also came from the JNA and was one of the commanders of "Storm," and the media described him has a genuine hero of the war of liberation. Then, in the second half of September 1995, he was suddenly arrested.

At the same time, the Office of the President announced that unlawful acts had been committed by the HV at Bosanska Dubica, resulting in casualties, and that the responsible commander had been dismissed.

What really happened? On 20 September of last year, sizable formations of the HV, including members of the First Guard Brigade, the "Tigers," moved toward Bosanska Dubica and Bosanski Novi.

After the campaign, Gen. Vrbanec was arrested but not brought before a military court; instead, the disciplinary measure of suspension was imposed on him, for a period of one and a half years.

According to officers at the General Staff, Gen. Vrbanec will not be dismissed in the upcoming purge—as long as he stays quiet.

At the GSHV, it is contended that Gen. Vrbanec did not personally command "... the unsuccessful operation at Bosanska Dubica," in which at least 48 soldiers died, with many more missing in action. On the contrary, the officers at the General Staff say that two days before the beginning of the operation Minister Gojko Susak knew exactly what was going to happen, and that he, in fact, approved the campaign, arguing that the HV had to occupy that territory in Bosnia before the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina got there!

"That was one of the worst examples of misuse of the Armed Forces for political ends," say GLOBUS's sources from the General Staff.

The dismissal of Gen. Tus, the uncertain position of Gen. Stipetic, and the charges against Gen. Vrbanec relating to the high casualties in the unsuccessful penetration toward Bosanska Dubica show that in all three cases the men involved are top-notch professionals, former JNA officers who in 1991 commanded the National Guard Corps and defended Croatia: These examples are characteristic of the real reasons for change in the Armed Forces.

Given the importance of these examples, one wonders whether the Croatian Armed Forces, after eastern Slavonia is also liberated or politically reintegrated, will be commanded by a group of inadequately trained officers who, even though they are not military academy graduates, joined the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] at the right time?

After all, when Gen. Janko Bobetko went into retirement, the HDZ proposed that the new chief of the General Staff be General Djuro Decak, an early member of the HDZ whose bravery and patriotism no one can deny, but who has never completed any military school and who, before the war, played the accordion in Pozega bars...

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**FYROM: New List of Ministers Announced**

*AU1202210596 Skopje MIC in English 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The new Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government will have three vice-presidents, notably: Jane Miljovski from the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], Bekjir Zhuta from the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], and Ljube Trpevski from the SP [Socialist Party]. The ministers that have held on to their spheres of competence are: Blagoja Handziski (SDSM), minister of defense, Vlado Popovski (SDSM), minister of justice, Jorgo Sundovski (SDSM), minister of urbanization, construction and ecology, Dimitar Buzlevski (SDSM), minister of transport and communications, Ilija Filipce (SP), minister of health.

The new foreign minister is Ljubomir Frckovski (SDSM), the new minister of the interior is Tomislav Cokrevski (SDSM), the new minister of finance is Taki Fiti (SDSM), the new minister of agriculture is Nikola Parakeov (SDSM), the new minister of education and physical culture is Sofia Todorova (SDSM), the new minister of culture is Slobodan Unkovski (SDSM), the new minister of development is Abdulmenaf Bedzeti, the new minister of labor and social politics is Naser Ziberi, the new minister of economy is Bekjir Zhuta, and the new minister of science is Aslan Selmani, all from the PDP. Vlado Naumovski (SP) and Dzemail Hajdari (PDP) are ministers without portfolio.

The new Government is expected to be verified at tomorrow's session of Parliament.

**FYROM: Restoration of Confiscated Jewish Property**

*96BA0086B Skopje PULS in Macedonian 15 Dec 95 pp 4-5*

[Unattributed Article: "The Jews as Well Are Claiming Their Property"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The plan for denationalization to be submitted to parliament has been supported by an increased number of people who believe that "their ownership" has not been confirmed anywhere. They especially do not see how they can recover the property they lost after the war. Among others, recently the Jewish community in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has spoken out. Although, according to the results of the 1994 census, only 27 individuals claimed to be Jewish, the community nonetheless raised the issue of inheritance and started looking for the way through which the real estate of some 8,000 Jews, who were deported in 1943 to the death camps, was taken away, and who now owns this property today.

Blagoja Mladenovski, the community president, says that they are interested in the property of those who perished and those who remained alive but no longer live in Macedonia, as well as the property of Jewish communities, synagogues, schools, etc. "Actually," he says, "Macedonia as an independent country must observe the international rules, one of which is the guaranteed nature of ownership."

However, the issue of inheritance becomes unsolvable if the initial owners of the property have perished and no one was left to inherit their property. The community would like to acquire that precise property that has no heirs; although, for the time being, it cannot find any legal stipulation to this effect in the law which is being currently drafted.

No other country has found a solution to such cases. The issue of heirs to Jewish property is being resolved in a variety of ways in Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Bulgaria. In all of these countries there have been various stipulations and dissatisfactions. The fact that the Jewish community in Macedonia has requested legal help from some world associations in which the Jewish lobby is very strong may lead to some changes concerning real estate inheritance by Jews who no longer live in this country.

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**Poland: Deputy Minister Discusses Bosnia Mission**

*WS1202134896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10-11 Jan 96 p 2*

[Article by Z.L.: "Our Soldiers in Bosnia: Government Assigned Tasks but Did Not Give Money; An Ideal Transfer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The operations of the Polish battalion in the peace-restoring NATO forces in Bosnia should cost no more than 30 million zlotys, the Council of Ministers estimated in early December of last year. However, the government failed to ultimately specify from what source the money should come. "We are implementing the task; for the time being, the operation, which is the most important and not only to the Polish Armed Forces, is being financed from the budget of the National Defense Ministry [MON]," Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka admitted on Friday [9 February].*

Karkoszka assesses that the initially estimated costs of our presence in Bosnia will most certainly prove to be higher. The residents of Banja Vrucica, Jelah, and Zepca, where the Polish troops are stationed, quickly saw the chance to make money on the visitors and raised all fees. Poles were billeted in hotels, adapted warehouses, and the base of the Blue Helmets, taken over from the British. However, some of our soldiers are living near Jelah in tents because, so far, attempts to find better shelter for them have failed.

On Thursday, the last group of soldiers that make up our contingent, crossed the famous bridge over the Sava River. "The complex operation of transferring the 16th Battalion via rail to the Balkans was carried out very efficiently. The operation, which involved an unprecedented transfer of armed soldiers via several countries, was legally and organizationally very well prepared by our experts in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Each transport via a transit country was convoyed by Polish military attaches."

At that moment, Deputy Minister Karkoszka said on Friday, we began carrying out our regular tasks. Poles are operating on an area of 30 by 50 kilometers; their basic tasks include overseeing the strategic road from Teslice to Jelah, a road that intersects the line that divides the parties to the conflict, as well as controlling the cease-fire sector in their area. The Nordic-Polish brigade, which is part of the 1st U.S.Division, consists of 3,682 soldiers. Aside from 624 Poles, operational tasks are also carried out by Swedish and Danish soldiers. The Finns have undertaken to handle engineering tasks, and the Norwegian contingent is responsible for logistics and medical services.

So far, fortunately, there have been no incidents involving local people. Poles were accepted, MON assures us. The ministry is enumerating the gains: For the first time, a Polish battalion was prepared to act in combat conditions in accordance with all of the technical and organizational NATO standards; it is ready to act jointly with partners that have been part of the NATO structure for a long time. Such experience cannot be acquired in invented and arranged military exercises.

**Poland: Ministry Protests Zhirinovskiy 'Calumnies'**

*LD1202161196 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1510 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 12 Feb—The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, knowing the contents and the style of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's earlier remarks, is not surprised at his most recent one, but it nonetheless expresses its protest in view of slanders and "condemns those unparalleled calumnies," addressed to Poland in Moscow on 10 February, the Foreign Ministry said today.

The Foreign Ministry expects that members of the Duma will take resolute steps to cut short practices that target good Polish-Russian relations; it "also hopes that, even before this statement is issued, political personalities of democratic Russia will have spoken up," Foreign Ministry spokesman Pawel Dobrowolski said.

Zhirinovskiy, who is a Duma deputy, said on 10 February that, "if Poland wants to be free, let it be free from both the Soviet Union and NATO, and if it behaves like a prostitute running from one customer to another, everything will end very badly. The next customer will strangle the prostitute."

Among other things, he warned that, if the Polish leadership intended to join NATO today, "unlike Stalin, he would not wait until 22 June."

**Poland: Apprehension About New Interior Minister**

*WS1202160696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Feb 96 p 3*

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik and Jerzy Jachowicz: "Will the New Ministry of Internal Affairs Head From the SLD Cover-Up the Oleksy Case? A Political MSW"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The majority of members of the Political Advisory Committee at the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] fear that, under the leadership of Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, the ministry will further the political interests of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].*

Zbigniew Siemiatkowski of the SLD is the most fiercely criticized member of the Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz

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cabinet. The opposition questions his credibility and objectivity as head of the MSW and doubts whether the ministry he came to head will be apolitical.

**Attack on the Secret Services**

The appointment of the head of the MSW was the toughest one for Prime Minister Cimoszewicz and the coalition. The fact that Siemiatkowski, one of Aleksander Kwasniewski's closest colleagues, would be appointed to that post was decided immediately before the new Cabinet was sworn in by the president. Siemiatkowski was Kwasniewski's press spokesman in the presidential campaign. He claimed to the very end that Kwasniewski had completed his university studies with a master's degree.

Together with the head of the presidential candidate's security and campaign staff head, Danuta Waniek, he accused the counterintelligence unit of the Office of State Protection [UOP] of interfering with Kwasniewski's campaign. Siemiatkowski has not withdrawn the charges, despite the fact that the Sejm commission for controlling intelligence and counterintelligence stated that the secret services were not involved in the election campaign.

Siemiatkowski is the author of the controversial vetting draft of the president. The draft has been criticized by UOP Chief Gromoslaw Czempinski in an interview for RZECZPOSOLITA: "The draft is a huge step backwards in the process of democratization. This will destroy the secret services. No one will cooperate with us. After the initial announcement made by the president that archives would be opened after 1995, we received signals of concern from all over the world. We will end up as a state without secret services—open, although many economic and political interests intersect here."

We asked several members of the advisory committee for their opinions on the new MSW head.

**I Will Not Be a Fig Leaf**

Senator Krzysztof Kozlowski of the Freedom Union does not see how he can cooperate with Siemiatkowski: "He is a young, amicable, and probably very talented young man. His presence at the MSW, however, is tantamount to involving the ministry in politics and subjecting it to the political interests of the SLD. The so-called presidential ministries should be neutral, nonaligned. The MSW is being completely dominated by one party, with a minor part played by the coalition Polish Peasant Party [PSL]."

Kozlowski stresses that Siemiatkowski is one of the most active leaders of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]. The current deputy interior ministers—Zbigniew Sobotka and Andrzej Anklewicz—also made their way to the MSW via the SdRP. The ministry's last officer affiliated with Solidarity—Deputy Interior Minister Jerzy Zimowski—announced his resignation after Siemiatkowski's appointment.

"So what if we have the affable and reasonable Prime Minister Cimoszewicz if he is entangled in the political interests of the coalition parties?" Kozlowski asked us. "I have no intention of becoming a fig leaf for a party ministry."

**The Committee Is Archaic**

Jacek Merkel (UW): "I am astonished that the coalition was unable to appoint someone with the authority of former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski to one of the most important state offices. I am not refusing to cooperate with Siemiatkowski right this minute. I do think, however, that the committee has become archaic because its functions have been taken over by the Sejm Internal Affairs Commission and the Special Commission for Controlling the Secret Services."

**I Will Suspect a Cover-Up**

Michal Janiszewski of the Confederation for an Independent Poland: "How can Siemiatkowski be an objective interior minister if he attacked the secret services during the election campaign and claimed that the Oleksy affair was a provocation staged by UOP? His appointment raises suspicions that the Oleksy case might be covered up. If Siemiatkowski accepts the resignation of UOP Chief Gromoslaw Czempinski, I will suspect he wants to cover up the case. Czempinski should stay at UOP until the case is finally settled."

Michal Kurek of the PSL refused to comment.

A former member of the committee told us: "Siemiatkowski knows very well how to charm others with slogans about reforms and democracy, but his communist past takes the upper hand when you go into details. At one of the committee sessions, he was the only one to support requests for reemploying former security service officers who had not passed the vetting process in 1990."

**If These Go, There Are Others**

"Some members of the political advisory committee are refusing to cooperate with you; others claim the committee is no longer needed. What do you think about this?" we asked the new minister.

Siemiatkowski: "Oh, well. I cannot help it if someone refuses to cooperate with me. Someone else will take his

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place. I do not agree with the opinion that the committee is no longer needed. Its opinions were sometimes taken very seriously. I will also take the committee's opinions into consideration."

**Poland: New Interior Minister Siemiatkowski Profiled**

*WS1302115796 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 9 Feb 96 p 2*

[Article by Piotr Zaremba: "Zbigniew Siemiatkowski"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fact that the 39-year-old Zbigniew Siemiatkowski took charge of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] might be summed up with the following conclusion: This ministry remains presidential. Siemiatkowski is a politician who probably was the staunchest supporter of Aleksander Kwasniewski. He even once called him Moses, who led former members of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] through the Red Sea. Other politicians of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] got involved in temporary disputes with Kwasniewski. Siemiatkowski was not one of them; he was always loyal to one leader.

Speaking about his activities in the 1980's, Siemiatkowski readily recalled his work at the Political Science Department of the University of Warsaw. This is not only because he belongs to the generation that thought highly of the post of a scientific worker at a school of higher education, but also because this allows him to show that there was nothing that linked him to the PZPR.

Although Piotr Gadzinowski [NIE journalist] recalled that in his party activity at the university Siemiatkowski was an orthodox Marxist, (the title of his Ph.D. thesis in 1987 was "Concept of Revolution in the Political Thought of the Polish Communist Party"), Siemiatkowski himself confessed: If I had studied history, I might have been in the opposition.

In 1989 he found a place for himself in the 8 July Movement, which was to reform the party. At the last PZPR congress, in 1990, he read out the resolution to dissolve it. He joined the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, which was weak and doomed to isolation at that time. All along he was close to Kwasniewski. In November 1991 he was elected to the Sejm in his home town of Ciechanow.

At that time he was completely unknown. All along he showed great interest in MSW issues by engaging in the fight against vetting [of public figures]. He was a member of the Ciemniewski commission that called Macierewicz to account for what he had done. A few months before dissolution of that parliament, he drew the attention of the media to himself for the first time. As a member of a subcommission that worked on a draft vetting law, he suggested that priests should be vetted as well, which was supposed to turn the initiatives launched by anticommunists into a laughing stock.

Deputy Siemiatkowski's career began in earnest in the spring of 1993, when he replaced Marek Siwiec as the SLD press spokesman. Thanks to his mobility, he got through to the media very quickly. His statements were synthetic and skilful, although they were worded clumsily. He presented himself to his interlocutors as a social liberal, an advocate of an agreement with the union's [not further identified] salons; however, he definitely disliked the Peasants, and he took advantage of every opportunity to criticize them.

Siemiatkowski did not have much luck in the fight for high office, although he held many lower-level offices: member of the MSW Political Advisory Committee and of the National Judiciary Council. However, President Lech Walesa prevented him from assuming the post of deputy defense minister early in 1994. He had the time to take a look at his office in the National Defense Ministry, but... "Siemiatkowski will be a deputy minister—in Uganda," Mieczyslaw Wachowski decided.

Only in 1995 did Siemiatkowski manage to become a member of a commission that oversaw the special services; in doing this, he defeated other prominent SLD candidates. He was coauthor of the SLD quasi-vetting draft law, which made it possible to screen the records of candidates for high office without the public participating in the process in any way. The draft law got stuck in a Sejm commission, and the SLD did not really press the commission to examine it.

Another favorite subject of Siemiatkowski's in the Sejm was the church. As the head of the Concordat commission, he encouraged compromise. He was the only post-communist in the commission who voted for the thesis that the Concordat was in line with the binding law. "I will cut your balls off," Izabella Sierakowska [SdRP politician] threatened him publicly in the Sejm lobby. Siemiatkowski yielded to the pressure, and, during the plenary session, he voted differently, explaining sadly that he could not breach party discipline.

Despite that, a motion to oust him from the SLD spokesman was submitted. He waited it out with a scholarship in the United States. When he got back, Kwasniewski employed him as the spokesman of his campaign staff.

In the fervor of the fight, the quiet Siemiatkowski turned aggressive. Even before this, he sometimes made quite stunning statements; for example, he claimed that

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what proved that public television was working hard was the "aggressive advertising" of Kutz's film entitled "Death Like a Slice of Bread," which was about the Wujek coal mine. During the exchange of blows in the campaign, he hit everyone—the church, [Public Television Director] Walendziak, and, primarily, the Office of State Protection, which he accused of fighting Kwasniewski's candidacy. Asked about this by the special commission (of which he is a member himself), he was unable to substantiate his accusations.

He also became famous for his curious idea in the area of psychological warfare. He mailed postcards to the participants of "anti-Kwasniewski rallies," who were previously photographed. Later he explained that this was a joke. It is possible that being in charge of the MSW will offer him opportunities to make more jokes.

After Kwasniewski's victory, he was appointed only deputy head of the presidential National Security Office [BBN], although he bargained for more; he wanted to actually head the BBN. He said that he was positive about Oleksy's innocence. He also stated that the SLD went astray when it voted against suspending Sekula's [SLD deputy who is perceived as an embezzler of public money] immunity and statute of limitations for communist crimes. However, in both cases he voted just like the rest of the SLD, which was against the opinion he voiced later.

**Poland: Article Analyzes Current Political Situation**

*WS1202134996 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 31 Jan 96 p 10*

[Article by Ernest Skalski: "Jozek"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"I wish for Jozek [Joe] Oleksy—after all, we are good friends and acquaintances—to do as much as possible for Poland and the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP]," President Kwasniewski said on Sunday. Jozek basically now means more than the state.*

**The Trade Union of Those in Power**

Solidarity, it was said 15 years ago, is a party that wants to pass for a trade union, while the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] is a trade union of the establishment that wants to pass for a political party. Little has changed since. Only the PZPR has changed its name to the SdRP.

The primary objective of a union is to fight for its members' interests. Thus, Ireneusz Sekula [parliamentary deputy and former head of the Main Customs Office], charged with stupendous fraud, is not deprived of parliamentary immunity or summoned to court. Thus, Prosecutor General Jerzy Jaskiernia can continue to defend his friends. Thus, Jozef Oleksy, alleged to have committed state treason, continues to be one of the top figures on the political scene since he can no longer keep his prime ministerial post.

Oleksy's election to the presidency of the SdRP is the Social Democracy's internal matter. The choice, however, discredits the ruling party, the government in which its ministers hold seats, and the president, who has given up membership in the party but has not, of course, renounced it. One may suppose that, in electing Oleksy, the SdRP has chosen to follow its own definition of what is good or bad. One may also conjecture that the decisionmakers' personal benefits, not those of the party, are the ultimate value. The state and party are merely instruments for procuring such benefits.

For those who think along these lines, a high state office is not a public service but an acquired good, to which rights are gained and which is defended quite openly—without a shadow of embarrasment. When resigning from office, Jozef Oleksy was not ashamed to point out that he had been wronged. And Aleksander Kwasniewski, having learned of the choice the SdRP had made and certainly understanding the akward situation in which it had placed him, took the opportunity of full media coverage to wish Jozek luck for all Poland to see.

The initiation of proceedings by the prosecutor ought to have exacted greater restraint. For what will happen if charges in the Oleksy case are confirmed or are not dismissed in a convincing way? The apparently fine show of friendship has proved to be more important than presidential authority or the authority of the state he represents. Kwasniewski is beginning to depreciate the office of president, just as Walesa did in the past.

It is no use pretending that, for political players, the exercise of power is nothing but a mission and a sacrifice. Those who believe they have a mission are, in fact, a real disaster because they are usually dangerous fanatics pursuing their own goals regardless of everything else, if only to stay in power at all costs.

Normal politicians combine private ambitions and interests with a sense of social duty. The balance between these is easily tipped in favor of ambition and private interest. The effectiveness and ethical standards of a democratic system, however, rest on its ability to identify and punish excessive pursuit of private interests. Everyone knows it is not allowed and that even suspicion of such conduct may be enough to cut short a political career. That is why politicians who are led by caution rather than by moral values discover it pays to keep to such standards.

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**From Communism to the Mafia**

The described mechanism functions only in a democratic state, where society knows what is happening and has an influence on events, and where criteria for what is good or bad are rather widely accepted and fairly stable. In a dictatorship, the leader defines what is good or bad. It was Lenin who stated that what helps the proletarian revolution is moral, but it was up to him to decide what helped or stood in the way.

The ideals of the revolution quickly grew to be abstract; the only concrete thing were the authorities, and in all communist countries they developed a closed mafia structure.

Not all criminal organizations are mafia. This term is frequently used too liberally. The mafia is a hierarchically ordered organization, with its own internal rules superceding all others; it is based on the shared—though not necessarily formal or stated—common interests of greater or lesser bosses controlling numerous vantage points. We can use this description for a comparison of the communist ruling apparatus and mafia organizations. For both the apparatus and classical mafia structures, clandestine operations and important links, as well as solidarity and obedience, served as a guarantee of their existence. In addition, the overwhelmingly personal relationships formed in these organizations were also a characteristic feature, as in all forms of conspiracy.

Many things in politics and business depend on personal trust and understanding. This is perfectly all right as long as the law and propriety are not transgressed by personal loyalty. However, an organization whose functions disregard the law and propriety must base its existence on personal subordination enforced through its own system of punishment and privilege.

As communist parties grew into trade unions of the authorities, their leaders awarded themselves prizes and privileges. The most precious of these was the privilege of irresponsibility and impunity. While in an open democratic system the higher the office the greater the responsibilities attached, in the communist system, the higher the position the more one was allowed, the more isolated from society and shielded from all responsibility one was.

**Smooth Transformation**

In the 1970's and 1980's, the ruling apparatus in communist Poland, in its own way, grew more civilized. Aside from party hardliners, there appeared those pragmatic politicians who, somewhat by mimicry, rather smoothly adapted to democractic conditions and the market economy. The experience of Italy and Latin American countries shows us that a mafia system can just as easily function in a state where there is a real parliament and market.

Postcommunist countries are especially susceptible to this disease. Mafia-style rule was a constituent feature of the system in these countries, not a deviation. In Italy, the mafia and the governing bodies it corrupted had to omit the law, hide from public opinion, bribe or kill policemen. In a communist society, the ruling apparatus itself laid down the law; the police and the press were its component parts.

In a capitalist society, the mafia is like a polyp casting a shadow over the economy and society, hampering political and economic mechanisms, exhausting the organism on which it thrives but does not kill. There are no such constraints on mafia rule—or a Medellin cartel threatening a Cali cartel—in the communist system, which brings about the breakdown of the country and its own downfall. This is what happened in 1989 in our part of the world and in the Soviet Union two years later.

The mechanism of exhausting a country's resources should not be viewed simply as the impoverishment of a nation from exploitation to satisfy the gloating consumptionism of the mafia or party apparatus. To function and consume, the mafia's upper echelons must maintain a system of control that limits or completely restricts growth, thus leading to social and economic decay. These controls are enforced in a communist system through totalitarianism and a planned economy. The capitalist system relies on a network of political and economic ties that, to a greater or lesser extent, are formal. In addition to that, there is, especially in postcommunist countries, an enormous state-owned and mixed sector and an entire system of restrictions, rebates, franchises, and privileges.

This is why we are maintaining and will for a long time continue to maintain a deficit-yielding state mining industry and an inefficient arms industry. This explains why sponge-like holdings in the sugar or oil industry are created. This is why we have lame monopolies operating such services as telephones, the mail, railways, the power supply, and, as a matter of fact, the social insurance system.

It ought to be remembered that, in keeping to the rule "Unto each what to him belongs," it is not only the SdRP that has carried out this policy. The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] is pretending it is not a postcommunist party. Yet it is. Not only because it was created as the United Peasant Party [ZSL], an instrument to destroy the party set up by Mikolajczyk [anticommunist peasant party leader in the 1940's]. And not because it backed the antipeasant policies of the communist party for more

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than 40 years in return for cozy positions for its party activists. What is significant is that the PSL today has focused its attention almost exclusively on placing its own people in the structures of power and business organizations and has not developed a political program for agriculture. The only thing it knows how to do is win electoral votes and defend privileges that solidify the backwardness of Polish agriculture.

**We Have Chosen the Past**

In a standard capitalist system, the mafia is usually apolitical. In case of need, it corrupts politicians of any shade of the political spectrum. If it ever makes use of elections, it is to commit election fraud, to blackmail voters, or to buy votes. On the other hand, in postcommunist countries, some of those whose roots are in the old structures of power or business life and some of the parties and politicians of the ancien regime enter the new system as left-wingers and win in fair elections.

This is because they present state control over the economy as prosocial policies, protecting voters from "wild liberalism." Some do this out of calculation, others out of stupidity. And, thus, it is possible in a democratic system to assume legal control over politics that rule the economy.

By no means are the active members of the old apparatus of power trying to restore communism. Even Gennadiy Zhyuganov, the Russian communist leader, has no such design, not to mention top decisionmakers here in Poland. Only now can they enjoy the richness of life; though still in power, they have now become company presidents, supervisory board members, parliamentary deputies, ministers (and the president!) in a real political system and not in a palace-like structure of power. To add to this, they are now in possession of real money, not goods whose supply is regulated. They will, as a result, ferociously defend capitalism, as if the state's independence depended on it, but this perforce must be a mafia and paternal type of capitalism. One in which they can enjoy the fruits of ownership, protecting themselves from the inconvenience of competition by means of personal ties and political power. And, given the ineptitude and dissipation of their political opponents, they can gain political power in a parliamentary system thanks to the structures, abilities, and resources carried over from the previous system.

This explains why they must keep up the existing system of ties, why Jozek is more important than the state. Hence, the painful surprise that this instrument of power cannot be that easily transposed to the new system. And, after all, the price that now must be paid for these benefits is social control. Hence the rage that the press is spoiling the luxury of rule and possession.

The weakness of right-wing parties in Poland is largely due to the fact that their legitimization lies primarily in the past, which is becoming an increasingly irrelevant issue to a growing segment of the population. It has practically little to offer aside from fighting a form of communism that no longer exists. Walesa's [presidential] campaign, conducted in an anticommunist-crusade style, added to the anachronism of the situation.

On the other hand, we had Kwasniewski's "Let's choose the future" [campaign slogan]. The implication being "Let's not bother about the past." This must have sounded tempting to many because either they preferred not to be reminded of the past or are disgusted with the ever-present looking back to communist times in Poland.

The winning faction has been very selective in breaking away from the past. It has carried over mafia ties and attempted to use them to broaden its own realm of possessions. Inasmuch as it is immoral to use state property for the enfranchisement of former administrators of the system, it is far more damaging to use this property while suspending the rules of an open society and competition, making use of ties from the not too distant past.

**Freedom for All**

It would surely be better for Poland's credibility and economic development if the key figures from the communist system were not occupying the highest public offices in the Third Republic. It ought not be forgotten, however, that they were legally elected.

Perhaps if a campaign of verifiying communists had been conducted earlier, the present situation could have been avoided. What lies at the crux of the matter is the ban on filling some of the top public offices with people who were important figures in the communist hierarchy. A few years ago many politicians demanded that a process of decommunization be started in Poland.

Many regret that it never took place. Some would even like to have it started now and are demanding that the SdRP be delegalized.

However, after careful consideration, one reaches the conclusion that it was not possible to carry out a decommunization campaign and that attempts to do so probably would have done more harm than good. In the period immediately following the Round Table talks, the interim parliament, composed mainly of activists dating from the People's Republic of Poland times, would have had to enact decommunization laws. These politicians

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cast a decent vote for major political changes but would not, of course, vote for their own political suicide.

In the 1991 elections, the postcommunists were already able to muster considerable social support, obtained through the democratic process, which had earlier taken years for the democratic opposition to obtain. To void this achievement would have been not only morally dubious, but also harmful. If SdRP members were purged from political institutions, it would not have eliminated this force. On the contrary, it would only have made it more radical, forced it to take to the streets, and would have brutalized public life.

The former democratic opposition ought to have won the next elections and kept postcommunists in opposition, which is their proper place in a democratic system. This is not what actually happened, and the political world has once again returned to the historical dispute with communism, it would seem. Once again, calls have been made to rebuild a law-abiding state and restore its credibility. All possible and some impossible alliances have been planned toward this end. These alliances would be between forces with significantly differing views as to the shape and functioning of a free market economy. The fundamental dispute concerning the pace of national growth, the shape of our civilization, and the adjustments to the structures and standards of the most developed nations is becoming increasingly murky and remote.

**Poland: Government To Import Coal If Emergency Arises**

*LD1202144596 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1334 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 12 Feb—The government is prepared to take appropriate steps in the event that an emergency situation occurs and citizens are faced with power cuts due to the miners' strike, government spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska said today at a news conference.

This would be an emergency purchase of coal and power, and, as Jakubowska noted, there would not be any difficulties in finding suppliers. For example, representatives of Ukrainian coal companies have already become active in Silesia.

Jakubowska stressed that the government is not a party in this dispute; she also expressed the hope that perhaps agreement will be reached in the talks being held in Katowice between the striking miners and the management of the coal companies.

The spokeswoman said that the government will certainly be interested in hearing the industry minister's report on the current situation in the mining industry at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 13 February.

**Poland: UOP Officer Arrested for Passing Information**

*WS1302121696 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13 Feb 96 pp 1, 13*

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "UOP Officer Arrested; He Passed Classified Information to Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On 9 February the Voivodship Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw arrested an officer of the Office of State Protection [UOP] for taking secret state information outside UOP premises. The prosecutor's office is keeping the investigation top secret (files are locked in the classified information room) and refuses to disclose any information on this subject.*

It is known that the investigation is being carried out by a different prosecutor than the one dealing with the leaks of classified information to the press in the so-called Oleksy case. The arrest was part of a different investigation, and there is no direct connection between the documents that have been disclosed by this functionary to unauthorized people and the Oleksy case.

We have managed to find out unofficially that the information revealed by this functionary has not been published anywhere yet. When he was detained, he admitted to committing the offense, and he provided detailed answers to the prosecutor's questions, which resulted in the necessity of verifying more information. In line with our information, it was a special control cell working within UOP that caught the trail of the officer. We also learned that the materials that were taken out of the UOP premises were political in nature. They were probably passed on to politicians. "But not to political parties," one of our interlocutors added.

The prosecutor's office brought against the functionary charges based on Article 260, Paragraph 2 of the Penal Code (disclosure of information that constitutes a state secret due to security of the state) as well as Article 263 of the Penal Code (violation of an ordinance issued for the purpose of protecting a secret).

It is worth recalling that, as a consequence of the leaks from UOP, General Gromoslaw Czempinski, UOP head, tendered his resignation. Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, who is now minister of internal affairs, will relay this resignation to the prime minister after his talk with Czempinski, who is formally on leave until Wednesday [14 February].

Before he left, the UOP head gave an interview to RZECZPOSPOLITA, in which he said that UOP func-

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tionaries are under pressure from journalists and politicians, who keep telling them that they should disclose classified materials "in the interests of society."

"Yes, one can say: Why, what kind of services are they that they yield to such pressure? However, if a paper offers $100,000 for a piece of information that confirms a thesis that Oleksy is either guilty or not guilty, then such a sum is not to be sneezed at. If journalists offer my officers 50 or 100 million zlotys for providing information, is this not pressure? (...) Fortunately, as I hope, this is not done by people who are directly involved in these issues. The information comes only from people 'on the sidelines,' who do not have complete knowledge. They feel that their actions are justified because they are told that such is the interest of the Polish state. In the past, leaks from this office occurred very rarely. Now they are commonplace. This is linked to specific political parties. People who ought to be really nonpolitical provide political parties with information. NIE refers to them as 'squirrels,' but, in fact, this practice is now in vogue: All editorial staffs try to get their own 'informer' in UOP."

Czempinski also talked about politicians who "may promise the moon" for providing information against their political adversaries.

**Poland: Counterfeit U.S. Visas Disclosed by Police**

*WS1202101596 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 2 Feb 96 p 1*

[Article by "ABA": "Sewn-In Visa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nowy Sacz, Warsaw, Katowice—For a year, a five-person group of forgers from Nowy Sacz has run an illegal travel office that organized trips to the United States with forged visa documents. Prosecutors from Nowy Sacz have not settled the question of how many citizens of the Polish Republic managed to cross the ocean in this way. Only one group has been intercepted.

"We have arrested some 50 travelers," says Jacek Woloszynski, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation. "There was surely a larger number of people who jumped at the travel office's offer. The price list ranged from $5,000-7,000."

The forgers used two methods: They stamped a visa with a fabricated seal or sewed in the pages an already stamped visa for a passport. They tore pages out of the stolen documents. The travel office was very well organized. Every client was driven in a limousine to the airport in Budapest or Warsaw, most often in a black Mercedes, and the chauffeur would take the luggage to the customs control checkpoint and then wave goodbye from the viewing terrace. Finally, after a year-long investigation, Arnold K., the mastermind of the enterprise, was arrested.

"The Nowy Sacz case was the biggest of its type in the country. Yet almost every day we arrest individuals with counterfeit visas," says Major Jaroslw Zukowicz, a press spokesman for the border guard. "At the Okecie airport itself, we arrested 250 Poles with counterfeit U.S. permanent residence visas last year. We also caught 15,000 persons who tried in various ways to cross the border at border crossings; Asians and Africans were dominant."

**Poland: KLN Opposes Restitution to Jews**

*WS1302135396 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 13 Feb 96 p 2*

[Article by "JUR": "A Peculiar Statement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Peasant-Independence Coalition [KLN] claims that declarations regarding the return of assets that belonged to Jewish communities, statments being made by President Kwasniewski before the enfranchisement referendum, are improper, to say the least. The president of the Polish Republic should first address the problems of his own citizens and only then deal with issues that are non-Polish affairs. The KLN issued a statement in which it also criticized statements made by Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati, who condemned the progrom of Jews in the Kielce region and showed repentance on behalf of the Polish people and state. The KLN, which issued this peculiar statement, consists of the following parties: the Confederation of Republicans, the Polish Patriotic Forum, the Polish Peasant Party (Mikolajczyk), the Polish Union (the Malopolska Region). The Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Rural Solidarity and the Center Accord play the role of observers there, whereas the supporting organizations are the Anticommunist Bloc and the Sejm of Polish Veterans.

**Poland: Two Polls Show SLD First, Solidarity Second**

*WS1202155196 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 10-11 Feb 96 p 2*

[Report by "DOM": "Public Opinion Research; SLD in the Lead"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is still at the top of the ranking list of political parties. According to the Sopot-based Social Research Laboratory [PBS], it is supported by 36 percent of the voters. According to the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS], the party is supported by 26 percent.

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The method used in the poll conducted (early in February) by the Sopot agency (and ordered by RZECZPOSPOLITA) differed from methods employed by other polling agencies. Each respondent had 100 points he could distribute among parties; he could give them all to a single party, but, if he was undecided, he could distribute them among a few groups; some points could also be given to the possibility that he would not go to the polls at all. If he knew that he would most certainly not go to the polls, he could give 100 points to this option. When PBS analysts estimated support for parties, they took into account only those points that were given to parties.

As RZECZPOSPOLITA stated, the rating of the SLD (36 percent) improved despite the charges leveled at Jozef Oleksy, leader of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, the main component of the SLD. Next on the list was Solidarity, with 13 percent. The Freedom Union [UW] obtained just as much support. The position of the newly established Jan Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland is quite high (9 percent). The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Union of Labor [UP] garnered 7 percent each. Other groups would not have won seats in the parliament because the support they obtained did not exceed 5 percent; all of them together garnered 15 percent.

According to CBOS, the SLD can count on only 26 percent of the vote. Solidarity can count on 15 percent, the PSL and UW on 10 percent each. The remaining parties would not exceed the 5-percent limit. Jan Olszewski's group (according to PBS, it enjoys the support of 9 percent of the voters) garnered only 4 percent among the CBOS respondents.

The CBOS poll was conducted between 2 and 6 February on a representative random sample of 1,205 Poles. The PBS poll was conducted on 3 and 4 February on a representative sample of 1,100 Poles.

**Poland: Former State Farms To Be Auctioned**

*LD1002204496 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 10 Feb 96*

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government agricultural settlement program is now being launched. In a few days' time, teams from the Agricultural Property Department [AWR] of the State Treasury will announce the first auctions in northwestern Poland, offering farms for lease. The settlement program is to facilitate the taking over of land that used to belong to the former PGR's [State Agricultural Farms] and that have so far not found buyers at the terms being offered. The people who win the auctions will be able to receive credit on favorable terms.

[Correspondent] The agricultural settlement program envisages that, in a few years' time, several thousand farms will be established on the land still remaining fallow, mainly in northwestern Poland. They are to be commercial farms that should be able to repay their loans, of about 100 hectares on average. They will be able to compete with the agriculture of the EU states.

[Begin Agriculture Minister Roman Jagielinski recording] The farms will be leased, and they will be eligible for loans from the Agriculture Restructuring and Modernization Agency. The Powszechny Bank Inwestycyjny, which has its branches in all Polish provinces, will be in charge of the allocation of loans. The loans will amount to as much as 5 billion zlotys and will enable farmers to purchase equipment and buildings, as well as construct new buildings and start production. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The settlement program is aimed primarily at young, educated, and enterprising people who have their own capital. To be accepted into the auction scheme, they have to submit a plan for the use of the land. Agricultural advisory centers are helping them to prepare such plans. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] At the first stage of the settlement program, 5,000 hectares of land will be offered for auction. Already now there are enough people interested to lease twice as much land.

**Poland: More Companies Await Privatization**

*WS1202102896 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 22 Jan 96 p 6*

[Article by "KRZYN": "Big Sale"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to estimates of the Ministry of Ownership Transformation [MPW] and Central Statistical Office [GUS], the value of real estate to be privatized totals 75 billion zlotys [Z].

Last year, the budget earned over Z1.7 billion from capital privatization. In 1996, the sum of Z1.8 billion is expected to replenish the budget on this score.

From 1990 to 1995, almost 3,500 companies undertook ownership changes. The Treasury Agricultural Assets Agency took over all (more than 1,600) agricultural production companies from the founding bodies.

In the years 1991-92, Treasury revenues from privatization were within the range of 160 million new zlotys. Three years ago, the revenues were even smaller and totaled over Z120 million. A certain growth took place

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in 1994: Slightly over Z400 million from privatization flowed into the state budget.

From the beginning of January till the end of last year, ownership changes were introduced in over 450 plants. About 200 were transformed into single proprietor Treasury-owned companies. In over 150 plants, the method of direct privatization was utilized, and, in almost 120, privatization was accomplished through liquidation.

According to the incomplete data given by the Katowice chapter of the MPW (there is no overall sum for the past year), by the end of 1995 29 plants were converted into single proprietor Treasury-owned companies, whose founding bodies were the governors of Katowice, Czestochowa, and Opole Provinces.

"In Katowice Province, the companies that have been privatized or are being privatized are numerous," TRYBUNA SLASKA found out at the chapter's office. "This year, privatization will proceed in the same way it has thus far—in a good direction and relatively quickly." According to the estimates, in Katowice Province there are about 500 plants (211 companies are under the governor's authority; the remaining ones are under supervision of central bodies) in which no ownership changes have been implemented or where privatization was undertaken but not concluded.

"Profitable enterprises were privatized first because they were most eager to be privatized, and, therefore, they easily succumbed to the transformation," says our source. "Most of the companies that are left, are the 'difficult' plants, not only because of their financial and economic standing but also because of their legal status."

A similar trend will occur in the country this year. Some 80 capital privatizations will be introduced at, among other places, Pollena Ewa, Centrum Department Stores, Ruch [press dealer and distributor], Polish Copper, and breweries in Zabrze, Tychy, and Lezajsk, as well as companies from the tobacco sector in Krakow and Poznan. In this way, mainly large and profitable companies will be sold. However, the question of smaller and economically worse off companies remains open.

**Poland: Consolidation of Banking System Detailed**

*96EP0023D Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 2 Jan 96 p 12*

[Article by Przemyslaw Szubanski, published under the rubric "Predictions 1996": "A Good Year for the Banks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is highly likely that the trends for favorable growth in the banking sector will continue in 1996. Much depends, however, on outside factors. The banking system is certain to have performed well in 1995. Its performance would have been even better were it not for the continuing considerable losses incurred by certain banks, chiefly by the Katowice Bank Kredytowo-Handlowy, S.A., which is in liquidation, and the Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej, S.A. [Bank of Food Industry]. But the other banks are generally in a good position. The best positions of all—next to foreign banks—are held by the "Nine," isolated from the National Bank of Poland [NBP] in 1989. Also good is the performance of the banks quoted on the stock exchange. The condition of the cooperative banks, that weakest link in the banking sector, is finally improving.

In 1995 the restructuring of these banks commenced. Restructuring bonds, on deposit with the Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej, were transferred to the Gospodarczy Bank Wielkopolski, which associates more than 200 cooperative banks in six voivodships whose losses account for nearly one-third of the total losses of the cooperative sector. There is a chance that another bond issue will be transmitted in 1996, and the losses of cooperative banks are certain to diminish this year.

On the other hand, the fate of small banks having low or nonexistent income from non-interest-bearing sources, that is, from sources other than loans, is worrisome. On the credit market they find it difficult to compete with bigger banks which can afford to reduce loan costs. In the absence of nonloan income, which serves to offset part of overhead expenditures, the situation of these small banks will be unenviable.

By a government decision, this year two banking groups are to be formed, one consolidated around Bank Handlowy in Warsaw, S.A., and the other around Pekao, S.A. Considering the formal and legal problems involved in establishing such holding companies and the absence of a final decision as to the designation of their shares, it should rather be expected that neither of these groups will be privatized any earlier than 1997. This also applies to Bank Zachodni, S.A., which is certain to spend a lot of time on finally resolving the question of the taken-over Bank Rozwoju Rolnictwa Rolbank, S.A. In 1996 we can thus expect the privatization of two

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banks: Yet another of the "Nine," Powszechny Bank Kredytowy, S.A., and the NBP-owned Polski Bank Inwestycyjny, S.A., which right now is taking over Prosper Bank, S.A.

It can be expected that in the year ahead we shall be dealing with mergers initiated not only from the top, but locally. This will result in a reduction in the number of weak banks and a concentration of capital and assets within the sector as a whole. This will be affected by the growing competition from foreign banks, although this factor should not—at least not in 1996—be overestimated. Practically all the most expansive banks are present in Poland by now. The biggest German financial institutions became active in this country as late as in 1995, and 1996 will be the year of their greatest activity.

Like any other sector of the economy, banks do not operate in a vacuum. But they are particularly affected by the ambient situation. In 1996 economic growth may weaken. That is because in the second half of this year the German economy, the principal customer for our exports, may slow down. In such a situation, credit demand would decrease. This will additionally affect wages, and by extension also savings. The banks that are aware of the possibility of such a scenario will thus be more and more intensively exploring new sources of income in the year ahead. Owing to the abolition of the mandatory resale of foreign exchange by importers, instruments for protection against currency exchange rate fluctuations will undoubtedly appear. In addition, growth in the demand for credit cards can be expected.

**Poland: Poor Condition of Fishing Fleet Discussed**

*WS1202092196 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 24 Jan 96 p 11*

[Interview with maritime expert Lechoslaw Bartoszewicz by Krystyna Pohl; place and date not given: "We Failed To Keep Cool"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Pohl] In the 1960's and 1970's, our deep-sea fishing industry was a power....

[Bartoszewicz] This is true. We had a modern fishing fleet and an excellent staff. Today the staff is still excellent, but the ships are obsolete. At that time, we accessed the world's largest fishing grounds. We were the first in many of them. [passage omitted]

[Pohl] While we are talking, trawlers are docked, not catching fish, and companies are losing because the parties cannot come to an agreement on the amount of payment for assigned limits.

[Bartoszewicz] I think this whole fishing contract should be renegotiated from scratch, instead of boiling it down to bargaining for limits and tariffs. It augurs nothing good and only speeds up the demise of Polish deep-sea fishing. Small limits and high tariffs will ruin the fishing companies.

[Pohl] We can always return to international waters. We have the right to.

[Bartoszewicz] Theoretically yes, but I am not sure whether it is feasible. [passage omitted]

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**Romania: Army Purchases French Air-to-Air Missiles**

*AU1202211896 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 6 Feb 96 p 1*

[Report by ROMPRES: "Romania Has Purchased Air-to-Air Missiles From France"]

[FBIS Translated Text] France has sold Romania air-to-air missiles to be mounted on the MiG-29, MiG-23, and MiG-21 aircraft that are currently in use, according to the EFE agency, citing an article published by the French newspaper LE MONDE. According to the article, this is the first delivery of French weapons to a former Warsaw Pact country since the Berlin Wall came down. The missile in question is the Magic 2, produced by the Matra company which won the contract against competition from the United States, Russia, and Israel.

**Romania: Ex-STS Director Transferred to SIE**

*AU1202211996 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 6 Feb 96 p 1*

[Article by Doru Dragomir: "Changes in the World of Secret Services: Colonel Stefan Coman, Former STS Director, Is Now Head of the SIE CIFRU Department"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel Stefan Coman, former director of the Special Telecommunication Services [STS], has been transferred to the Foreign Intelligence Service [SIE]. There, Col. Coman has been appointed head of the SIE's Cifru [Cipher] Department and his duty is mainly to ensure the secrecy of SIE agents' telephone conversations with the central department. The former STS head is also in charge of coordinating the reception of various coded messages transmitted by SIE employees on duty abroad.

It is known that, during its last meeting held last year, the CSAT [Supreme Council for the Country's Defense] decided to release Col. Stefan Coman as STS director and to employ him in another position. In accordance with the CSAT decision, Col. Tiberiu Lopatita, one of the former director's deputies, was appointed as the new STS director.

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**Slovenia: Ljubljana To Repay France $38.6 Million**

*AU0902092296 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 6 Feb 96 p 1*

[Report by C.R.: "Gaspari Signed Agreement on Assumption of Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana—Slovene Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari signed an agreement between Slovenia and France on the assumption of a portion of the debt to the so-called Paris Club of banks in Paris yesterday.

The Slovene share of the debt with known end recipients to the Paris Club banks totals $237 million. According to the agreement, Slovenia will pay a little more than $38.6 million to France. Gaspari signed a similar agreement with Germany last week, and such agreements will also need to be signed with the other 14 members of the club, primarily, the United States, Austria, the Netherlands, and Kuwait.

**Slovenia: Bekes Appointed Ambassador to Italy**

*AU0902091296 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 Jan 96 p 4*

[Article by Sasa Vidmajer: "Peter Bekes Leaving for Rome"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Peter Bekes, a 53-year-old lawyer and lecturer at the Higher Administration School (and member of the United List of Social Democrats [ZLSD]), will depart for Rome on 1 February to take up the ambassador's seat that has been vacant for quite some time. We were told at the Foreign Ministry that, pursuant to the procedure envisaged by the Law on Foreign Affairs, the president of the republic appointed Bekes the new Slovene ambassador in Italy on 25 January.

The most exposed ambassadorial appointment within the Slovene diplomatic network has been empty since the early departure of Marko Kosin from Rome. After many complications and after the government first proposed a candidate in autumn and subsequently withdrew his candidacy, the name of Peter Bekes appeared in mid-November. In the meantime, the first adviser in the embassy in Rome was appointed as the interim charge d'affaires. Toward the end of the year, Bekes also got the approval of the parliamentary committee for international relations, and it was said then that he would take up the post by Christmas.

Due to the traumatic nature of Slovene-Italian relations, the complications that accompanied the appointment of the new ambassador in Rome received considerable attention among the public. The impression that, for quite some time, Slovenia either could not decide or, for political reasons, had postponed a decision on its representative in the neighboring country is not entirely irrelevant. The Foreign ministry's explanation that the practice by which the departure of Ambassador Kosin was not followed immediately by the arrival of his successor is not unknown in diplomacy is essentially correct. However, we cannot ignore the lack of coordination and skill of the Slovene authorities, whose treatment of the sensitive ambassadorial issue was not exactly at the state level.

Trieste IL PICCOLO reported recently that the Rome Quirinal, the headquarters of the Italian president of the republic, reacted positively to the news about the appointment of a new Slovene ambassador to Rome. Peter Bekes (ZLSD) graduated from the Law School in Ljubljana, he worked in the Socialist Alliance of the Working People in the eighties, and later headed the Marxist Center. In the previous makeup of the Slovene parliament, he was a ZLSD deputy. Since 1990, he has been a lecturer at the Higher Administration School, and he specialized in administrative and public law.

**Slovenia: Defense Ministry Prefers Israeli Communications**

*AU1202161896 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that the conflict surrounding the purchase of communications system for the requirements of the Defense Ministry will finally get its epilogue. Namely, the government commission has reportedly ended its review and, as we have learned, supposedly discovered no major irregularities. We did not manage to learn any details at the Defense Ministry. More news is expected at a news conference in a couple of days, however, the ministry still insists that the system of the Israeli manufacturer is, in terms of price and quality, better than the American. They also rebuff some accusations that the purchase, in light of the decision about the rapprochement with NATO, is also political. One of the major NATO members also uses an identical communications system and it was also purchased by four countries that are members of the Partnership for Peace.

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## Federal

### FRY: Serb Krajina Families To Be Sent to Sarajevo

*LD1202204396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1826 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 February (SRNA)—Four hundred-fifty families, refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina, which are currently accommodated in the Ivanjica reception center in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, will be accommodated in the Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo by the end of the week.

At the request from the Serb Republic Ministry for Refugees, the secretariat for property and legal issues of the Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo inspected 1,746 residential units, of which 313 flats are currently inhabitable.

All municipalities of Serb Sarajevo should submit a report to the Ministry on the currently available inhabitable property, as over 1,000 refugee families have expressed the desire to move permanently to Serb Sarajevo.

### FRY: Belgrade Lawyer To Defend Djukic in The Hague

*LD1202232496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2246 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—In its issue tomorrow the VECERNJE NOVOSTI daily of Belgrade carries an article saying that Belgrade lawyer Toma Fila has been informed that criminal proceedings against Serb Republic Army General Djordje Djukic were instituted because of his alleged involvement in war crimes and that he has declined to make a statement to The Hague tribunal representatives in Sarajevo prison in the absence of his lawyers.

Gen. Djukic also said he wishes to be defended by Mr. Toma Fila, which Fila has accepted without hesitation, Miroslav Vasic, a lawyer in Fila's law office, has told VECENJE NOVOSTI. [passage omitted]

### FRY: Milosevic, Bulgarian Prime Minister in Talks

*LD1202182796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1738 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic this afternoon received Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov, who is paying an official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the head of a Bulgarian state delegation.

In their talks, which were held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, President Milosevic said he was pleased that the high-ranking Bulgarian guest was paying the official visit, and stressed that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were linked by good-neighborly relations and successful bilateral cooperation, which has been confirmed in many areas of mutual interest, says a statement issued by the office of the Serbian president.

As two Balkan countries keen on stepping up their economic development and joining comprehensively current processes of international integration, and primarily as countries pursuing a resolute policy of peace and cooperation on an equal footing between states and peoples, the FRY and Bulgaria must work toward forging friendly and good-neighborly relations. There is no doubt that this can be an example of how to promote overall equitable relations between Balkan countries, states, and peoples.

The two sides expressed their firm belief that there existed highly integrated links and common interests between business partners of the two countries. The two sides agreed that of special importance were major investment projects of developing infrastructure and large industrial facilities, such as the Nis-Dimitrovgrad highway, energy-producing plants, and others. These will create prospects for developing even closer economic links between FRY and Bulgarian firms.

It was said at the talks that there were no open questions burdening bilateral relations and that the two national minorities and developed border contacts of the population represented a positive link, which strengthens mutual interest in the development of communications and the global forging of good relations.

An emphasis was put on the importance of maintaining the continuity of contacts between the two countries, with the view to exchanging views and experiences on most important international issue and also those relating to internal development.

### FRY: Russia, FRY Agree To Found Oil Company

*LD1202190596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1742 GMT 12 Feb 96*

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 12 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia and Russia decided Monday to found a joint company for the production, transport and marketing of oil.

The Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic and Russian Minister of Energy and Fuels Yuriy Shafranik also agreed that the two countries expand their cooperation to cover joint prospecting for oil in Russia, a government statement said.

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Yugoslavia and Russia will work together on oil and gas pipelines so as to secure Yugoslavia's steady supply with fuels from Russia and, at the same time, enable the sale of Russian oil and natural gas in neighbouring and other countries.

In the talks held at the close of Shafranik's two-day visit to yugoslavia, the forms of cooperation between the oil, power and coal industries of the two countries were defined in detailed.

The two sides agreed that joint enterprises were the best form of cooperation in the domain of energy.

They decided as soon as possible to found joint companies for the building of new and revitalization of the existing power plants and for the production and eale of coal and electricity.

**FRY: Cooperation Accords Prepared With Belarus**

*LD0902134996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1245 GMT 9 Feb 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 9 (TANJUG)—Twelve draft agreements on the promotion of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Belarus in foreign affairs, economy, science, culture and education were drawn up during a two-day visit to Belgrade of a Belarus Government delegation.

'I am very pleased with the results of the visit, during which we have reiterated that the Belarus Government and public did not support the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia,' Belarus Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Sinitsin told Radio-Television Serbia Thursday.

We especially stressed that it was impossible to disrupt the deeply-rooted friendship between our peoples, Sinitsin said.

He said he wanted all problems in the Balkans to be resolved peacefully and that Belarus had a principled stand on all conflicts in Europe and the world.

[Deputy Prime Minister] Sainovic told Radio-Television Serbia that all 12 draft agreements would be signed during Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic's visit to Minsk in early March.

Sainovic thanked Belarus for its support to Yugoslavia.

**FRY: New Democracy Head Urges Joining PFP**

*LD1202133896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1217 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 12 (TANJUG)—President of the party New Democracy (ND) Dusan Mihajlovic told a panel discussion hosted by TANJUG on his party's initiative in Yugoslav parliament that Yugoslavia should join Partnership for Peace that the essence of the programme had been approved through the Dayton accords, that is a military balance in the region.

New Democracy is a coalition partner of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) in the Serbian government.

Mihajlovic said that the basic idea of Partnership for Peace was to allay fears of all countries that they would be attacked and added that it was a voluntary agreement under which all countries would have sufficient military capability for defence and not for aggression.

The concept is to build confidence and promote cooperation among European countries, Mihajlovic said.

Commenting on claims in Yugoslavia that adhesion to the programme would imperil the country's sovereignty, Mihajlovic wondered about the reasons for which the Serbs would want to have a higher level of sovereignty than citizens in Russia, the Netherlands, Italy, France or Yugoslavia's neighbours.

Mihajlovic said that the Serbs had always taken sides in the past and that their allies had always been on the right side.

**FRY: Bulatovic Interviewed on Military Doctrine**

*AU1202195696 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 6 Feb 96 p 3*

[Interview with FRY Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic by Colonel Vladi Vladkov; place and date not given: "The Most Secure Door Is the One That Is Always Open"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vladkov] Minister, after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia your country had to create its armed forces practically from scratch. Have you completed this process?

[Bulatovic] It is a fact that former Yugoslavia was destroyed through armed secession and a civil war conducted by the republics that split off from the former Yugoslav state. They were helped in this by the exceptionally active participation of certain international factors, not only in the fields of psychological propaganda and intelligence but also in terms of funding.

The process of forming the Yugoslav Army began immediately after the adoption of the Federal Constitution and the transformation of the armed forces of the previous state. The goal was to form professional, depoliticized, and small armed forces, armed with modern weapons and established in accordance with the processes of democratic pluralism. This process is still being implemented in accordance with the objective needs

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and material possibilities of our society and state. The comprehensive process of constructing a new military organization is being implemented in three stages, two of which have been more or less completed. According to the assessment of the Supreme Defense Council, whose prerogatives include command over the Yugoslav Army, our army has preserved its combat ability and readiness to implement its constitutional obligations and be a strong factor in preserving peace, security, and stability.

I am sure that after adopting the Dayton and Paris peace agreements, ending the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia, and lifting the sanctions, real foundations will be established for completing the process of transforming and constructing the Yugoslav Army as a modern and efficient military force.

[Vladkov] What are the basic elements of the military doctrine of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and how does it define the security risks for your country?

[Bulatovic] First of all, I would like to say that the FRY has fully contributed and will continue to contribute to erecting the new architecture of European security and cooperation, simultaneously striving to base this architecture on universal values, such as equality and tolerance among peoples and states. Having absolutely no territorial claims toward any neighboring state and wanting intensively to cooperate in all spheres including security and defense, without interfering in internal politics, are permanent principles of our state policy.

The basic elements of our military doctrine spring from the common concept on the national defense. Thus, our doctrine and strategy are first of all defined as categories of the country's defense. In addition, the military doctrine is being implemented by the Yugoslav Army, relying on all the components of the defense system and on the entire military potential.

Consequently, the basic elements of this doctrine comprise; nationalizing all activities related to national defense, maintaining a professional and modern military organization as a basic factor in implementing national defense, a selective engagement of all other elements and the state's military potential, and relying on our own forces in planning and producing military weapons and equipment.

We have based our military doctrine on repelling and preventing any possible armed aggression from outside, eliminating the possibilities of strategic and operational surprises, making the army capable of absorbing the first strike of a possible aggressor, and securing the conditions for quickly and efficiently transforming the state and society onto a military footing.

[Vladkov] Does the FRY intend to ask for international guarantees for its national security after the lifting of the embargo and, more specifically, is it coming closer to the European and North Atlantic structures as part of those guarantees?

[Bulatovic] The quickest reintegration in the international organizations, of which it was a founder—the United Nations and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]—may be of vital importance for the FRY. With its principled and consistent peace policy and especially by signing the peace agreements and striving toward their full implementation, Yugoslavia has fully confirmed its desire to cooperate as a member of the international community.

It is our priority decision to act as a factor of peace, stability, and security because without the Balkans stable there can be no stable Europe.

Since the issues of security, confidence, and military balance that emerged on the territory of former Yugoslavia have already been resolved through military and other commitments, which have been incorporated in the Dayton and Paris agreements as annexes, your question has been answered at least partly.

It is clear that Yugoslavia must not remain isolated as a country under a military-strategic and political siege and that we need a common position on the global future processes. It also is clear that the world acts under the influence of the most powerful countries and that what remains for the small states is prudently to determine their vitally important interests in this process. We want a full and equal cooperation with all countries and we are prepared to sign all international conventions. We have no political reservations toward countries that have joined military-political organizations.

It is my understanding that the current international situation does not presuppose separate states coming closer to global or regional military-political alliances, but rather a proper level of cooperation and adopting and observing already accepted universal criteria and standards.

[Vladkov] What do you think is FRY's place in the all-European process of limiting conventional weapons?

[Bulatovic] The FRY is and must remain a component part of Europe and its culture, history, economy, universal and civilization values, and security. This presupposes a commitment on the part of the international community to our equal participation in all processes leading toward progress and peace.

Yugoslavia supports the principles of equal security for all states, adopting confidence and mutual security

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measures in relations between neighboring states, and balancing the military potentials in accordance with OSCE agreements and documents. I believe that our country has an important place in this process, and it is possible and useful to work out separate measures and instruments of regional Balkan security.

[Vladkov] What do you think are the main forms of cooperation between the FRY and Bulgaria and which could be implemented in the near future?

[Bulatovic] I really believe that our common border must become a bridge of cooperation and friendship. For many generations the nation to which I belong has believed in the wise rule that the door locked best is the one that is always open. This is precisely what Yugoslavia wants: to keep our common "door" always open. We can and must do this.

We want to cooperate with the Republic of Bulgaria in all spheres of mutual interest. I think that those are practically all areas of constructing the armed forces and preserving security and stability.

More specifically, I think that we will soon be establishing cooperation in many areas of defense: science, joint research and development projects, production sharing, converting the capacities of the weapons and military equipment, production enterprises, exchanging experience in training personnel, military justice regulations, military medicine, civil defense, etc.

Various forms of cooperation are desirable and possible; from mutual visits, through exchanging information, to forming public teams of experts for the implementation of projects of mutual interest.

Against the background of the fact that our countries' economies supplement each other, we could implement different variants of military-economic and scientific-technical cooperation, including common participation in third countries' markets, which we have not yet developed in accordance with the needs and possibilities of two friendly and neighboring countries.

The FRY-Bulgarian program of cooperation in the field of defense will soon be coordinated and adopted through a common document.

## Serbia

### Serbia: Milosevic, Bildt Discuss Peace Implementation

*LD1202182296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1739 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 February (TANJUG)—The president of the Republic, Slobodan Milosevic, today received Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community for civilian aspects of the Bosnian peace plan, who arrived in Belgrade with his aides.

They discussed the main issues regarding the civilian aspects of the implementation of the peace plan. According to a statement issued by the office of Slobodan Milosevic, they pointed out the joint efforts of the international community aimed at speeding economic reconstruction in areas where civil war was waged, which are of vital importance for the normalization of the situation and for the process of consolidation of mutual relations and confidence building between the parties to the agreement.

It is expected that in the interest of the stabilization of peace and the comprehensive normalization of the political situation in the region that positive results will be achieved through cooperation between the parties and the international community and through the necessary coordination of activities involving the international players.

### Serbia: Minority Issue Discussed With Bulgarian Official

*AU1302090296 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0500 GMT 13 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Dealing with the nationality issue is an internal matter for every state and should not be a source of conflict between the country in which the ethnic minority lives and the mother country—this was stressed during the talks yesterday between Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Svetoslav Shivarov and Mrs. Margit Savovic, FRY minister for minorities and human rights, TANJUG reported.

During the meeting it was affirmed that any internationalization of this issue violates state sovereignty. It was also emphasized that the state of human rights in Yugoslavia is unjustifiably placed in the center of attention of certain international institutions. In this connection, TANJUG quotes Svetoslav Shivarov as saying that certain individuals who are striving to upset the relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia do not have the Bulgarian Government's support. Shivarov reiterated the unequivocal position of the Bulgarian Government that minority issues are a subject for the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

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## Montenegro

### Montenegro: Bulatovic Receives International Envoy Bildt

*LD1202153496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1437 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—In Podgorica today, Montenegro President Momir Bulatovic received Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community, who is visiting this republic accompanied by his aides.

There was an open exchange of views on the results of the implementation of the Dayton and Paris agreements, especially its civilian aspects, the presidential office announced. [passage omitted]

The start of the normalization process of economic life is a basic precondition for the stabilization of the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was concluded.

In this context, President Bulatovic said that maintaining the international community's sanctions against the [Bosnian] Serb Republic is illogical and counterproductive. The lifting of these sanctions would have a strong positive effect on the overall implementation of the peace agreement and promotion of peace on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

## Kosovo

### Kosovo: Explosions Reported in Serb Refugee Camps

*LD1202144996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1411 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 12 Feb (TANJUG)—There were explosions in several Serb refugee camps in Kosovo-Metohija between 2100 and 2200 last night. Fortunately, there were no casualties, TANJUG has learned.

According to the first reports, hand grenades were exploded in the Serb refugee camps in Vucitrn, Pristina, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pec, and Suva Reka.

The explosions caused damage.

Investigative bodies have launched an intensive search for the culprits.

These deliberate attacks against refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina have caused disquiet in Kosovo-Metohija.

### Kosovo: Role of British Diplomacy Viewed

*AU1202120496 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 7 Feb 96*

["BUJKU and Albanian Party in Montenegro on the Role of British Diplomacy's Towards the Albanians"—KOSOVA DAILY REPORT headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Prishtina-based [Pristina] Albanian-language BUJKU newspaper carries today (Wednesday) [7 February] two separate articles which feature the role of British diplomacy, past and present, towards the Albanians in general and Kosova in particular. An alleged statement of Mr. Ivor Roberts, charge d'affaires of the British Embassy in Belgrade, during a trip to Cetinje, Montenegro, last month, in which he reportedly said it was the British diplomacy which assisted Montenegro in winning the coastal town of Ulqin [in Slavic "Ulcinj"] late in the 19th century, has raised heated discussions as to the role of British diplomacy over the Albanian cause through history.

"British Diplomat's Statement Irritates Albanians" is the title of a short article by the BUJKU correspondent in Ulqin. The British envoy's address in the founding convention of the Montenegrin-British Friendship Association in Cetinje, in which he echoed the British diplomacy's full support for the accession of Ulqin by Montenegro, has irritated the Albanian intellectuals, the Ulqin-based correspondent says. This statement is provocative and imprudent now that efforts are being made to create a new social order, rather than "revive the past tragedies which saw the partitioning of Albanian lands," the report from Ulqin concludes.

Meanwhile, the BUJKU writer Ibrahim Berisha, in a long essay entitled "The British Diplomacy and Ulqin, at Last," after quoting the British envoy's statement, as carried by the Belgrade-based NASA BORBA daily on 24 January 1996, says Mr. Ivor Roberts could have made mention of other Albanian towns which were given to Montenegro and Serbia, the "contribution of the British diplomacy and military being conspicuous and respectable" in this regard, as it "has never been concealed by Serbs and Montenegrins." The BUJKU writer concedes it is by the overt support of the British and the Russians that Serbia was encouraged to go ahead with ethnic cleansing of Albanians in the second half of the 19th century, namely 1877 and onwards. "Besides Ulqin, Tivar ('Bar' in Slavic), Kraja, Plava, Gucia, fifteen more large Albanian towns, every one and each being inhabited at least 80 percent by Albanians, could have been mentioned by Roberts," I. Berisha says.

The BUJKU writer echoes the position of the two British plenipotentiaries, Benjamin Disraeli and Lord

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Salisbury, at the Berlin Congress, which convened on 13 June 1878. The British stood in defense of the Ottoman Empire at the detriment of Albanians, the author holds, referring also to the deadly decisions of the 1913 London Conference for the Albanian cause and the Albanian territories.

Quoting another statement of Ivor Robert's, a week before the European Union's Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels, in which he said "British government's priority task is to see a speedy reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the international community," the BUJKU writer says Great Britain, through statements such as Robert's, "has made it clear that it wants to legitimize the state of affairs (in Kosova) created by virtue of Serbian violence and crimes." By overlooking the Serbian president's abusive record in Kosova, the British diplomacy to all intents and purposes takes the side of its "historical allies, Serbs and Montenegrins, while many a while during meetings with (Kosova) Albanians, it has proscribed their right to echo the past history." In newly created geostrategic conditions in South-Eastern Europe, the very insistence of the British "to seal off the Albanians in the dictatorial Serbian state" means keeping a flashpoint and a permanent source of crisis in the region, the BUJKU writer emphasizes. After elaborating the position of the British diplomacy to Albanians during World War II, "which was much the same, supportive of the Serbs and Montenegrins and, to a degree, Macedonians," Ibrahim Berisha says during trips to Kosova in the past few years, the "British diplomats have been seeking ways to encourage Albanians, especially from the former communist establishment," who would be acquiescent to Serbian interests. Such a policy has been pursued by the Russian diplomats, too, he adds. The BUJKU writer maintains the British diplomacy has discredited its right to get involved in the settlement of the Kosova and the Albanian question, and goes on to portray what he calls "double standards" of the British Government towards issues such as Kosova and the Northern Ireland. While insisting on "legitimizing Serbian occupation of Kosova," they have agreed to a "shared understanding" with the Irish Government towards the right of the Irish to self-determination. The British Prime Minister John Major himself has agreed to the right of the people of Northern Ireland to decide through free vote whether they wish to remain in the United Kingdom, or favor a united and sovereign Ireland, "as long as it reflects the democratic wish of a greater number of its people," the BUJKU writer recalls. He further refers to the "A New Framework for Agreement," presented jointly by Great Britain and the Irish Republic late in 1994, in which the right of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland to exercise self-determination is acknowledged. Such a right, the self-determination principle, acknowledged by the British to the Irish people, should be acknowledged to the Albanians and Kosova, too, the BUJKU writer stresses. "Ninety percent of the people of Kosova have stood for independence from Serbia in a national referendum conducted in 1991," Ibrahim Berisha concludes.

The alleged statement of the Belgrade-based British diplomat Ivor Roberts over the plight of Ulqin and the role of his country's diplomacy has been criticized by the strongest party gathering Albanians in Montenegro. Muhamet Nika, secretary of the Democratic League in Montenegro (LDMZ), said in a statement today (Wednesday) the British diplomacy should not "resort to an emotional attachment to its policy in the last century." The partitioning of Albanian lands in Montenegro has been done with "the blessing of the British, too," Mr. Nika said, quoting words of the British envoy in the Montenegrin-British Friendship Associations' founding convention. The Albanians in Montenegro expect support from the British Government to the realization of a "special status" for Albanians, the LDMZ official concluded.

**Kosovo: Travelers to Albania Risk Passport Confiscation**

*AU1202132796 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 8 Feb 96*

[BUJKU: "The Farce of Exit Visa Requirements"—KOSOVA DAILY REPORT headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Prishtina-based BUJKU newspaper carries today (Thursday) [8 February] a front-page leading article in which it features the problem facing the Kosova Albanians wishing to travel to Albania. The Belgrade regime has doggedly maintained in contacts with foreign delegation the Albanians who have a passport have "no problems whatsoever to travel to Albania or whatever country," BUJKU says. It suffices for Serb-Montenegrin policemen to spot that you have got a Cafasan (Qafe Thane) border crossing stamp (that is the FYROM [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] stamp) in your passport, or the mere fact that somebody has been seen on the Albanian TV, to be liable to heavy fines as well as deprivation of travelling rights up to three years, the BUJKU writer Nehat Islami writes.

According to the Prishtina-based [Pristina] Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) 119 Albanians had their passport confiscated last year because of a "Cafasan" or other stamp at the border crossings to Albania. "The number of those who had their passports confiscated or been in other ways punished is several times higher, because not all of those

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who have been affected have reported their case to the CDHRF, hoping they would solve their problem easier if they do not make their plight public," BUJKU writes. The legislation of former Yugoslavia adopted in 1979 (updated in 1981), still in force, stipulates that "citizens can travel without Yugoslav visas also to the countries with which Yugoslavia has not signed a treaty for dropping the visa requirement as long as there are diplomatic and consular offices in those countries," the Prishtina daily recalls, noting that such representative offices exist in Belgrade and Tirana, capitals of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia and Albania, respectively. Yet, the "legal basis" used to confiscate passports of Albanians or otherwise punish passport-holders who have been to Albania was laid down in a decree passed by the Former Yugoslavia Government, which is currently concealed to foreign delegations and others interested in the matter. The decree, published in the Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 68/81, says expressly that the disposition of Item 1, governing the issue, does not apply for Albania, BUJKU writes. Instead of engaging in lying, the best way is to immediately cancel the exit visa requirement for Albania, BUJKU concludes.

**Kosovo: Serbian Ruling Party Discusses Kosovo Policy**

*LD0802180796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1358 GMT 8 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pristina, 8 February (TANJUG)—The Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] has strengthened its position in Pristina and in Kosovo and Metohija as the most straightforward, attractive, organizationally strongest, and politically most influential party which made a remarkable contribution to stabilization in this region, it was said at today's electoral conference of the Pristina SPS.

The constitutional and legal administration of the Republic of Serbia have been established in Kosovo and Metohija and in Pristina, Zoran Gligorijevic, chairman of the [Pristina] SPS city council, said in his address. Personal safety and safety of all citizens' property, regardless of their religious or national affiliation, have also been secured.

The emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins has been stopped, the number of returnees is rising, secessionist fractions have been isolated from the governing bodies, and most important institutions, Gligorijevic added.

According to Gligorijevic and several other participants in the discussion, the assemblies of Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should pass appropriate laws in due time, and prepare regulations and a comprehensive program which would contribute to further stabilization of the region and improve the distorted national structure of the population. This will require, it was said, stable and realistic conditions of financing.

It is also necessary to envisage in the forthcoming statutory decision on Kosovo and Metohija a mechanism to prevent the Albanian majority overruling the Serb minority. [passage omitted]

## Vojvodina

**Vojvodina: Ethnic Hungarians Oppose Serb Resettlement**

*LD1202233496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 12 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian organizations of Vojvodina have repeatedly protested against the permanent resettlement of Krajina Serbs into the province. Telephone dispatch by Arpad Madarasz:

[Madarasz] The local government of Subotica has rejected an order by the Serbian Government and the ministry in charge to compile—within five days—a list of vacant houses and apartments suitable for moving in, parcels of land to be rented out, and job vacancies. This was announced by Subotica Mayor Jozsef Kasza at the local government's regular weekly press briefing.

Earlier the presidium of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM] called on the Hungarian mayors of Vojvodina not to observe the order. Jozsef Kasza, who, incidentally, is chairman of the other Hungarian organization, the Association of Vojvodina Hungarians, stressed that the intention of the final settlement of refugees had become very clear from the official note. The mayor referred to an earlier resolution of the local government, according to which neither the distribution of lands, nor the establishment of further settlements—consequently the alteration of the ethnic composition of the population in Vojvodina—should be allowed.

A similar position has been taken by a regional branch of the DZVM in Szenttamas in central Backa.

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